withstanding the statement that "the United States freely acknowledges and recognizes this sovereignty [of Colombia] and disavows any intention to impair it in any way whatever." Would the constitutional authorities in the Senate of the United States be likely to hold otherwise in case it was proposed to grant to a foreign power a similarly endless occupancy and jurisdiction of a part of our national domain? Would they admit that their discussion of that issue might fairly be regarded as factious and deceitful? Yet, as later will be seen, it was proposed in the deliberations of the Colombian Senate so to amend the constitution that the apprehended legal objection should be removed!

As for the considerations which prompted the adverse action of the Colombian Senate, it may be said that in any case they were properly beyond our official animadversion or even official discussion. High-minded diplomacy usually holds in courteous respect the motives which may have inspired the legislative act of a sovereign nation. Yet in addressing Colombia our administration ascribed to her the basest of motives. The mere opinion of our minister to Colombia was cited as showing that the Senate's discussions were prolonged and the ratification finally rejected, with the sordid view of holding up the construction of an Isthmian waterway, and thus being the better able to exact terms from the United States. Further, what was only a report of the Colombian Senate's "committee on the Panama Canal" was officially quoted as proof of that accusatory opinion. The following statement was published in a rejoinder to Colombia's minister plenipotentiary in Washington:

*

By a report of the majority of the Panama Canal committee, read in the Colombian Senate on the 14th of October last, it was recommended that a bill which had been introduced to authorize the Government to enter upon, new negotiations should be indefinitely postponed. The reason for this recommendation is disclosed in the same report. By a treaty concluded April 4, 1893, the original concession to the Panama Canal Co. was extended until December 31, 1904. The report [of the Colombian Senate's committee] affirms that the aspect of the question would be entirely changed in consequence of the fact that when a year later the Colombian Congress should meet in ordinary session the extension of 1893 would have expired and every concession with it. In that case the Republic would become the possessor or owner, without any need of a previous judicial decision and without any indemnity, of the canal itself and of the adjuncts which belong to it, and would not only be able to contract without any impediments, but would be in more clear, more definite, and more advantageous possession both legally and materially.

The administration's official statement continues:

*

This program, if not expressly, was at least tacitly adopted by the Colombian Congress. It was a scheme to which this Government could not possibly become a party.

And that, although the Colombian Senate was a national legislature and had acted within its sovereign rights..

Is it conceivable that the President would have cast such innuendoes and accusations in the face of Great Britain or Germany or France? Would he have tolerated such open affront on the part of any other nation? To ask the questions is to answer them. The physical weakness of Colombia should have been her triple protection. Toward helplessness power should have felt itself bound by a chivalrous noblesse oblige. It is safe to say that never in the previous history of

jdezivilized diplomacy was there such a public,

official characterization by one nation, of another nation's motives for legislative action. Therein the President's conduct was audaciously wrong.

At this point the President vainly seeks his vindication by a reference to practical results. He says:

Be it remembered that unless I had acted exactly as I did act there would now be no Panama Canal. Every man who at any stage has opposed or condemned the action actually taken in acquiring the right to dig the canal has really been the opponent of any and every effort that could ever have been made to dig the canal.

Here is a veritable "Daniel come to judgment." The great Burke professed his inability to draw a valid indictment against the people of a whole nation, but this self-eulogizer finds no difficulty in denouncing the innumerable critics of his Panama action under the one base category of those wishing to deprive the world forever of a waterway from the one to the other sea. No matter how many the dissidents nor how worthy their reputation and achievements nor how earnestly explicit their declaration that they yielded to none in their desire for interoceanic navigation, they are charged with hostility to any Panama Canal whatever.

How insensate the President's charge. As if those who were confident that Colombia would appreciate decent treatment and would agree to amended but still reasonable terms were thus confident without a vestige of reason. He himself had already declared:

Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warning when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored.

He had, furthermore, and for his own purposes, quoted a Colombian high official as affirming, on November 6, 1903-the very day on which the Panama insurgents were recognized as having established a new nation-in a note to the American minister at Bogota, that on certain conditions

The Colombian Government will declare martial law and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority when public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers, will call extra session of Congress with new and friendly members next May to approve the treaty.

The American minister at Bogota adds, "There is a great reaction in favor of the treaty." On January 6, 1904, Colombia's minister plenipotentiary at Washington officially declared:

The necessity of the canal is so well recognized in Colombia that it was proposed in the discussion in the Senate to amend the constitution in order to remove [what Colombia regarded as] the constitutional difficulties; and the minister of foreign relations, after the sessions of Congress were closed, directed the chargé d'affaires to advise the Washington Government that the Government of Colombia was ready to enter into renewed negotiations for a canal convention.

He further averred that the fact of the rejection of the HayHerran convention—

does not mean that we have been opposed, nor that we are opposed, to the realization of the greatest undertaking of the kind which the past and future centuries have seen or will see. * * * I have been directed to declare to your Government that Colombia, earnestly wishing that the work of the canal be carried into effect, not only because it suits her interests, but also that of the commerce of the world, is disposed to enter into arrangements that

would secure for the United States the execution and ownership of the said work. * The charge made against the Government of Colombia that it proposes to cancel the concession of the French company vanishes as soon as it is known that under the latest concession granted by Colombia the said concession would not lapse until the year 1910.

Who can doubt that if the President had curbed his angry impatience and withheld his irritating, insolent threats, Colombia's Senate would have acceded to terms rightly advantageous to both countries? Who disbelieves that if, as was our acknowledged, perfect right, we had invoked the third "point" of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, to wit:

The said treaty shall be binding on both parties until 12 months from the time that one of the parties notifies its intention of proceeding to a reform— Colombia would have been duly impressed with the gravity of her situation, and have earnestly striven to come to terms with her in--dispensable ally? Accordingly, it is pure hardihood for the Presi-dent to affirm, "Unless I had acted exactly as I did act, there would now be no canal." It is simple slander, silly slander, when he says, "Every man who at any stage has opposed or condemned the action actually taken in acquiring the right to dig the canal has really been the opponent of any and every effort that could ever have been made to dig the canal." His critics asked that the right to dig the canal might be acquired by lawful means. Being enthusiastically in favor of an interoceanic waterway they only demanded that "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind," a substantial regard for international law and treaty obligations, should guide the acts of the Washington administration. It certainly is not too much to suppose that if their protests had been heeded we should now have a canal whose title would be wholly free from stain and whose advantages. might be enjoyed with complete self-respect.

In this chapter of national dishonor there are still other transactions to be considered.

The President, according to his published admission, was aware as early as August, 1903, that the secession of the Province of Panama was secretly fomented. He has openly declared that toward the end of October the attempt "appeared to be an imminent probability." In his message to Congress of January 4, 1904, he said:

*

In view of these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue instructions such as would insure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising. On November 2 the following instructions were sent to the commanders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dirie: "Maintain free and untinterrupted transit. Prevent landing of any armed force, either Government or insurgent, within 50 miles of Panama."

*

*

That is, in time of profound peace between Colombia and the United States; while the treaty of "peace and amity," of "friendship and good understanding," was in undisturbed force; while it was still written, "There shall be a perfect, firm, and inviolable. peace and sincere friendship"; while the neutrality and sovereignty of Colombia were solemnly and gratefully guaranteed by the United States as against interference by foreign powers, and therefore against interference by the United States herself: while Isthmian transit was absolutely free from interruption; while there was no slightest overt act on the part of the would-be seceders; and while

bia was forcefully forbidden to land her own troops within 50 miles of the city of Panama where, if anywhere, the secession would be attempted. In other words, the success of the revolt, whenever it might occur, was resistlessly decreed. When the President of the United States issued the "50-mile order" of November 2, 1903, he virtually declared war against the very nation of which the United States was the sworn ally, and to which the United States was united by obligations admittedly paramount He bound Colombia hand and foot and delivered her over to her domestic foes..

Yet the President, in his floundering attempts at self-defense, declares that

These orders were precisely such as had been issued again and again in preceding years-1900, 1901, and 1902, for instance.

But no identity, nor even resemblance, appears when the orders of those preceding years are brought into comparison. Here is the record. On July 25, 1900, our consul at Panama was thus instructed:

You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons or property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment of Panama would have this effect, and the United States must insist upon the neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty.

Here was simply a protest in advance of possible harm. It was merely a warning of Colombia that she would pursue a certain course upon her own responsibility, and that the United States would interfere if free transit was interrupted. On November 20, 1901, this telegram was sent to our Panama consul:

Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit across the Isthmus that such interference must cease, and that the United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the railroad. Consult with captain of the Iowa, who will be instructed to land marines if necessary for the protection of the railroad in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United States.

That order went no further than to demand that interruption of transit should cease, and to provide means, in case of necessity, for enforcing the demand. On September 12, 1902, the commander of the Ranger, then at Panama, was notified:

*

The United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus, and that a free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embarrassed. Any transportation of troops which might contravene these provisions of treaty should not be sanctioned by you, nor should use of road be permitted which might convert the line of transit into theater of hostility.

Here, again, was a merely admonitory order sent to forestall any use of the transit line which would destroy its legitimate function by making it, unnecessarily, the scene of armed conflict.

Thus the official record shows that, so far from countenancing the "50-mile order." the asserted precedents clearly condemned it. In direct refutation of the President's declaration is the fact that the previous orders" were: First, in accordance with Colombia's understanding and wish; second, that they sought, in authorized ways, to safeguard Isthmian transit from critically impending or actual interruption: third, that they constituted no assault upon either the supreme jurisdiction or the supremely free action of Colombia. The "50-mile order" grossly offended in all these respects. It was known to be infinitely abhorrent to Colombia as a sovereign nation; it had prime reference to an apprehended political insurrec

tion against Colombia's territorial integrity and national control, with only consequential reference to a possible transit interruption; it laid essentially violent hands on Colombia's sovereignty; it forcibly prevented Colombia from taking precautionary measures; it was a virtual declaration of war. Colombia was suddenly, peremptorily. restrained from the free disposition of her own troops on her own soil. The venerable treaty whose stipulations were to be "religiously observed" was, so far forth, flung aside as vacuous and its Covenants trampled in the dust!

The President's search for justifying precedents was foredoomed to failure. There was a vast improbability that the history of the United States would furnish any analogy of such despotism. The President should have known beforehand-doubtless he did know— that the outrage was wholly novel, conspicuous in its infamous isola-An unoffending ally fettered and gyved, in forecast of her instinctive movement for self-preservation! The President's act was truly monumental. It was altogether and characteristically his

own.

Imagine that when the Confederate forces threatened Washington a nation whose strength outmeasured ours as ours outmeasured Colombia's had forbidden our Government to send troops within 50 miles of the endangered capital. Imagine that the dictating nation was bound to us by treaty pledges of "inviolable peace and sincere friendship." Imagine that our Government had guaranteed that nation, to the effect that its legation in Washington should not be imperiled. Yet that when we thought to safeguard the capital from secession's deadly attack-all legations being then unmolested, and it being by no means sure that, even if there was armed conflict, any legation would be injured-our overawing ally forcibly prevented our proposed defensive action, thus handing us over to our assailants, making our disruption a certainty foregone and absolute! What, in that case, would have been our feeling and judgment? What would have been the verdict of the civilized world? Would it have been conceded by us, or by anybody, that the interdict was other than atrocious? On the very face of it, and in its very nature, the peremptory ban would appear as unspeakably abusive.

But the President tells us that he then knew, and now knows, no standard of public and governmental ethics "higher, or finer, or nicer"! Perhaps he is entitled to the plea.

The 50-mile order," however, was destined to be outdone. On the succeeding day, November 3, 1903, the following order was sent to the commander of the Nashville at Colon:

In the interests of peace, make every effort to prevent Government troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama. The transit of the Isthmus must be kept open and order maintained.

The President's repressive determination was not to be balked. As yet our Panama consul had forwarded only the news of what he called an "uprising" in that one city. Yet the President issued an order preventing Colombia from moving her own troops via her own. railway, from her own Colon to her own Panama. So far as concerned their freedom to go to the scene of danger, Colombia's troops. were reconcentradoed and manacled. Let it still be borne in mind