INTRODUCTION

EVER since the application of theories of evolution to social phenomena, there has been a constant interchange in terminology between biology and sociology; societies have been called organisms, and organisms societies of cells. There is an actual division of labour among the organs of a living body, while institutions have been called the organs, or parts of organs, of Society. The interchange of matter effected among the organs of an individual has been called a "physiological contract," while the circulation of money may be compared to the circulation of blood and lymph. Questions arise as to what extent such comparisons are legitimate, if they should be taken in any other than a metaphorical sense, and if it is possible to set a precise boundary between the provinces of biology and sociology.

Much has already been written on such problems as these, and no doubt much more will yet be written. We shall not attempt either to discuss or to solve them in these few introductory pages; they are merely touched upon here, and will only be alluded to when absolutely necessary for the careful investigation of facts bearing upon our work.

I. Societies and organisms. The analogy exist

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ing, from the point of view of evolution, between biology and sociology, arises from the fact that the evolution of societies as well as that of organisms, is the result of the co-operation of two factorssimilarity and adaptation.

In biology, the similarity between organisms springing from the same stock, is due to heredity, while adaptation is the result of individual variation.

In sociology, societies are the descendants of former societies, in that the new are modelled upon the old. Similarity is the result of imitation, while adaptation is the result of invention -ie. of all improv ment and innovation tending to make a new society different from that which preceded it.1

These fundamental analogies suffice in themselves to justify our collaboration, whatever may be the solution of the question-which is really only a question of terms-as to whether societies should be regarded as organisms, or organisms as particular kinds of societies,2

1 Invention is frequently a combination of several imitations. When a society is formed, its characters are not necessarily borrowed from those societies from which it more or less directly proceeds. It may be modelled upon other social structures with which it had no hereditary connection.-V. Tarde, Les Lois de l'imitation.

2 See Les Sociétés animales, p. 128 (Espinas). "Integration, or grouping together, is a universal law common to all organic or inorganic existence. Society, properly speaking, is only a complex and important instance of this universal law."

See La Science Sociale, p. 97 (Fouillée). "All purely physio

In either case, it is certain that organisms and societies used in the sociological acceptation of the term-exhibit some characters in common, and some distinctive characters.

The common characters may be accounted for by the co-operation which exists in both cases between the units of which they are composed (individuals, or cells).

The dissimilar characters are probably connected with what constitutes the essential difference between social aggregates and organic aggregates. With the former there is a physiological continuity between the composing units, while with the latter co-operation is entirely due to mental relations.

II. Individuals, colonies and societies.-Our view in this matter is considerably at variance with the current opinion. Many authors, and M. Espinas among them, regard colonies, whether animal or vegetable, as societies, even when the members of these colonies are connected by physiological bonds.1

logical characters of life, viz.: 1. Correlation of parts; 2. Relation between structure and function; 3. Division of all living parts into other living parts; 4. Spontaneity of movement; 5. Particulate existence; 6. Development and degeneration, i.e. evolution, are to be found in a greater extent in animal and human societies." 1 See Les Sociétés animales, section 2, pp. 207 and foll.— (Espinas), Cours de philosophie positive, vol. iv. (A Comte). "These strange societies are to be found among the lower animals, an involuntary co-operation being the result of an unseverable organic union, which is either a mere adherence or actual continuity."

We shall justify the distinction we make by showing that colonies are entirely distinct from societies. The two are divergent branches which spring from the same source, a solitary individual. These divergent branches of organic life may be distinguished in the following manner : An individual may be either unicellular or multicellular. Every cell capable of sustaining life and reproducing its own kind is an individual.1

In the case of multicellular individuals there is an unbroken physiological continuity, while life lasts, between the cells of which they are composed. All these units spring from one primary cell (i.e. a fertilized egg) which sprang itself from two cells (male and female), proceeding usually from two separate individuals. From the moment that this union is effected, the continuity remains unbroken.2 When such an individual reproduces

1 We regard the cell as the unit of life, although, according to Altmann, the unit of life is a still simpler structure-the bioblast. He maintains that the bioblast, or living granule, is the ultimate element of the cell; it is born from a pre-existing granule; it lives, feeds, reproduces, and is, in fact, an organism (see Die Elementarorganismen und ihre Beziehungen zu den Zellen; Leipzig, 1890.—Studien über die Zellen; Leipzig, 1886.-Zur Geschichte der Zelltheorien; Leipzig, 1889 (Altmann). The existence, however, of the bioblast is a pure hypothesis, no definite proof having been established of its existence; and to assume that it is the simplest unit of life is to abandon oneself to pure imagination.

2 Although this theory is in agreement with the observed facts of biology, it is necessary to point out the complexity of the ideas of individual and organism. Boveri (Über die Befruchtungs

asexually, giving rise to offspring which remain attached to it, the whole forms a colony. All the cells of this colony spring then from one single cell (a fertilized egg cell), and an interchange of nutriment goes on incessantly among these cells. This is what Spencer designates as a "physiological contract." Societies, on the other hand, consist of units springing from various sources, whose connection is merely mental. It is only in the communities which Tonnies calls "Gemeinschaften," in distinction from societies bound by mental agreement (Gesellschaften), that all the individuals spring from one and the same couple.

From our point of view, a colony must not be regarded as an intermediate condition between an individual and a society. No known society has passed through a colonial stage, and the members of a colony could not, on separating, become a society. Among the simplest aggregates, all the units are und Entwicklungsfähigkeit kernloser Seeigel-Eier, und über the Möglichkeit ihrer Bastardirung. Arch. f. Entwicklungsmechanik der Organismen, Bd. ii., pp. 394-443), for instance, has shown that it is possible to fertilize the eggs of Echinoderms, from which the nuclei have been removed, by the spermatozoa of other species of Echinoderms. The egg is a typical cell, an organism, an individual. All its parts are essential to it, and are incapable of separate existence, at any rate for any length of time; close physiological bonds unite the component parts, yet it is possible to substitute for an essential part of one individual a part taken from another individual. It may therefore be concluded that the idea of an organism no longer necessarily implies the idea of continuous functional unity which one was formerly tempted to ascribe to it.