Englishmen are beginning to understand that pessimism also stands for a recent development of speculation which provides a complete theory of the universe, and which appears to be adopted, at least in the land of its birth, by a large and growing school. The attention which the great founder of German pessimism, Arthur Schopenhauer, now receives in his own country, thanks more especially to the labours of faithful expositors like Frauenstädt, and of partial disciples like Hartmann, has for some little time aroused a certain curiosity in England. And so it has become the fashion, among those who would pass as experts in the movements of German philosophy, to talk in a half-mysterious and esoteric manner of Schopenhauer and his system of pessimism. Quite recently, moreover, attempts have been made to unfold the leading doctrines of the pessimists to English readers. I may refer to Miss Zimmern's Life of Schopenhauer' (1875) and to an account of Hartmann's philosophy in the Westminster Review' (January 1876) as being among the first efforts in this direction. It is this modern philosophical pessimism which will more especially engage our attention in the present inquiry.

At first sight it might seem that these two kinds of pessimism, the popular and instinctive, and the philosophic and reasoned, have nothing to do with one another, and that no light can be thrown on the later by the earlier development. It is, no doubt, true that modern German pessimism as a philosophy of existence must be examined and estimated on its own grounds, and be accepted or rejected according as it shows itself to be or not to be a consistent and well-reasoned system of thought. At the same time the full significance of this speculative doctrine cannot be understood except by a reference to pre-philo

sophic pessimism. Systems of philosophy do not spring from pure isolated intellect, but are the products of concrete minds made up in part of certain emotional and moral peculiarities which mould and colour in numberless particulars their intellectual workmanship. It is at least à priori supposable that the philosophic pessimists partake somewhat of those habits of feeling and thought which underlie the more popular type of pessimism.

But more, it is certain that these philosophers do not rely exclusively on their speculative basis, however stable they conceive it to be, but include in their doctrine an enumeration of the facts of life. As we shall see later on, both Schopenhauer and Hartmann hold that their view of existence as an unalterable condition of evil rests on an ample empirical ground of induction. And here the pessimism of the philosopher and of the plain man appear to touch and to be no longer wholly distinguishable. For does not the latter insist with more or less distinctness on the preponderance of evil over good, of misery over enjoyment in this and that region of human life? In point of fact we shall find that the two classes, when dealing with the tangible everyday realities of our common lot, resort to much the same method of argument, and even fall into much the same style of language.

It seems clear, then, that if we wish fully to understand the new and speculative pessimism, we must study it in connection with the much older and unsystematised creed. Nor can we stop here. The meaning and origin of what I have called the instinctive form of pessimism cannot be understood apart from the antithetic mode of belief, namely, the optimism which emphasises and singles out as representative of reality only what is pleasing and cheering. In

truth speculative pessimism itself is clearly related, both in its origin and in the form of its doctrines, to a corresponding type of optimism. Hence though pessimism is to be the more special aim of our inquiry, it will be necessary to treat to some extent of its antagonist. In fact, we must not confine our attention to either of these opposing views, but must take up the underlying question of the worth of life and of the world which each of these theories seeks to answer in one particular way.

It may, perhaps, be objected that by including such various modes of belief under the terms pessimism and optimism we shall rob these of all precise meaning. These badly formed Latin words, it may be urged, connote something definite, are abbreviations of fairly exact propositions. The first employers of the term optimism, after which the correlative term pessimism is formed, distinctly understood by it the affirmation that the world is as good as it is possible for it to be. Why, then, widen the terms, so as to include loose and unexamined beliefs which are not correctly denoted by them at all?

To this objection the reply is very simple. Even if the term optimism once had a correct etymological meaning, the counter term never possessed this distinction. It is true that Schopenhauer, the founder of the speculative creed, half seriously contends that the world is as bad as it can be, consistently with its bare existence. But the essence of philosophical pessimism is something less than this, namely, the denial of happiness or the affirmation of life's inherent misery, and this doctrine is by no means clearly conveyed by the form of the word. So much as to the need of abiding by the etymology of the terms.

The full justification, however, of this extension of the terms is to be found in the fact that they have already, by a natural process, acquired the larger sense here claimed for them. The popularisation of the terms, if it serves to hide their original philosophic significance, seems to indicate clearly enough the existence of a close relation between the various shades of belief denoted by each. The popular mind has instinctively classed philosopher and poet, the speculative and the non-speculative mind in one group; and, as I have remarked, very good grounds may probably be found by the critic for upholding this classification.

I propose, therefore, to interpret the terms optimism and pessimism in their widest meaning. Any theory which distinctly attributes to the world and to human life a decided worth, representing it as something good, beautiful, or pleasant, will be included under optimism, no matter whether this doctrine be reasoned or not, and no matter what grounds may be selected for ascribing this value to the object. Similarly, pessimism will cover all doctrines, reasoned or unreasoned, which distinctly deny this value to life, and represent it as something unworthy, unsatisfying, or lamentable.

It will be found that both optimism and pessimism embrace beliefs which, though essentially alike in their psychological character, differ in their subject-matter. Thus the pessimist may condemn the world in its totality as discordant or productive of misery; or he may make human nature, under its moral or æsthetic aspect, the object of his depreciation; or, again, his pessimism may take the form of a despairing view of human effort and of man's capabilities of intellectual, moral, and social improvement. Similarly with the optimist.

The various forms of these beliefs will have to be distinguished in the following review of the subject.

It may be objected to this plan that no room is left for intermediate doctrines, for views of life which lean neither to the favourable nor to the unfavourable pole. Let it, then, be said, once for all, that I not only recognise the possibility of such beliefs, but hold that it is among these that a just and correct estimate of life is to be looked for. Of this enough will be said in the right place. In reviewing the history of optimism and pessimism, I shall seek to group all theories of life, as far as possible, according to their general tendency, as favourable or unfavourable, hopeful or despairing. At the same time reference will have to be made to doctrines which are mainly critical and negative, which are put forward as reasoned protests to some extreme form of optimism or pessimism. Such doctrines cannot, of course, in every case correctly be reckoned in the opposite group that against which they are directed.

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Our path ought now to be pretty plain. Be it remembered, then, that though modern pessimism is to be the special subject of our study, this doctrine can only be understood by help of the other forms of pessimism; and that these, again, must be studied in connection with the corresponding forms of optimism. It follows that our inquiry will most fitly begin with a historical sketch of instinctive and reasoned optimism and pessimism. When the historical relation of modern pessimism has been thus ascertained, we may proceed to unfold and to examine its leading ideas. In criticising its philosophical and scientific value I shall select one or two leading peculiarities of idea or of method as typical and representative. After having approximately measured the worth of pessimism as a system of thought, it