information resource and when possible, expand the use of Taipei's intelligence gathering capabilities. Mr. Wolff was told by Premier Chung Chiang-Kuo that the Taipei government has no remaining ties with the CIF forces. Furthermore, the stiff drug laws are preventing widespread domestic drug abuse and thus far we have experienced no drug problems with our military in Taiwan.

The information which the ROC provided to us concerning participation of the People's Republic of China in international narcotics trafficking is currently being checked out. At this point, no definitive confirmation of PRC participation has been made other than a documentation of their lack of cooperation in combating trafficking which occurs in their territorial waters and near their southern border.

The ROC analysts informed us that the Chinese Communists have close ties with the Burmese Communists. This has been confirmed and presents a threat since the Burmese Communists have been engaging in narcotics trafficking. We should be watching very closely the relation of the Shans to the Burmese Communists. The Shans are normally anti-Communist and yet with the increasing pressure being applied by the Burmese, they are being driven into an alliance with the Communists as their only means of preservation. This alliance would present new problems of major proportions to the United States and would hinder the achievement of a permanent solution in the region.

We should continue to use the intelligence of the Taipei forces to monitor the movements of the Chinese seamen who meet in Taipei and maintain our information exchange relating to activities inside the PRC and the Shan states where our intelligence is inadequate.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When the security of certain nations of Southeast Asia was threatened, the United States sent millions of our best youths and almost $200 billion to defend these nations from an insidious attack upon their independence. Yet when our Nation is threatened by an attack upon these self-same youths, some of whom fought and defended these Southeast Asian nations, the U.S. Government will not demand assistance in defending our youth from the virulence of a drug attack upon our shores nor will those Southeast Asian nations give up a few dirty dollars which they derive from the production or traffic of opium. We refuse to devote either the money or the manpower necessary to adequately cope with the drug problem. We must realize that the invasion of drugs is just as great as a military invasion of our shores. The number of deaths of our youths and the cost to society are greater than some distant threat to an ally 10,000 miles away. It should be met with the same commitment and funding which we have devoted to thwarting military threats. In the international arena, we should not hesitate to withdraw all support from any country which does not show the same commitment to the drug problem that we do to their defense. No country likes to be singled out as the cause of another country's problems. We do know however that international pressure has brought about constructive responses from both Turkey and Thailand in the past, and it can bring results in Burma which is the current stumbling block in Southeast Asia. We should not hesitate to mobilize international opinion through the U.N. and their drug enforcement organizations against all those who give just lip service to cooperation. Furthermore, we should give the drug problem the priority which it deserves in our overseas missions.

At present, State seems to downplay the narcotics issue and allow the preservation of our country to country relations to assume priority over the real threats to our country-the drug menace.

The training programs administered by DEA should be greatly expanded and their funding should be dramatically increased to a level commensurate with their awesome task. We should increase our training of overseas personnel in all aspects of narcotics enforcement and increase substantially our overseas forces. It is here where the battle must be joined. We cannot expect our 30 DEA agents in the Asian countries to be able to control the 700 tons of illicit opium which are produced annually. It would take an army of U.S. military personnel standing shoulder to shoulder over every mile of our border, to stop drugs from entering the United States and even then this would be ineffective. Once the drugs are broken into small refined lots, the difficulties of detection and interdiction are geometrically increased. It is easier and more economical to stop these drugs at their source.

At the present time, there are three major networks which can be used to supply the United States. One originates or transits through

Mexico, the second begins in Turkey and moves through France and the third begins in Southeast Asia.

Narcotics control funding, which should be separated from the AID budget, should be so set up that the "resources" can be moved freely to deal with the demand of changing situations and current conditions. We should especially concentrate on the Golden Triangle area because once the illicit drugs are in the pipeline, even if it is 5,000 miles from our shores, the battle against addiction is almost lost. We have to focus our efforts where they can do the most good and that is on the growing fields wherever they exist. Our customs operations and "busts" of narcotics rings will never solve the major problem because the profit motive is too strong in narcotics and new rings will always spring up. If we dry up the supply, we will not only frustrate the demand but we will withdraw the source for the traffickers before they can make their profit.

The real success in the control aspect of narcotics traffic comes from enforcement cooperation. Police from the various countries can act when embassies cannot. I think it is important to emphasize this enforcement agency contact and keep the State Department and its counterparts out of the effort wherever possible The narcotics traffic has a serious impact upon the citizens of the United States, and it must be impressed upon the foreign representatives of our government that this is a top priority of the overseas mission because of its direct impact upon the United States. This should be as important as the counter-insurgency which we support in the various affected nations. It must be emphasized that the drug war is one of the battles that must be won if we are to survive to help fight anyone elses insurgency battle

We feel that the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control has been very helpful in organizing Far Eastern drug control coordination. There is, however, a real need for an information coordination center which would process the information gathered by agents in different countries. The United States could be instrumental in providing the computer time and setting up the system. Interpol operates along the same lines as the coordinating body which we envisage for the Far East, but Interpol does not do an effective job in Southeast Asia. Narcotics smuggling does not respect national borders, and there is a clear need to improve the communication from the agents in one country to another when they are following a suspected trafficker. This information system could provide updated data sheets on suspected traffickers and also on suspected vehicles, boats, and routes.

Up to the present time, intergovernmental cooperation has been slow in developing. Furthermore, the goal of cooperation should be a complete and frank interchange of intelligence on producers, financiers, traffickers, routes and users. As a corollary we suggest forming a working group with representatives of Western nations which are faced with the problems of drug addiction, .e., Holland, Canada, France, Germany, the United States, and others who want to do something constructive about the trafficking. The idea would be to mobilize a functional group from the affected countries. For too long, each country has tried to say drug abuse is someone else's problem. Drug traffic is an international problem which threatens to get worse unless decisive and constructive action is taken.

On another aspect, we should work for the cooperation of the Peoples Republic of China in the next few months concerning joint patroling of the waters off their coast which are used as drops for the Hong Kong junks which pick up the drugs from ocean-going vessels. PRC forces made a significant seizure in November off their coast of a ship which was carrying several tons of opium. They may now be ready to work more actively with international efforts. Up to this point, they have only been observers. They have still not signed the Single Convention. There continue to be rumors of PRC's indirect involvement in the Golden Triangle area and in the production of opium for illicit channels.

Drug abuse is a major threat to our national security and to the American way of life. The quality of life is seriously threatened while drug abuse is rampant. The cost in terms of both lives and money cries out for a solution. To date, however, the United States has made the commitment based mainly on words. It is time to translate the words into action. What is it worth to make a dent in the $27 billion U.S. crime bill? What is it worth to save a single U.S. life, no less the 4,500 who died of overdoses during the past year?

What is it worth to save a generation of Americans from the scourge of drug abuse? What is it worth to stop the impairment of our military effectiveness through cutting off the supply of drugs to our servicemen? The answers now are in the hands of the Department of State.