mutual tendencies of motives and the will of moral beings to each other; and so inseparable the connexion between the influence of the former and the exertions of the latter, that no object suited to the state, temper and disposition of the mind, ever cometh into its view, without being actually chosen; such an object is no sooner apprehended and perceived by the mind than it is relished and chosen; and such was the antecedent state and disposition of the mind, and such the adaptedness of the object with its qualities, to that particular state and temper of mind, as to lay a foundation of choice, and be a ground of the cer tainty of it, whenever the object shall come within the view of the mind."

1. I would here ask Mr. W. R. Weeks, whether this is compatible with his assertion, that it is the immediate agency of God alone that moves the mind to act?

I would in the next place observe, this is all we ask. We certainly shall not pretend, that motives are the cause of volition or the mind's choice, in any higher

sense.

3. If so strong and insuperable are these mutual tendencies of motives and the will of moral beings to each other; and so inseparable the connexion between the influence of the former and the exertions of the latter, that no object suited to the state, temper or the disposition of the mind, ever cometh into its view without being actually chosen;" I would query, with what propriety, after this concession, could this writer affirm, that there is an utter impropriety in saying, that the mind is governed or determined by motive?" It is hard to see the justice of this remark, unless he meant to deny the existence and operation of all second causes whatever. For no second cause can have greater power to produce effects, than what he here ascribes to motives.

4. After thus ascribing to motives all the causality that any second cause in nature can be supposed to possess, could it be proper for him to represent it as a

point undecided, what the cause of volition, or of the mind's being excited to choose is? His words are, "What the cause of volition is, may, perhaps, be a subject worthy of attention, and fit to employ the talents of inquisitive, contemplative minds?" There can be no doubt remaining to solve, as to what the first cause of all things, and so of volition, is. All contemplative minds know this to be God. And if we can say of motives and the will, as he does, that "there is an inseparable connexion between the INFLUENCE of the former and the exertions of the latter," neither can there be any doubt, with inquisitive minds, as to the second cause.-Does not this appear to be involving in perplexity, a very plain case, and throwing over it a vail of mystery, and representing the most profound research as necessary to discover what he had already sufficiently explained! It is never worth while to teach men to set aside plain, sound, common, good sense, and to go in quest of something else to be wise. But

5. What is more to our purpose here to remark is, If God can give to mind and motive these mutual tendencies; if the antecedent temper and disposition of the mind may be so constituted, and the qualities of motives so adapted to please the mind, that they will certainly be chosen as soon as they come within its view; then why may not God govern and determine the wills of fallen men, at least as to all their sinful actions, by motives or second causes, without a direct operation on the heart? If the connexion between motive and volition be thus established, nothing further is necessary, than for God in his providence, to order things in such a manner, that motive shall come within the view of the mind. According to the Doctor's concession, it will then certainly be chosen.

This is as full to our purpose as any thing we could adduce from any writer whatever.

The great argument, the sum of all that is advanced, to prove the will is not determined by motive, is

this, "Motives, as being wholly unperceived, have no tendency to move the mind, or engage election. Beauty for instance, so long as it is wholly unper-. ceived, hath no tendency to produce love and engage affection. It doth not, antecedent to its being perceived, exert any influence upon the mind, which, exciteth to motion and affection; when it is perceived, it is too late for it to exert influence upon the mind, in order to excite its choice; it being already relished and of course chosen. In the mind's perceiving any thing, which is fitted by the nature and constitution of it, to be an object of its affection, is really all the choice which is ever made of it." West's Essay on Moral Agency.

Here the fallacy of the Dr.'s argument lies very much in changing the concrete for the abstract term, using beauty instead of a beautiful object, and making no distinction between the understanding, apprehending an object; and the will, choosing, or relishing, it.

It must be admitted that tasting and relishing the beauty of an object, and choosing it, are much the same. But the understanding perceiving the existence of such an object, and tracing out those qualities, in which beauty consists, and representing them to the will, as an object of choice, is a very different thing from choice itself; and must not such an act of the understanding precede every rational choice, either of natural or moral beauty? If this distinction between the office of the understanding and the percep tions of the heart or will, be kept properly in view, the justness of the Dr.'s reasoning will vanish.

But not to insist upon this, let us try the force of this reasoning in a case, which, at least to me, appears to be parallel. Fire, for instance, cannot produce the sensation of pain, till it comes sufficiently in contact with the body, but when it actually thus reaches the body, the pain exists, and it is then too late for the fire to act and produce such an effect. This will not surely be admitted as proof, that fire is

not the cause of the sensation of pain. But the reasoning is no better in respect to the denial of the influence of motives. It is conceded by Dr. West, that a motive wholly out of the view of the mind, can produce no effect, excite no desire, affection, or volition, yet the mind may possess an antecedent capacity, to be moved by it, when it shall come into view. And the motive, though out of view, may, in its nature, have a tendency and adaptedness to excite the will, whenever the understanding perceives it. And we can say all this and no more, as to the nature of the body, and of the fire which excites pain in it by contact. Now when this mind and this motive come within the sphere of operation, why does not volition or affection follow, just as naturally, as the pain in case of the application of fire to the body; and that notwithstanding the great difference there may be in respect to the properties of the body and mind, and the different mode, in which fire may operate on one and motives on the other. We can perceive no possible reason why we may not as well say, there is an utter impropriety in asserting, that fire is the cause of the sensation of pain when applied to the body, as to say, motive, when it comes within view of the mind, cannot be the cause of desire or choice. This reasoning against motives being the cause of volition appears to be very fallacious, and contrary to the writer's own concession respecting the mutual tendencies of mind and motive, and contrary to plain common sense. For we do certainly know how men in general will act in any given case, if we can first discover what motives will there be brought to operate on the mind, or be presented to its view. There is no other cause and effect in nature, between which the connexion is more evident and certain, whether we judge as philosophers, or as men of common discernment and prudence. On the whole, it appears that the doctrine of Lock, Edwards and others respecting the will being determined by the strongest

motive is sound philososphy, and has never been demolished by any new theory, and we believe it never will.

POSITION II.

The other position is one, which certainly demands a serious consideration, for it is professedly derived from most express and solemn declarations of Scripture. It is however of the same tenor with the preceding. It affirms that God does not by any arrangement, plication or power, given to second causes and instruments, determine the wills of wicked men, and give existence to their moral exercises. If the Scriptures taught any such doctrine as this, the question would be decided, and here we ought to stop and be silent for ever.

It is a most obvious and glorious truth, that the Scriptures represent God as exercising an absolute and most perfect control and moral government over the minds, the wills, the passions, inclinations and designs of men, considered as nations or individuals.

To this purpose are the following texts, and many others that might be adduced:-"Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it withersoever he will." Prov. xxi, 1. "He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal subtilly with his servants." Ps. cv, 25. "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not unto covetousness." Ps. cxix, 36. "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." Rom. ix, 18. "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast,until the words of God shall be fulfilled." Rev. xvii, 17. Now these are some of the most plain and forcible texts which ascribe the production of moral evil to a divine agency.