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and we hope that with the reorganization of the equipment request procedure in the United States, our actions will support our words, and there will be no further delays. This report is concerned with seeing our commitment translated into action-something which has not yet occurred to the extent required.

BURMESE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

The Burmese are certainly a most important key to the whole problem that begins in the Golden Triangle. Approximately a third of the area in territorial Burma is not controlled by the central government. Furthermore, there is a serious lack of communication with these remote and inaccessible regions. Burma follows a nonalignment policy; it distrusts foreigners, and the insurgent problem is their first priority. Seemingly, the only real reason they will involve themselves in anti-narcotics efforts is if it will have some effect on their counter-insurgency battle. On this point, there is little or no Burma-United States narcotics cooperation and there is less ThaiBurmese cooperation. The traffickers use this to advantage. When the Thais chase refinery operators, all the operators have to do to elude capture is clear the border. Then, they can simply thumb their noses at the Thais-the pursuit ends because the Thais cannot cross the border.

Unfortunately, our State Department has reinforced the priorities of the Burmese by making anti-narcotics cooperation a second priority to the battle against the insurgents. Our major concern with Burma should be its influence on the traffickers as this is related to our national interest of controlling drug abuse. We should not stop short of withdrawing recognition from the Burmese Government if they will not cooperate fully with us in trying to cut off the flow of illegal narcotics which originate inside their border. At the least, we should demand that they abide by the procedures outlined in the Single Convention on Narcotics to which they are a signatory.

Burma, at present, is not seriously concerned with its own addict population even though it numbers over 100,000. The Burmese will be more apt to take some constructive action if international pressure to curb production were coordinated by the United Nations and focused on Burma. International pressure to take constructive action is much more effective than U.S. pressure alone. Although Burma has recently agreed to accept five U.S. helicopters, ostensibly for narcotics control, Burma remains steadfastly xenophobic in its external relations and works hard at appearing unaligned, politically, often to the point of foreswearing any outside aid or assistance save from the U.N. and only then on a selective basis.

Some segments of our government see it as a major step toward cooperation that the Burmese are now willing to accept our helicopters. We think it should be noted that our Ambassador is not allowed to leave the city of Rangoon, and no DEA agents are allowed to remain in the country. When we provide the Burmese with the helicopters, we will have no check on how they are used. One should further note that the Burmese originally requested large, troopcarrying helicopters which certainly undermines the sincerity of their pledge to use the helicopters for anti-narcotics programs, and not for anti-insurgency. At the present time, the entire Burmese forces only

have two operational helicopters in the entire country. We do not think that the helicopters will serve in a constructive fashion in turning the corner against narcotics traffic. We think the Congress should give serious consideration to the requirement that a DEA agent be permitted to enter Burma and that we have definite proof that Burma is seriously concerned with anti-narcotics programs before we provide any helicopters.

We are well aware of the impact which our dealings with the Shan representatives will have on our relations with the Burmese, but we feel we should evaluate objectively how successful our cooperative efforts with Burma have been and what the consequences of alienating the Burmese would be in relation to the ends that might be gained.

For many years, the Southeast Asian countries have tolerated the hundreds of thousands of opium smoking addicts who exist in their countries. This was a condition with which they could cope.

However, a new dimension to the addict problem now is the involvement of the young people, particularly those in the urbanized areas. They are addicts in the full, Western, sense. The basic reason that the Southeast Asian countries recognize that they have a problem now is that the narcotic being abused is No. 3 or No. 4 heroin which is smoked or injected; it is no longer a matter of opium being smoked. The young addict population is beginning to create the same economic and criminal problems with which the Western countries are faced.

For the first time, the officials of many of these countries have agreed that addiction is a problem for them. This serves as a true incentive to create an effective narcotics control force. The actual numbers of addicts in each country are not known but the fact that a large portion of the society, hundreds of thousands in Hong Kong, Burma and Thailand, is involved is enough to insure that these countries will be more interested in doing something about narcotics in the future.

Heretofore, most grower nations considered the addiction problem as peculiar to the United States. They considered our efforts to stamp out this scourge as an attempt by the United States to solve a unilateral problem through a bilateral effort which was a hardship for the grower since it deprived them of a cash crop. They never really seemed to care about or contribute to the solution of the problem. Now, plagued with the problem themselves, they are in a mood to assist.

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

JAPAN

Japan does not have a major drug trafficking problem at the present time that would have a negative influence on the U.S. drive to keep illicit drugs out of our country. Although heroin consumption is on the rise in Japan, their most serious problem concerns the abuse of pills.

The statistics of law enforcement seizures in Japan are very encouraging. It should be noted, however, that while Japan has made progress, the quantities seized have been very small. Our DEA staff size has increased fourfold in recent years and is now at a level commensurate with their responsibility. Our DEA officials are receiving excellent cooperation from the Japanese. We are working very closely with the Japanese to monitor suspected drug couriers who pass through Japan and for the first time, Japanese officials are launching investigations of their own. They seem to be preparing well for the possibility that as Hong Kong controls become more stringent, Japan could become a major transit point. At the present time, most of the heroin, Gangha and Buddha Grass which is consumed in Japan comes from the Golden Triangle countries.

We feel that Japan can be very helpful to the United States in curbing traffic in drugs from Southeast Asia in several specific ways. We should continue to work with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry to create adequate controls or a more effective monitoring system over the export of acetic anhydride to the Golden Triangle countries and Hong Kong. Acetic anhydride is essential for the refining of heroin. Although acetic anhydride has many industrial uses, in countries like Thailand and Burma, a major portion of the acetic anhydride is devoted to narcotics refining. This is one link in the trafficking picture which can be further exploited.

We should work with Japanese authorities to help control the escalating pill problem which they face, which could effect our diplomatic community or our military personnel in the region. We are aware of the overproduction of amphetamines and barbiturates in Japan and narcotics officers have already seized large quantities of the precursors. We should work with the State Department to provide the resources to bring the high-ranking Japanese narcotics officials over here for a sophisticated DEA training course, and possibly send a course over there which the DEA could run for 1 or 2 weeks. This will help them to combat their problems and prevent it from spilling over to the United States and other countries.

Japan has already recognized the need to increase the surveillance of air travelers in Japan and the air crews who may be involved in narcotics trafficking. These efforts should certainly be linked to a region-wide information system which would help Japanese officials (30)

to follow individuals suspected of narcotics trafficking. Japan is certainly not at a crisis level of drug abuse or drug production. We should be able to work with them in a preventive program so that their narcotics situation remains under control.

SOUTH KOREA

The drug abuse problems in South Korea are not very serious at the present time, but we should plan on providing greater assistance in the form of funds and equipment if we want to help Korea keep the situation under control.

Heroin abuse in Korea is minimal, even in the military. Some LSD is consumed but not on a large scale. Marihuana is raised in Korea and consumed but there is no evidence of buddha sticks or hashish oil. At the present time, the farmers do not know much about marihuana nor the marihuana market, which helps to keep domestic production down. A widespread drug abuse public information campaign could prove to be counterproductive in this respect.

The only real problem which Korea is beginning to have is the abuse of barbiturates. There is an overproduction in the Republic of Korea and because of the scarcity of medical doctors, barbiturates are not considered prescription drugs. The rural people rely on the pharmacists for medical advice. The fear, from the United States' perspective, is that our military may abuse the barbiturates because they can readily buy these drugs without a prescription in any Korean pharmacy. In anticipation of this we now have a search of all of the military before they return home; this includes the use of dogs which are trained for marihuana.

Our DEA staff is currently below an adequate level, but we have a trained official available who has language capability and he should be phased into our mission. The real need is for more equipment and supplies of gasoline. The DEA is currently rationed 21⁄2 gallons of gasoline per day. This is not enough for them to leave their central post and make a serious investigation anywhere in the country. To help the Koreans, and they are willing to help us, we must provide more jeeps, walkie talkies and radios for the cars to improve our communication in the field. Korea, unlike other areas where U.S. troops are stationed does not present the narcotics vulnerability to which U.S. servicemen are exposed. Strong enforcement activities and tough, imposed sentences discourage local participation in drug traffic. For U.S. troops this can be considered a "safe" area, in fact in most circumstances safer than U.S. stations.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Republic of China is only a participant in international narcotics trafficking indirectly. First of all, Taipei is often the meeting place for high-level couriers. Secondly, Taipei has had connections with the Chinese Irregular Forces under the direction of General Li and General Tuan who head the 2d and 5th CIF divisions. The Government has taken constructive actions in response to each of these situations. ROC officials currently provide the United States with information about the traffickers who frequent Taipei and this allows us to follow them when they leave Taipei. We should continue to make use of this

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