Our primary objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or prolongation of the war. We do, certainly, want peace, but not peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the following conditions must be met: 1. Since the war now in progress in Vietnam was provoked by Communist aggression and subversion, it is essential, first of all, that these subversive and military activities undertaken, directed, and supported from abroad against the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam cease, and that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two zones, a principle that was laid down in the 1954 Geneva agreement" and in international law, be respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must dissolve all these front organizations and agencies it has created in South Vietnam under the 61 Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, pp. 275-276. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do delivered this speech after the flags of the 30 countries which had so far given aid to VietNam had been raised: see footnote 46 to doc. IX-93, ante. 82 Text in American Foreign Policy 1950– 1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-767 and 785-787. title the "Front for the Liberation of the South," "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary Party," and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and the political and military leaders it has sent there illegally. 2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be left to the discretion of those people in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever source. That will be feasible, obviously, only when the aggression by the Communist regime of Hanoi and its campaign of intimidation to which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been terminated. 3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and beyond its boundaries that are now necessary to defend that territory against Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their military forces from South Vietnam. It reserves the right, however, to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right to appeal again for foreign assistance in the case of further aggression or threat of aggression. 4. Lastly, the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam must be effectively guaranteed. If the Communist regime in Hanoi sincerely wants peace, if it puts the interests of the nation above those of an ideology or a party, if it wants the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of southeast Asia to live in peace instead of war, prosperity instead of poverty, freedom instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression. This is the only path that we believe can lead to peace if the South Vietnamese people are to be able to enjoy the full benefits of the aid that the friendly nations have so generously lavished upon it. Document IX-133 Address by the Secretary of State (Rusk) Before the American Foreign Service Association, June 23, 1965 (Excerpts) United States Call for "a Free Reports in the first half of June have confirmed . . . that what is wanted today in Hanoi is a military victory, not peace, and that Hanoi is not even prepared for discussions unless it is accepted in advance that there will be a Communist-dominated government in Saigon, and unless too-so far as we can determine-American forces are withdrawn in advance." So this record is clear. And there is substance in Senator Fulbright's conclusion that "It seems clear that the Communist powers still hope to achieve a complete victory in South Viet-Nam and for this reason are at present uninterested in negotiations for a peaceful settlement." For the simple truth is that there is no lack of diplomatic procedures, machinery, or process by which a desire for peace can be registered-that there is no procedural miracle through which peace can be obtained if one side is determined to continue the war. As I have said, Hanoi is presently adamant against negotiation or any avenue to peace. Peiping is even more so, and one can plainly read the declared doctrine and purpose of the Chinese Communists." They are looking beyond the current conflict to the hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia-and indeed beyond. But one finds it harder to understand Hanoi's aversion to discussion. 63 Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, pp. 50-55. 64 See footnote 23 to doc. IX-127, ante; and ante, docs. IX-128, 130. 65 Address before the Senate, June 15, 1965 (The Congressional Record, vol. III, pt. 10, June 15, 1965, pp. 13656-13657 (quotation on p. 13657)). 66 See footnote 25 to doc. IX-127, ante. More immediately than the Chinese, the North Vietnamese face the costs and dangers of conflict. They too, must fear the ambitions of Communist China in Southeast Asia. Yet they are still on the path of violence, insisting upon the forceful communization of South Viet-Nam and refusing to let their brothers in the South work out their own destiny in peace. In recent weeks, after 2 months of reduced activity, the enemy has sharply quickened the tempo of his military action in the South. Since early May, major Viet Cong units have returned to the battlefield, and already a series of sharp engagements has shown us that the fighting through the summer may be hard. Setbacks have occurred and serious defeats have been avoided only by the combination of continuing Vietnamese bravery and effective air and other types of support. Losses on both sides have been heavy. From April first to date, we have had confirmed reports of almost 5,000 Viet Cong dead, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese, and almost 100 Americans. We must expect these losses to continue-and our own losses may increase. In authorizing combat missions for our ground forces in Viet-Nam, the President acted to meet his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief. He has recognized the obligations of this nation under the Southeast Asia Treaty, which the Senate approved by a vote of 82-1.7 He has acted under the joint resolution of August 1964, which passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2-and passed the House with no opposing vote. This resolution expresses our national readiness-as the President determines "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States" and "all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" to help Viet-Nam and Southeast Asian members of the SEATO who ask for help to preserve their freedom. der the stress of war." We see there the ferment of a society still learning to be free, even while under attack from beyond their borders. We must remember that this ancient people is young in its independence, restless in its hopes, divided in its religions, and varied in its regions. The turmoil of Viet-Nam needs the steadfastness of America. Our friends in Viet-Nam know, and we know, that our people and our troops must work and fight together. Neither of us can do the work of the other. And the main responsibility must always be with, and is fully accepted by, the South Vietnamese. Yet neither of us can "go it alone." We would not be there without the urgent request for assistance from those whose land this happens to be. We have a tested faith in the enduring bravery of the people of VietNam, and they, in turn, can count on us with equal certainty. The people of Viet-Nam long for peace. And the way to peace is clear. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam set forth the fundamental principles that can provide a "just and enduring peace.' Those principles, in summary, are: 9978 -An end to aggression and subversion. -Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources." -As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Viet-Nam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam. -And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam. Now these are the fundamental steps. This is what the arguing and the fighting is all about. When they are carried out, we can look forward, as we have stated previously many 77 See footnote 59 to doc. IX-131, ante. 78 Supra. times, to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the peoples of North and South Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. This forthright and simple program meets the hopes of all and attacks the interests of none. It would replace the threat of conquest by the hope of free and peaceful choice. Document DX-134 Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked on a U.S. Information Agency Television Program, June 24, 1965 TM "The Point [by Hanoi] That South Viet-Nam Should Be Organized . . . in Accordance With the Program of the Liberation Front ... Is Not Acceptable" 80 The four points announced by Hanoi include the point that South Viet-Nam should be organized and resolved in accordance with the program of the Liberation Front. And, of course, that is not acceptable to the South Vietnamese or to the friends of South Viet-Nam. But we would be glad to go to the conference table to take up these agreements of 1954 81 and 1962 to see where things went wrong, to try to bring the situation back to those basic agreements, but these people on the other side won't even come to the conference table. You remember when Hanoi sent a delegation to Moscow some weeks ago, in their joint communique they expressed their interest in conferences on Cambodia and 79 Department of State Bulletin, July 19, 1965, p. 110. This interview was videotaped on June 24, 1965, for broadcast on July 4. 80 Ante, doc. IX-111. 81 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750–767, 785-787. 82 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083. Laos. All right, why not have such conferences? Let's get started. Let's get to the table. There's plenty to talk about. There's a great job to accomplish of restoring peace in Southeast Asia, to remove the dangers that are there at the present time. But you can't do it unless you get started, and that is why it's so puzzling to know why the other side won't come to a table, won't receive visits, won't let anyone discuss these problems with them, won't take any part in the process of discussion. |