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1979 General Program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Mr. Stibravy added that the United States Government intended to request further funds for this purpose to be provided during the course of the 1979 operational year. Mr. Stibravy noted:

Today's pledge represents a significant departure from our past practice of withholding such announcements until later in the year. We are taking this step out of recognition of the urgent humanitarian tasks the UNHCR has before it and our confidence in that organization's ability to be promptly responsive to the plight of refugees and persons displaced as a result of manmade disasters throughout the world. Of particular immediate concern, and reflected in our initial contribution, are the needs of Indochinese, African, and Latin American refugees who are struggling for their very survival

Press Release USUN-123 (78), Nov. 17, 1978.

Organization of American States

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By a letter, February 24, 1978, to the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Ambassador Galo Leoro of Ecuador, the United States Permanent Representative, Ambassador Gale W. McGee, requested the Permanent Council to give its urgent attention to the matter of reducing the United States quota (66 percent) of the Organization's assessed budget. Ambassador McGee's letter read:

The United States Delegation has stated on several occasions in forums of the Organization of American States that it considers it inappropriate for one member to be responsible for 66 percent of the Organization's assessed budget. Secretaries of State Kissinger and Vance referred to this problem at the last two regular sessions of the General Assembly and explained the reasons why my Government believes it politically undesirable for any one country to pay two-thirds of the normal operating expenses of our 25-nation OAS. The Government of the United States believes that this matter requires the urgent attention of the Permanent Council, and that a firm proposal to achieve a reduction in its quota from 66 percent to 49 percent of the assessed budget should be submitted to the Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly. In his budget for Fiscal Year 1979, President Carter anticipated a reduction in the quota and has suggested to the Congress that the U.S. quota portion for 1979 be set at 62 percent.

My Government recognizes that any reduction in its quota must be effected in accordance with the Charter and in consonance with its provisions. Hence, it is my purpose to request that this matter be given urgent attention in order that a mutually agreeable formula for resolving this question can be found.

Allow me to point out that my Delegation's concern is directed to the assessed budget, not the Voluntary Funds. It is my Govern

ment's expectation that the United States will continue to contribute up to 66 percent of the payments to the Voluntary Funds on a matching basis.

The United States Delegation is prepared to work with all the other delegations in reviewing this matter and in devising an acceptable formula. We would appreciate it if this subject can be considered in the Permanent Council so that the views of all the members can be heard and we can establish a new basis for assessed budget sharing.

OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/Doc. 787/78, Feb. 28, 1978.

The Permanent Council took up the United States letter at its regular meeting on March 8, at which Ambassador McGee, speaking in its support, said in part:

I want to underscore the sense of urgency of this matter, but in doing so I want to stress one other factor, and that is that we would like to consult with all of our colleagues in the Permanent Council on how to proceed in these steps to come to grips with the question of a reassessment formula. It has been laid down that we look toward a 49 percent contribution from the United States in various stages of adjustment. One projection that you are aware of was for a 10-year period to make that possible; another was a 5-year period. Already we are confronted, through my Government's budget process, with the hope to get a 62 percent adjustment for starts.

However, we are also mindful that this body makes its own decisions on these matters, and that is the reason we seek the consultation with you on some meaningful way to proceed.

I would have to say, since some of these items occurred before I was honored to be a part of the Permanent Council, that there is no rigidity as such, no mandate as such that is not negotiable, but rather that the urgency lies with confronting the wisdom of a meaningful and fair adjustment, a bit of an adjustment at both ends, as one of the studies has also indicated. Given the inflationary factors and other considerations in the Organization, we would have to look once more at the minimum charge for governments at the same time that we assess what the maximum charges ought to be for any one nation

We think it is very important that the Organization make the decision and not that it be imposed on my mission from the outside by political circumstances in the country. I happen to be one of those who believe very strongly in the negotiated process in international organizations and that we should honor and respect it. But we can see likewise that we are coming up to that time in the climate of some public opinion in our country, reflected in congressional opinion, that will require a meaningful re-evaluation.

It is in that context that we ask your cooperation to assist us in trving to do this as equitably as it can be done, at the same time, being as realistic as the circumstances of the political climate of the moment dictate. We believe in doing it under our procedural responsibilities in the OAS, rather than under unilateral mandates

that come because of whatever motivation produces the action in a given government.

It is in the same context, then, that we would urge the members of the Permanent Council to join us in striving to find an equitable formula, and I would therefore suggest . . . that this be referred to the General Committee ...

Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo Permanente de la Organización (Proceedings of the Regular Meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organization), Mar. 8, 1978, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/ACTA 318/78, Mar. 8, 1978 pp. 1011.

After discussion, the Permanent Council decided to refer the letter to the General Committee, which had the subject under study, and to request the General Secretariat to prepare a technical study, taking into account the member states' ability to pay. Ibid., pp. 45, 48. See, also, the Summary of the meeting (in the English language), OEA/Ser.G, CP/SA.318/78, Mar. 8, 1978, par. 5 (CP/SA. 318/78(5)).

The U.S. note of Apr. 26, 1977 (OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc. 693/77, corr.1, May 16, 1977; see the 1977 Digest, pp. 44-45), also concerning reduction of the U.S. share of the assessed costs of the Organization, had been referred to the General Committee by the Permanent Council at its regular meeting on Sept. 14, 1977. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/SA.297/77, par. 6 (CP/SA.297/77(6)).

The OAS General Assembly, at its eighth regular session, held at Washington, D.C., June 21-July 1, 1978, adopted Res. AG/RES.363 (VIII-0/78), which extended the mandate of the Permanent Council to present its study on the bases of financing of the program-budget of the Organization to the General Assembly at the (upcoming) Sixth Special Session and to propose a financing formula for the Organization. Under the third operative paragraph of Res. AG/RES.363 (VIII-0/78) the percentage scale of quotas was retained at the level approved at the Fifth Special Session (Res. AG/RES.321 (V-E/77)) until the General Assembly should take a final decision in the matter. Organization of American States General Assembly, Proceedings, 8th Regular Session, Washington, D.C., June 21-July 1, 1978, Vol. 1 (1978), p. 83.

The Sixth Special Session of the OAS General Assembly was convoked under AG/RES.355 (VIII-0/78), July 1, 1978 (ibid., pp. 66-68), to approve the level of appropriations for the second year (1979) of the biennium 1978-1979 for the Organization's program-budget and to determine quotas for the regular fund and voluntary contributions for the special multilateral funds. Under Res. AG/ RES.378 (VI-E/78), adopted Nov. 28, 1978, the Sixth Special Session voted to convoke a special session of the General Assembly in the second quarter of 1979, in order to conduct a broad and complete study of the bases of financing of the program-budget, if progress made in the study called for in Res. AG/RES.363 (VIII-0/78), ante, permitted. Organization of American States General Assembly, Proceedings, 6th Special Session, Washington, D.C., Nov. 20-28, 1978, Vol. 1, (1979), p. 5.

F. POWERS AND RULES OF ORGANS

United Nations

Section 503 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Public Law 95-105, August 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 844, 858), required

the United States to make a major effort toward reform and restructuring of the United Nations system, to present a program for such reform to the United Nations Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, and to report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations upon recommendations for these purposes to be made by the United States. One area of congressional concern was the decisionmaking process in the United Nations, and section 503 called for the United States to give consideration to proposals which would adjust them "by providing voting in the General Assembly weighted according to population and contributions and by modifying veto powers on certain categories of questions, such as membership recommendations, in the Security Council." The President's report stated in this regard:

DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN THE UNITED NATIONS Weighted Voting in the General Assembly and Modified Veto Powers in the Security Council

There is no prospect for the adoption of a generally applicable weighted-voting system in the General Assembly. Even on a limited basis it has little likelihood of being accepted. In fact, pressure for change has been in the opposite direction: to replace weighted voting in global institutions where it now exists with decisionmaking procedures on the model of the General Assembly. The tradeoffs proposed, which involve sharp curtailment of our veto power in the Security Council, are not in U.S. interests. Nor do we believe they would serve the organization well.

Therefore, it would be better to employ our efforts toward defining voluntary but common standards to curtail the use of the veto in the Security Council and reduce the necessity of invoking it.

We are also prepared to examine the offer to very small new states of some form of associate status with the United Nations, short of full membership and voting privileges.

Consensus Decision

Consensus offers an alternative to formal voting as a way of arriving at decisions. It is increasingly used in the General Assembly and other U.N. organs. We hope that genuine consensus will become the principal method of conciliation in the continuing North/South dialogue in the United Nations. We are prepared to give substantially greater weight in our national policy to decisions so arrived at. Dept. of State, Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, Selected Docs., No. 8 (1978), p. 8; Sen. Comm. Print, Proposals for United Nations Reform, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978), p. 4.

The accompanying report of the Secretary of State discussed the proposals set forth in section 503 and the problems they presented in greater detail. It read in part, as follows:

DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Proposals for Weighted Voting in the General Assembly Proposals for weighted voting in the General Assembly are not new. They have engaged the attention of government officials and political scientists almost from the inception of the United Nations. A wide variety of possible weighted voting formulas has been constructed and analyzed, aimed at better reflecting the political, military, and economic strength of member states, the size of their populations, their consequent ability to play an effective part in world affairs, and their capabilities for giving concrete support to actions called for by U.N. resolutions.

Some proposals have called for the introduction of weighted voting in the General Assembly on an across-the-board basis. Others have envisaged the application of a weighted voting procedure only to certain specified types of questions, such as those involving budgetary matters.

Related proposals have urged amendment of the rules of procedure to include as states present and voting those states abstaining on a vote (at present they are not, which means that resolutions may be approved with the support of only a minority of the membership of the United Nations), or establishment of a special budget committee which would give major contributors control with respect to U.N. financial matters or at least assure that no decisions on such matters could be taken over their objections.

In considering the decisionmaking process in the United Nations, it is important to bear in mind that, while the one-state, one-vote procedure for expressing the sense of the General Assembly is from many points of view unsatisfactory, the incorporation of this principle in the Charter was balanced by giving the Assembly only recommendatory powers.

In addition, by giving the permanent members of the Security Council the right of veto, a very important form of weighted voting was introduced by the drafters of the Charter into this central organ of the United Nations. This means that the United States is the beneficiary of an important privilege as regards voting power in the crucial area of peace and security. Moreover, as a major power and a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States is accorded a further privileged position in the organization through practically automatic election to any U.N. forum-governing bodies, commissions, or committees in which it desires membership.

Finally, while the General Assembly can study, debate, and recommend, it cannot legislate. Apart from approval of the budget and adoption of a scale of assessment, as well as certain elective and appointive responsibilities (such as electing nonpermanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General upon recommendation of the Security Council), the General Assembly cannot make decisions which are binding on its members or on the specialized agencies which are autonomous. Binding decisions can be made only in the Security Council concerning action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

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