bury and Pope-The Ethical Optimists: Hartley, Tucker, Smith, &c.-

Mandeville-David Hume-French literature: Voltaire and Rousseau

-The teleological argument-Later German philosophy: Kant, Fichte,

Schelling, and Hegel-The doctrine of progress: Condorcet, Godwin,

&c.-Progress and evolution

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30

CHAPTER IV.

THE GERMAN PESSIMISTS. SCHOPENHAUER.

Life of Schopenhauer-His disposition and character-'The world as Will

and representation '-Will the essence of all things-Relation of will

to phenomenal world-Grades of the will's self-objectification—Origin

of conscious beings-Will as the basis of human character-Love the

manifestation of the will of the species-The will to live-The source

of life's misery-Pleasure a negation-The world's evil incurable—

Momentary deliverances of Art-Affirmation of will to live-Denial of

will-Asceticism and suicide-The worst of possible worlds

74

CHAPTER V.

THE GERMAN PESSIMISTS. SCHOPENHAUER'S SUCCESSORS,

HARTMANN, ETC.

Bahnsen, Frauenstädt, and Taubert-Edward von Hartmann-His life-

'The Philosophy of the Unconscious '-The unconscious in living

organisms-Instinct and Clairvoyance-The unconscious in human

feeling-History, the work of the unconscious-Matter as unconscious

volition-The unconscious and organic evolution-The genesis of con-

sciousness Unity of the unconscious-The origin of the Cosmos—

The blunder of existence-Threefold illusion respecting happiness-

Proof of the preponderance of suffering in life as it is-The illusion of

progress-The reconciliation of pessimism and optimism- Intellect

the redeemer of will-Hartmann's Eschatology-The opponents of

pessimism

CHAPTER VI.

A NEARER DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM.

First limitation: the worth of the world determined by feeling-Objec-
tions to the hedonist's standard of worth-Spinoza's objection to

106

estimation of world's value-Limited nature of our knowledge of con-

scious life-Human life our measure of the world's worth-Problem

not disposed of by conceptions of world as embodiment of Intelligence

and as action of blind force-Relation of our problem to that of Scep-

ticism-Problem not solved by adopting the view of the world as

beauty and harmony-Nor by adopting the view of the world as the

realisation of a moral result-Definition of optimism and pessimism-

Answer to question to be found in experience-Metaphysical and

theological devices for getting rid of the reality of evil-Complex

relations of our problem to theological questions-Practical aspects of

our problem-Its intellectual and emotional interest-Its relation to

the doctrine of practice-Bearings of pessimism on the hedonist's doc-

trine of life-value

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146

CHAPTER VII.

THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PESSIMISM.

Value of ontological attempts to interpret the world-They consist of pro-

jections of activities of the individual mind-Uncertainty of onto-

logical interpretation-Criticism of Schopenhauer's principle of will—

Irreconcilability of Schopenhauer's realism and his Kantian idealism-

Place of the Platonic ideas in his system-Examination of Hartmann's

world-principle-Difficulty in co-ordinating the various wills of his

scheme-Illusory character of his explanation of the genesis of con-

sciousness Mythical character of the world-process

169

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PESSIMISM: (A) THE PESSIMISTS'

INTERPRETATION OF PHYSICAL NATURE.

On the extension of unconscious will to the physical world-Relation of
mind to consciousness-Meanings of consciousness-Consciousness and
self-consciousness-Consciousness and attention-Helmholtz's doctrine
of unconscious inferences-Partial sensations as unconscious mental phe-
nomena-Consciousness as wide as mind as known in ourselves-Con-
sciousness as an aggregate or series-Fallacy of inferring the presence
of isolated mental events-Criticism of argument in support of will in
physical processes-The scientific conception of force-Fallacy of in-
ferring unconscious will in organic changes-Relation of modern bio-
logical science to the problem of design-Bearing of the doctrine of

the conservation of energy on our inferences respecting the range of

consciousness-Limits of conscious life unknown-Oscar Schmidt's

opinion of Hartmann's natural science.

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183

CHAPTER IX.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PESSIMISM: (B) THE PESSIMISTS'

INTERPRETATION OF MIND.

Will as substance, and will as conceived by modern psychology-The

pessimists' view of will confuses volition and feeling-It confuses voli-

tion and instinctive active impulse-Distinctive marks of volition and

instinctive impulse-Complex nature of will-Characteristics of the

higher volition-Confusion of will with desire-Analysis of desire-

Desire controlled by volition-Summary of errors in the pessimists'

conception of desire-Their view of the relation of pleasure and plain

to will-Independence of these feelings of desire and will-Real rela-

tion of pleasure and pain to will-Nature of negative pleasure and the

satisfaction of desire-Bearing of repetition and habit on the relative

intensity of negative pleasures and pains-Examination of Hartmann's

doctrine of nervous exhaustion-Fatigue not invariable consequence of

prolonged pleasurable stimulation-Effects of prolonged painful stimu-

lation-Different effects of prolongation and of renewal of pleasurable

and painful impressions-Hartmann's idea that pleasure does not fully

compensate pain-Disproved by conceiving pleasure and pain as simul-

taneous present feelings-By viewing pleasure and pain as conjoint

effects of one action-The scientific value of the pessimist's view of

ennui

206

CHAPTER X.

THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF PESSIMISM.

Hartmann's mode of dealing with individual testimony-Value of his

scheme of life-Unscientific character of his estimation of life-Value

of work, including muscular and intellectual activity-Health a posi-

tive condition of pleasure-Value of reflection on the past-Hartmann's

conception of the illusory nature of a sentiment-His omission of the

results of a volitional control of circumstances-Examination of the

pessimist's proof of the worthlessness of progress-Relation of the idea

that progress depends on intellectual development to pessimism—

Hartmann's opinion respecting the worth of material, moral, scientific,

and æsthetic progress

237

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XI.

PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS.

Résumé of the examination of pessimism-Investigation of scienti
mism-The idea of the coincidence of the individual and the
happiness in ethics and economics-Hartley's psychological
optimism-The doctrine that pain is a condition of pleasure-Th
tific conception of progress-Need of certain preliminary enq
Question of the excess of pleasure or of pain in human life—Tr
of the question apart from the comparative frequency of the e
causes-Deficiencies in the theory of the causes of pleasure and
Pleasure and pain not invariably equal in different regions of co
activity-Inexactness of subjective comparison of pleasure with
these regions-Results attainable by such comparison important
not adequate Comparison of amounts of pleasure in different
-Unsatisfactory character of this abstract method of calcul
Resort to a biological conception of pleasure and pain of little p
utility-Impracticability of summing the single external ca
pleasure and pain-Also of adding together our single experie
pleasure and pain-Liability to error in estimating the value of
feelings The results of an observation of others' single feelin
less satisfactory-Life not to be measured directly in single feel
pleasure and pain-Modification of the problem by the substitu
the idea of happiness for that of pleasure-Objections to such a
tution as (a) a cession of the hedonist's position, and (b) an ex-
of a simple for a complex idea-Provisional answer to these obj
-Popular conception of happiness examined-Permanent condit
pleasure the root-idea of happiness-(4) First stage in const
of happiness. (1) External elements. (a) Happiness as resi
certain permanent external circumstances-Reasons of the p
distinction between valuable objects and agreeable feeling
Happiness as consisting in permanent lines of pleasurable exter
directed action: meaning of interests-(2) Internal element
Internal processes of reflection as determined by regulation of ex
aims: abiding internal effects of moral achievement-(6) Pleas
reflection as result of distinct effort to obtain an inner possession
culture as ingredient of happiness-(B) Higher stage in con
tion: due adjustment of competing aims, external and internal
Final stage in construction: control of elements of life, as th
ranged, by attention-(1) External function of attention negativ
positive-(2) Internal function of attention negative and pos
repression of desire and cultivation of pleasurable recollection
imaginations-How far a furtherance of others' interests involve
wise pursuit of individual happiness-Reciprocal advantages of fri
relations-Large external aims of individual involve benefits to

-Conscious pursuit of others' good-Limits to coincidence of agent's

and others' interests-Our idea of happiness seen to involve a clear

remainder of pleasure-Pain of sustained effort in pursuit of happiness

--Happiness and satisfaction-Different meanings of contentment-Our

wise hedonist both contented and discontented-His grounds of content-

ment-His grounds of discontent-Objection to hedonism that pleasure

can never satisfy-Happiness differs in structure from a series of single

feelings-Degrees of satisfaction realisable in a series of feelings-Con-

tent and discontent inseparable accompaniments of all conceivable aims

--Necessity for renewed endeavour does not involve disappointment—

Real attainable happiness inferior to our imagined ideals-Bearing of

the evanescence of life on our problem-Brevity of life a good from

pessimist's point of view-Shortness of life does not destroy differences

of value in fugitive and relatively permanent good-How a recognition

of its brevity intensifies the value of life-Stoic contempt of life as

evanescent, partly rational, partly irrational-Brevity of life the basis

of a peculiar sentiment of tender regard-Sense of the brevity of indi-

vidual life partly submerged in wide altruistic sympathies-Review of

argument and re-statement of problem .

NOTE TO CHAPTER XI.

On differences of quality in pleasure-Differences of quality in pleasure said

to be attested by consciousness-Aristotle's arguments for qualitative

differences-How pleasure comes to be thought of as differing in quality

-The higher pleasures probably surpass the lower in quantity, even

to the subject himself-Points of quantitative superiority of the refined

enjoyments viewed as competing with sensual pleasures in their maxi-

mum volume for a chief place in our aggregate happiness' Higher'

and 'lower,' as applied to pleasures, connote a remote bearing on

others' happiness

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256

326

CHAPTER XII.

THE REALITY OF HAPPINESS.

Is the practicability of our scheme of happiness affected by the diversity of
human feelings and tastes?-Influences determining action in certain
lives antecedently to individual choice-How far special inherited ten-
dencies and early-formed habits preclude a realisation of happiness—
Bearing of the doctrine of the determination of volition on the attaina-
bility of our ideal of happiness-Effectual pursuit of happiness pre-
supposes a disciplined will-Question of the limitation of human
powers-Pleasure-value of the fixed arrangements of the world, only
roughly ascertainable-Vital question concerns the extent to which
human effort actually dominates the fixed conditions of life-The