officer is conclusive and contradictory evidence is properly rejected. If the documents are properly authenticated they are admissible. Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, supra, 478 F.2d at 903.

Petitioner contends that certain documents were inadmissible because they refer to attachments which were not included. This contention is rejected since it goes to weight and credibility which cannot be reviewed by this Court on the habeas petition. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, supra, 478 F.2d at 905. These reports by the bank examiners and the liquidator were based upon detailed and thorough investigation and were corroborated by other depositions. They were not "extracts." To require that each document involving a bankruptcy be included in a bank examiner's or liquidator's report as an exhibit to a complaint in extradition would defeat the purpose of the Treaty and require the standard already rejected-proof of a prima facie case.

The document accompanying Pontello's statement (Enclosure No. 5) is partially illegible, as is the English translation. However, as the Government points out, Pontello fully sets forth in his deposition the origin, significance and explanation of that document so that once again only weight and credibility are affected.

In my opinion there is no question that the evidence contained in Enclosures No. 1-9 established that BPI was a bankrupt and that Sindona was a director within the meaning of the fraudulent bankruptcy statute. His intent was a fact to be inferred from the evidence. It cannot be said that the inference which was drawn by the magistrate was incorrect.

[The next portion of Judge Werker's opinion discussed Sindona's allegations that his restraint was unlawful because: the offenses were of a political character and thus exempt from extradition under article VI of the Treaty; that his extradition was being sought to punish him for his political beliefs and violated his right to be free from political persecution under article 33 of the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; that the magistrate refused to hear and consider evidence of such political persecution and denied him the opportunity to call witnesses to support those claims; and that the magistrate refused to hear and consider evidence showing that Sindona would face death or grave bodily harm if returned to Italy.]

Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11

Under article VI (5) of the Treaty, extradition is not permitted for offenses of a political character or when the request has been made with a view to trying or punishing the person for an offense of a political character.

While the question of whether an offense is of a political character is a mixed question of law and fact, it is chiefly one of fact to

be resolved on the evidence, and as such it is not reviewable by this Court. ... [Citations omitted.] Even so, there is no doubt in my mind that the charges against Sindona do not fall within the political offense exception.

Sindona's contention that the request for extradition was politically motivated is similarly unconvincing, for the motives of the requesting country are not within the jurisdiction of the Court but are reserved for the province of the Secretary of State. GarciaGuillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972); In re Lincoln, 288 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651, 36 S.Ct. 721, 60 L.Ed. 1222 (1916).

Moreover, it is clear that Sindona falls within the "serious crimes" exception of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 UST 6259, TIAS No. 6577, which provides that the convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that

"(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside of the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee . . . ." Id. Ärt. 1 (F) (b).

Finally, Sindona contends that he faces grave bodily harm if he is returned to Italy. This matter is also exclusively within the discretion of the Secretary of State, who can deny extradition on humanitarian grounds if it appears that the petitioner faces danger or that the Treaty is not being respected and carried out. Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 787, 50 L.Ed.2d 778 (1977). See also Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 391, 395, 499 F.2d 527, 531 (1974), aff'd 424 U.S. 614, 96 S.Ct. 1062, 47 L.Ed.2d 278 (1976); Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965).

Paragraph 12 of the Petition

Sindona's claim that the magistrate failed to specify the offense for which he was certifying extraditability, Shapiro v. Ferrardina, supra, is completely without merit. Judge Griesa fully met his duty to define the charges against the petitioner and specifically found that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that Sindona had committed the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, as defined by articles 216 and 223 of the Italian Bankruptcy Law. 450 F.Supp. at 687-88.

Judge Werker addressed, in conclusion, due process issues raised in Sindona's reply memorandum, regarding certain civil actions pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, some since 1974, in which Sindona was a defendant. Sindona had also been advised that he was a "target" of a grand jury sitting in the Southern District, and that he had been named as an unindicted coconspirator in a criminal proceeding. Sindona contended that his extradition should be delayed until either the criminal and civil suits had

been concluded or his assistance were no longer required by counsel, and alleged that, otherwise, his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment would be violated. As to this, Judge Werker said:

While the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees an individual the right to be heard before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), which includes the right of access to the courts, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 896, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed. 2d 224 (1974), it does not grant immunity to an individual who falls within the category of persons extraditable under treaties existing between this country and friendly nations.

I consequently find no merit in petitioner's contentions.

461 F. Supp. 199, 204–208.

Sindona appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, No. 78-2155. By an order, May 3, 1979, the case was remanded to the district court, pending disposition of a second petition for habeas corpus which Sindona had also filed.

On June 10, 1978, Jacques Rene Berenguer, a French citizen, was extradited from the United States to Italy to stand trial on charges of murder and aggravated robbery.

Berenguer had been arrested for narcotics offenses in New York City on August 18, 1976. He had pleaded guilty to two felonious narcotics offenses under United States law, had been convicted on November 19, 1976 (United States v. Berenguer et al., No. 76–2829 (S.D.N.Y.)), and had been sentenced to the Federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

In the meantime, the Embassy of Italy had submitted a request to the Department of State on August 20, 1976, for his provisional arrest, pursuant to article 13 of the Treaty on Extradition with Italy, signed January 18, 1973 (TIAS 8042; 26 UST 493; entered into force March 11, 1975), predicated upon unexecuted warrants of arrest issued by various Italian courts or authorities in 1974, 1975, and 1976, for homicide, double aggravated homicide and robbery, complicity in kidnapping, and kidnapping for purposes of extortion.

On April 18, 1977, the Embassy had submitted a formal request for Berenguer's extradition, with supporting documentation, and had asked for him to be kept in custody pending completion of extradition proceedings. On April 6, 1978, Chief Judge William J. Nealon of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held an extradition hearing, and on April 13, 1978, issued a certificate of extraditability and order of commitment for murder and aggravated robbery (proceedings No. 78-32, Misc., U.S.D.C., M.D., Pa.), covered by sections 1 and 10, respectively, of article II of the 1973

Treaty. After reviewing the finding of the Court, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher issued a warrant for Berenguer's delivery and surrender to the Government of Italy on May 25, 1978, and on June 10 his extradition was effected.

On November 13, 1978, the Embassy of Italy requested the Department of State, pursuant to article XV of the 1973 Treaty (which provides in paragraph 3 for waiver of the rule of specialty by consent of the surrendering state), to consent to Berenguer's being tried also on offenses set out in a warrant issued by an investigating judge of the Tribunal of Rome on September 15, 1976.

Additional documentation and information communicated by Italian officials during ensuing discussions with the Departments of State and Justice were considered sufficient to establish probable cause to conclude that Berenguer had committed the offense of illegal possession of a military firearm (covered in section 29 of article II of the 1973 Treaty). The Embassy of Italy submitted its request on December 21 to cover that specific offense, and the Department of State conveyed the United States consent in a note of the same date reading in part:

The Department of State and the Department of Justice have carefully reviewed the documents transmitted by the Embassy in connection with this request. On the basis of these documents, it has been determined that the offense of possession of a military firearm is punishable under the laws of both the United States and Italy and is an offense covered by the Extradition Treaty, that there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Jacques Rene Berenguer was involved in the commission of that offense, and that the individual sought to be tried is the person to whom the evidence relates.

Dept. of State File Nos. P76 0130-1551, P76 0135-0265, P79 0108-1329, P78 0100-2090, P79 0108-1331, P79 0108–1336, and P79 0096–0753.

On Feb. 12, 1979, criminal proceedings began in Italy against Berenguer and 37 other co-defendants.

On Mar. 26, 1979, Berenguer filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to have the Secretary ordered to revoke the consent of the United States to his trial in Italy for the crime of possession of a military firearm and seeking to have the United States effect his return to the country for a hearing like that required for initial extradition, before enlargement of the extradition could be effected.

Art. XV of the 1973 Treaty on Extradition with Italy reads:

ARTICLE XV

A person extradited under the present Treaty shall not be detained, tried or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than that for which extradition has been granted nor be extradited by that Party to a third State unless:

1. He has left the territory of the requesting Party after his extradition and has voluntarily returned to it;

2. After being free to do so, he has not left the territory of the requesting State within forty-five days; or

3. The requested Party has consented to his detention, trial and punishment for an offense other than that for which extradition was granted, or to his extradition to a third State.

These stipulations shall not apply to offenses committed after the extradition.

86

Protection of Human Rights

General

At a White House meeting on December 6, 1978, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, President Carter reaffirmed the United States commitment to use its influence to enhance the cause of human rights throughout the world, which, he stressed, was at the core, and not the periphery of United States foreign policy. Portions of his remarks follow:

This week we commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We rededicate ourselves... to the Universal Declaration as . "a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations."

The Universal Declaration and the human rights conventions that derive from it do not describe the world as it is. But these documents are very important, nonetheless. They are a beacon, a guide to a future of personal security, political freedom, and social justice.

For millions of people around the globe that beacon is still quite distant, a glimmer of light on a dark horizon of deprivation and repression

Political killings, tortures, arbitrary and prolonged detention, without trial or without a charge, these are the cruelest and the ugliest of human rights violations. Of all human rights, the most basic is to be free of arbitrary violence, whether that violence comes from government, from terrorists, from criminals, or from selfappointed messiahs operating under the cover of politics or religion. But governments-because of their power, which is so much greater than that of an individual-have a special responsibility. The first duty of a government is to protect its own citizens, and when government itself becomes the perpetrator of arbitrary violence against its citizens, it undermines its own legitimacy.

There are other violations of the body and the spirit which are especially destructive of human life. Hunger, disease, poverty are