Observance by the United States and South Viet-Nam of a 30-Hour Cease-Fire During the Christmas Period

United States forces in Viet-Nam have been under orders not to be the first to resume hostilities after of Christmas. The Government South Viet-Nam has given similar orders."

Unfortunately there were a number of incidents of firing by Communist units during the 30-hour Christmas period. The Vietnamese and American units have replied effectively to this fire. No Americans are reported killed, but several are reported wounded. The evidence thus indicates that the Communists have not stopped their attacks, but our forces continue to act with great restraint. 5

Clarification of the Moves
Involved in the United States
End of the Year Peace
Initiative on Viet-Nam

23 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 10, 1966, p. 52.

24 On Dec. 7 the Viet Cong radio had proposed a 12-hour cease-fire to last from 7 p.m., Christmas Eve, until 7 a.m., Christmas Day. Commenting on this, Secretary of State Rusk, on Dec. 9, indicated that the conclusion of such a truce should be left up to the local authorities (ibid., Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1014).

No formal acceptance of the Viet Cong proposal was made, but, on Dec. 23, U.S. and South Vietnamese authorities announced that they would observe a ceasefire for the 30 hours from 6 p.m., Christmas Eve, until midnight, Christmas.

U.S. and South Vietnamese military units resumed ground fighting early on Dec. 26 in the face of increasingly heavy Viet Cong attacks, following the expiration of the Viet Cong 12-hour truce period. U.S. bombing of North Viet-Nam, however, which had been suspended at the beginning of the cease-fire period, was not resumed until Jan. 31, 1966.

The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1965.

These talks 27 are all connected with the basic American position in Southeast Asia. Peace remains the foremost objective of the United States in Asia, and the strongest desire as far as the President can see in the American people's minds. Everything that this Administration is doing is designed to bring about conditions in which peace is possible. . . . We have a genuine desire to cooperate with anyone to whom peace is as desirable a goal as it is to us.

The President has himself, for a long time, been talking to chiefs of state as well as to a number of ambassadors in Washington concerning that very fundamental tenet of our policy in Asia.

The President has had Secretary (of State Dean) Rusk, Vice President (Hubert H.) Humphrey, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Harriman and other senior members of the American Government discussing those basic views with responsible outstanding world leaders

27 A number of high ranking U.S. officials had recently been sent abroad by President Johnson to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement on VietNam. This "peace offensive" was launched directly after the suspension of the bombing of North Viet-Nam (see footnote 25 to doc. IX-159, supra). Vice President Humphrey departed on Dec. 27 for Tokyo where he conferred with Premier Sato on Dec. 29. He went then to Manila for the inauguration of President Marcos, with whom he also had discussions. While in Manila, he talked with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. From the Philippines, he flew to Taipei on Jan. 1, thence to Seoul, Jan. 1-2, 1966, for talks with Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Park Chung Hee. He returned to Washington on Jan. 3, 1966.

In addition to the Humphrey trip, Ambassador Goldberg journeyed to Rome for meetings with Pope Paul VI, Dec. 29, and Prime Minister Moro on the following day. On Dec. 31 he met French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris. His last stop was in London to meet with Prime Minister Wilson on Jan. 1, 1966.

Ambassador at Large Harriman visited Warsaw, on Dec. 29, for discussions with Foreign Minister Rapacki, and Yugoslavia to confer with President Tito on Jan. 1, 1966. He met Prime Minister Shastri in New Delhi on Jan. 2, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan in Peshawar and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran on Jan. 3, and President Nasser of the U.A.R. on the following day in Cairo before proceeding to the Far East.

Presidential Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy flew to Ottawa to consult with Prime Minister Pearson on Dec. 29. After the New Year, Assistant Secretary of State Williams visited many of the African countries. As part of the "peace offensive," other contacts were made by U.S. ambassadors in the countries to which they were accredited.

in Washington, at the United Nations, and in other capitals. I think everyone knows, for example, Ambassador Harriman has taken other trips in an effort to reaffirm our basic position in Southeast Asia to those capitals to express our views. . . .

The President, in the last few weeks, has felt that it was especially appropriate for more leaders of the world to know his views on Asia. Those views are exactly as expressed in the President's Baltimore speech in April of this year." Exchanges between this country and other countries have been going on for a long time. More than 100 nations have been in constant touch with our Government on a number of matters, including peace in Southeast Asia, and Ambassador Harriman traveled before and will travel again to make these views continually known.

has

From here on out, I think this morning, it is fair for me to say that I don't think it would be responsible in the interest of peace for me to say more. I don't want to be the person who unjustifiably raises hopes or indicates anything except that we are very anxious to be reasonable. This in effect has been what these officials have constantly, over a long period of time and most recently, expressed to other governments, that the United States seeks peace in Asia, the United States will cooperate with anyone who wants peace in Asia, as we want only to be reasonable, to talk about our problems, to resolve our differences at the conference table, and that it is not in the interest of those objectives to carry on excessive public discussions.

Document IX-161

...

ber 31, 1965 to news media in Saigon by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam:

SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

U.S. participation in the Vietnam war increased steadily throughout 1965. Total military strength grew from about 23,000 on January 1, 1965 to approximately 181,000 at year's end. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces increased during the year from about 559,500 to approximately 679,000. Enemy military strength rose from about 103,000 to an estimated 230,000 by December 31.

As troop strength increased, the pace of the war quickened. More than 1,300 U.S. troops and some 11,000 RVN Forces were killed in action, while the enemy lost over 34,000 men killed and almost 6,000 captured. There were 28 combat operations in which more than 200 Viet Cong were killed, but more than 28,000 incidents were initiated by the Viet Cong and reported during the year.

The U.S. and Vietnam Air Force flew close to 12,000 strike sorties into North Vietnam during the year and over 60,000 within the Republic of Vietnam. Navy and Marine Corps, both carrier and land based, struck at North Vietnam in more than 6,600 sorties. They also supported operations in Republic of Vietnam, flying over 39,000 sorties. However, more than 160 U.S. planes were lost over North Vietnam and some 80 went down in the south. Surface-toair missiles (SAMS) accounted for 10 of the planes downed in North Vietnam. The U.S. in return, struck at 18 SAM sites. Starting February 7, U.S. planes almost daily hit military targets in the north. In the third quarter of the year alone, more than 500 highway bridges were struck. U.S. Air Force planes dropped more than 56,000 tons of ordnance and Vietnamese aircraft dropped more than 25,000 tons. Almost 80,000 airlift or logistical sorties were also flown by the U.S. Air Force, carrying about 265,000 tons of cargo and more than 660,000 passengers. The Air Force flew 13,500 search and rescue sorties, saving 162 persons.

The war was many sided. U.S. and South Vietnamese personnel dropped more than 77 million leaflets, 340,000 newspapers and 20,000

30

gifts into North Vietnam. Under the "open arms" program, more than 11,000 military and civilian Vietnamese returned to Government control. The U.S. Armed Forces gave medical treatment to over 4.5 million Vietnamese under the Medical Civic Action Program during 1965. They also assisted in distributing to the Vietnamese people 106,000 tons of foodstuffs and more than $100,000 worth of other commodities, donated by various relief services. There were more than 2,400 military civic action construction projects, ranging from bridge and school building, to road repair and drainage control. Throughout the country U.S. military units and individuals contributed to the support of hundreds of orphanages, schools and dispensaries.

An economic boom accompanied the military expansion. Planned U.S. construction projects in South Vietnam at year's end were valued at nearly $1 billion. Petroleum con

sumption rose from 250,000 barrels in January to more than one million per month in December. Imports by ship into South Vietnam rose 800 per cent while intercoastal shipping doubled, from the January tonnage figure of 25,000. Civilian personnel working on military construction projects totaled only a few thousand in January but were over 20,000 at the end of the year.

With the U.S. military build-up in Vietnam continuing, at the end of the year these were the major units stationed in the country: III Marine Amphibious Force, including the 3rd Marine Division (reinforced) and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile); 1st Infantry Division; 2nd Air Division (8 Wings); 173rd Airborne Brigade; 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; Naval Advisory Group; Headquarters Support Activity; 1st Logistical Command; 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and units from the 7th Fleet.

565,000

27,500

52,500

34, 000

679,000

111,000

9,500

38,500

22,000

250

181, 250

1,500 300

17,000

2,600

150

1,000

75-85,000

100-120,000

40,000

Document X-1

Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary General of the OAS (Mora) on the Activities of the OAS, July 1, 1964-June 30, 1965 (Excerpt)1

The Response of the Organization of American States to the Challenge of the Dominican Crisis

On April 30, after the first reports had been received from the Papal Nuncio on the situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic,2 and twenty-four hours after the Council was notified by the Representative of the United States of the measures that country had been obliged to take, the Secretary General was authorized to go to the scene of the events to cooperate in the solution of the crisis. On the following day, the Meeting of Consultation was in a position to appoint a Special Committee from its membership that, without loss of time, began its efforts for peace in the Dominican capital.

For the first time in the history of the Organization, the Secretary General was invested with certain powers that implied assuming, away from headquarters, in the terrain of the events, a mission of information and peacemaking. Later he was to be authorized also to offer his good offices to the parties in conflict,

1 OAS doc. OEA/Ser.D/III.16. 2 See post, docs. X-18, et seq.

3 See post, doc. X-21.

with a view to the establishment of a climate of peace and conciliation; that time, in his capacity as representative of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. Thus maximum utilization of all the existing machinery in cases of utmost urgency was established as a precedent.

Called upon to act, the OAS, the mediating function of the Organization itself, and the participation of the Secretary General in the carrying out of successive mandates from the Tenth Meeting of Consultation were fully justified.

The urgent question of the departure of numerous persons who had taken asylum in various embassies in Santo Domingo made it necessary to grant them the protection of the OAS. In my capacity as Secretary General, I made the decision to issue them a special document, as a safeconduct. Thus, with the aid of the forces that arrived in the Dominican Republic, especially their air and naval elements, it was possible to resolve satisfactorily another urgent situation that demanded our humanitarian aid.

The signing of the Act of Santo Domingo, achieved by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, confirmed the ceasefire, assured the evacuation of the asylees, provided for respect for human rights, and obtained the recognition of the international safety zone. Those bases having been achieved, which gave legality to the

Post, doc. X-28.

The Dominican case has had profound repercussions in the sphere of inter-American relations and has established valuable precedents in the development of collective action. In this regard we could not fail to point out the establishment, also for the first time in the history of the system, of an Inter-American Peace Force," made up of contingents from several member states with a unified command under the authority of the OAS. This force, serving the peace and security of the hemisphere, has shown its practical usefulness and effectiveness during the Dominican crisis. As Secretary General, by virtue of a decision of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, I took on the functions referred to in paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted on May 6 and requested the Governments of Brazil and of the United States to designate, respectively, its Commander and Deputy Commander. Thus the unified command of the Organization of American States was established. It also devolved upon me, as Special Representative of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, to sign the Act Establishing the said Inter-American Peace Force.

can people met the most spontaneous acceptance by the member states, which hastened to send medicine, food, medical personnel, etc. In the latter connection the collaboration of the Pan American Health Organization gave wonderful results, particularly as concerns hospital supervision and the adoption of preventive measures in cases of possible spread of epidemics. No less useful in developing the many activities of the so-called "Relief Operation" were the spontaneous and determined cooperation of the International Red Cross, the Dominican Red Cross, and the Institution CARITAS, as well as the Assistance of religious agencies and AID.

But the situation in the Dominican Republic has presented different facets, which have made it of urgent importance to resort not only to political, military, and humanitarian measures, but to economic and administrative measures as well. Hence, in order to ward off the crisis determined by the partial or total interruption of public services, including banking transactions and the payment of governmental obligations, it became necessary for the OAS to assume much more complex responsibilities than those that could be foreseen at the beginning.

In this connection, acknowledgement must be made of the excellent cooperation given by the entire Secretariat personnel that has been active in the Dominican Republic from the early days of the crisis. The list of those who spontaneously and promptly offered their services without reserve or limit came to be quite long. It can be said that all of those appointed to carry on the various activities, performed their duties quite satisfactorily, despite the danger involved and the delicate circumstances under which they performed their tasks.

In spite of all inconveniences, the results obtained thus far should move us to continue with firm determination in fulfillment of the duty implicit in guaranteeing total restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, by contributing to the renewed functioning of its democratic institutions and to its economic and social recovery.

The Provisional Government that we have installed agreed, by virtue of

[Doc. X-1] 927