On September 6, 1965, this Council, after calling upon the parties to cease hostilities and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965, unanimously went on to say that it:

Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution and the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures possible to strengthen the UNMOGIP (the observer force), and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area . . . .

Our Secretary-General did exactly that. He filed a steady stream of reports indicating the steps that he was taking pursuant to this resolution in order to give effect to what this Council had decided. And he frankly shared his thoughts, his views, his recommendations, and his actions with the members of the Council. On September 16-I shall not read all his reports as they are too voluminous and the hour is late-in his report, the SecretaryGeneral said this:

I have taken immediate steps to obtain extra transport and communications equipment to facilitate UNMOGIP in its task. I have also made provisional arrangements to increase the number of Military Observers in UNMOGIP at short notice, should developments make this increase necessary.3

We were on notice of this when we met on September 20 to consider the deteriorating situation which had developed in connection with this dispute. Being on notice of this, this Security Council again adopted a resolution which, in this respect, was agreed to by all parties. This Council requested in this resolution:

. . . the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel.

In another paragraph we requested "... the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution."

The next day the Secretary-General supplied us with another of his many reports. In this report the Secretary-General pointed out what had transpired during this period. The original cease-fire line was a cease-fire line of a little less than 500 miles. The Secretary-General reported that there were crossings of the border, the international

U.N. doc. S/6886.

boundary between the two countries, and then he went on to say:

The border between India and West Pakistan, where fighting has been taking place between India and Pakistan armed forces, extends for a distance of over 1,000 miles from the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas on the southern edge of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.1

Then he went on to point out specifically in detail that because of this situation:

In the supervision of the cease-fire and of the withdrawals, it is the intention to deploy, at least initially, a team of approximately 100 Military Observers with the necessary logistical and staff support.

He was not talking at that point about UNMOGIP; he was talking about recruiting a team of military observers for the international boundary, as we all necessarily understood. The Secretary-General continued:

It is the purpose to have those Observers in the area at the earliest possible date after the cease-fire becomes effective. According to tentative plans, the locations outside of Kashmir where Observers might be most usefully stationed would be the following . .

Then there are specified in detail the headquarters on the Indian side and on the Pakistan side for this group of observers. Then the Secretary-General went on in a separate paragraph to talk about what he intended with respect to UNMOGIP. He stated:

Security Council resolution 210 of 6 September 1965 calls upon the SecretaryGeneral "to take all measures possible to strengthen UNMOGIP". To this end, I have already made specific approaches to the Governments providing military observers to UNMOGIP to make available additional observers so that the over-all strength of UNMOGIP can be very substantially increased. As stated in my second report to the Council on my mission to India and Pakistan (S/6686)," I have also taken urgent steps to provide extra transport and communications equipment for UNMOGIP.

This Council met on September 27 and noted the reports of the Secretary-General. There was not a voice raised in this Council at the time, although we were fully apprised of every step that the Secretary-General had taken, that the Secretary-General in any sense was deviating from the mandate that this Council had given him in carrying out the task and heavy responsibility we had entrusted to him.

4 Ante, doc. IX-73.

5 See footnote 58 to doc. IX-68, ante.

And the Secretary-General did not leave us in the dark as to what he was doing. Quite the contrary; on October 1, 1965, he told us in specific detail what observers he was recruiting for both these forces: "As of 30 September, a total of ninety Observers have been provided for UNIPOM [United Nations IndiaPakistan Observer Mission]." Then he goes into it in detail. Then, "As of 30 September, a total of fifty-nine additional Observers had been provided for UNMOGIP."

Now, it seems to my Government and to my delegation that the Secretary-General has proceeded exactly in accord with the resolutions that this Council has unanimously adopted and that he has advised the members of the Security Council, step by step, of every step he has taken in order to execute the Council's resolutions. There would have been time at any point during these proceedings to raise the question of whether the Secretary-General was proceeding improperly, and that was not done. That was not done although the facts were known and were laid before us.

My Government wishes to commend the Secretary-General for the steps taken by him to carry out what we agreed upon here. And in regard to the status of the cease-fire, it is a plain and simple fact of life that we owe much to the patient efforts of the United Nations observers, who have promptly gone to work, thanks to the Secretary-General's expeditious action in responses to the Council's mandate to him on September 20, "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel," as well as the mandate of September 6, "to strengthen the UNMOGIP."

Had the Secretary-General not acted rapidly and firmly, with our authorization, and had he not received the prompt cooperation of the governments to which he turned for observer personnel and equipment, it is highly likely, in my view, that we would be meeting today not to call for the implementation of withdrawal but to call anew for the cessation of hostilities. There have

U.N. doc. S/6699/Add. 6. UNIPOM was to supervise withdrawals along the IndiaPakistan boundary apart from the Kashmir area, where the previously established UNMOGIP operated.

been violations, regretfully, of the cease-fire, and complaints from both sides have been confirmed by the observers on the spot; but it is nevertheless true, and it is apparent from the reports of the Secretary-General, that the observers are there, and the fact that they are there and that they arrived very promptly had much to do with the fact that the situation is not worse.

I wish to make it clear that my Government emphatically rejects the suggestion that the SecretaryGeneral acted beyond his mandate or that he should have consulted the Council in advance on the details of the actions he took under that mandate. In our view his actions were entirely reasonable, well within the limits that could be envisaged in view of the seriousness of the problem. If 43 observers were appropriate, as has been long recognized by this Council, to observe a cease-fire under peaceful conditions and in a cease-fire line of less than 500 miles, then 200 observers are obviously reasonable for supervising a ceasefire line that now extends 1,500 miles under the grave and troubled conditions that now exist between India and Pakistan.

I think I for one understood what the Council was mandating in our discussion. We made it very clear that we asked and requested and directed the Secretary-General to take steps to strengthen the force and also to take steps to see to it that there was appropriate supervision of what we had demanded that India and Pakistan should do. Therefore it seemed to me that there can be no question about this.

It is interesting to see that there is not always consistency in this area. Today we are told by my colleague from the Soviet Union that the Secretary-General acted improperly in the face of a resolution we adopted which called upon the Secretary-General to strengthen the observer force. I would like to remind the representative of the Soviet Union of his actions and his comments when the Dominican problem was before the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution inviting the Secretary-General "to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic." " When the resolution of

7 Post, doc. X-34.

May 14, 1965, was before the Council on June 9, Ambassador Fedorenko had this to say about that resolution, which invited the Secretary-General to send, as an urgent measure, a representative:

We also favor the view that the representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic should continue to supervise the cease-fire, and the Soviet delegation agrees that the membership of the group headed by Mr. Mayobre should be increased for the purpose of effectively carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council.s

And on July 20, 1965, the same thoughts were expressed by my friend Ambassador Fedorenko."

Now, it seems to me quite clear that if a resolution is adopted that says a representative is to be sent and it is the view of the Soviet Ambassador that this means the representative may recruit additional observers, it is quite inconsistent with the position taken today, that when the Security Council adopts a resolution mandating the Secretary-General to strengthen an existing observer force of 45, the actions taken by the Secretary-General are not appropriate under the circumstances.

I think that we ought to stick to the problem at hand, the real problem at hand. And our real problem at hand is a grave one: It is the problem of implementing the resolutions which we unanimously adopted; it is the problem of seeing to it that there is a prompt withdrawal of engaged forces; it is the problem of seeing to it that there is an honorable settlement between India and Pakistan; it is the problem of seeing to it that, when the withdrawal is effected, we then do what this Council determined to do, and that is, in terms of operative paragraph 4 of resolution S/RES/211 (1965), to decide "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict." That is the task of the Council; that is the task that the world is waiting for us to perform. It is not our task, in my opinion, and with all due respect, to raise questions which cannot be properly raised under the terms of the resolution which directed what has been done and which authorized the Secretary-General to do precisely what he did.

8 See U.N. doc. S/PV. 1222. See U.N. doc. S/PV. 1230.

Document IX-80

Resolution 215 (1965), Adopted by the U.N. Security Council, November 5, 1965 10

Reiteration by the United Nations Security Council of Its Demand for Observance of the Cease-Fire and Withdrawal of Forces by India and Pakistan

The Security Council,

Regretting the delay in the full achievement of a complete and effective cease-fire and a prompt withdrawal of armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as called for in its resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September," 210 (1965) of 6 September,12 211 (1965) of 20 September 13 and 214 (1965) of 27 September 1965,11

1. Reaffirms its resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965 in all its parts;

2. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to co-operate towards a full implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965); calls upon them to instruct their armed personnel to co-operate with the United Nations and cease all military activity; and insists that there be an end to violations of the cease-fire;

3. Demands the prompt and unconditional execution of the proposal already agreed to in principle by the Governments of India and Pakistan that their representatives meet with a suitable representative of the Secretary-General, to be appointed without delay after consultation with both parties, for the purpose of formulating an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties; urges that such a meeting shall take place as soon as possible and that such a plan contain a timelimit on its implementation; and requests the Secretary-General report on the progress achieved in

to

10 U.N. doc. S/RES/215. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Jordan and U.S.S.R.). 11 Ante, doc. IX-66. 12 Ante, doc. IX-68. 13 Ante, doc. IX-71. 14 Ante, doc. IX-77.

[Doc. IX-801 815

15 The U.N. Security Council meeting of Nov. 5 was the last held in 1965 to consider the India-Pakistan question. Subsequently, Secretary-General Thant continued to submit reports on observance of the cease-fire, compliance with the withdrawal provisions, and on his efforts to give effect to the Security Council's resolutions (see UN. docs. S/6699/Add. 10-11, S/6710/Add. 6-14, and S/6719/Add. 4).

16 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1965, p. 860.

17 Concerning suspension of U.S. military aid shipments, see ante, doc. IX-69. After enactment of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act (post, doc. XII-8), no new commitments were made on economic aid to India and Pakistan during 1965. 18 See ante, doc. IX-27.

Document IX-82

Statement Issued by the Soviet Government, December 8, 1965 20

Announcement of Agreement by the President of Pakistan (Ayub Khan) and the Prime Minister of India (Shastri) To Meet in Tashkent

The Soviet government, guided by the interests of peace and the desire to further an improvement in relations between India and Pakistan, has offered the governments of the two countries its good offices with respect to a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistani conflict." To this end the Soviet government submitted for the consideration of the governments of India and Pakistan a proposal to hold a meeting in Tashkent between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan.

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan have agreed to the Soviet government's proposal to meet in Tashkent on Jan. 4, 1966.

In accordance with the wishes of both sides, A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, will participate in this meeting when necessary.

19 These discussions continued into 1966 (see the Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1966, p. 17).

20 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 49, Dec. 29, 1965, pp. 23-24. 21 See ante, doc. IX-67.

SINGAPORE

THAILAND

Document IX-83

Message From the Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Foreign Minister of Singapore (Raja Ratnam), August 11, 1965 22

United States Recognition of Singapore as a Sovereign, Independent State

I have the honor to convey to the Government of Singapore the best wishes of the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the United States recognizes that the Independence of Singapore Agreement, 1965, The Proclamation of Singapore of August 9, and The Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965 represent the authoritative decision of the people of Singapore and of the people of Malaysia that their common interest in the welfare and security of their territories is best advanced on the basis of friendship and cooperation between independent and sovereign states. It is noted that these Acts make provision for the continuity of international obligations.

The United States Government therefore recognizes Singapore as an independent and sovereign state. Further, the Government and the people of the United States wish to reaffirm their close friendship for the Government and people of Singapore and to express their sincere desire for the successful development of the new state of Singapore. I look forward to early communication with you concerning the accreditation of representatives between our two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

22 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 30, 1965, p. 357. The text of the message was read to news correspondents by the Director of the Office of News, Robert J. McCloskey.

On Aug. 9, 1965, Singapore seceded from the Malaysian Federation and established itself as an independent state under the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

Document IX-84

Excerpt From an Address by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) Before the Open Forum, Daytona Beach, Fla., March 14, 1965 23

Thai Countermeasures to the Threat of Communist Subversion

We hear much these days about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. For very obvious reasons the focus is on Viet-Nam and to some extent on Laos, but I would like to draw your attention to another area in Southeast Asia where Communist China and other Asian Communists are involved in expansionism and subversion. I refer to the northeast area of Thailand, where there is an impressive and growing array of evidence that Thailand may become an important target for the Communists. However, this is something that the Thai Government has long foreseen and, with our assistance, has taken effective measures to counteract. Here are some of the facts:

Communist subversive activity within Thailand has centered primarily on the northeastern province of Nakhon Phanom, close to Communist-held areas of Laos. There have been acts of terror. There has been a step-up in attempted recruitment of Communist-type cadres among the villagers and a reported increase in the number of meetings called by Communists and Communist sympathizers, who parrot the Communist line and hand out propaganda materials.

There has also been a step-up in the radio propaganda effort. The voices of Radio Peiping and Radio Hanoi are strongly heard in northeast Thailand. They are supplemented by a clandestine radio, located in Communist-held areas of Laos (and at times in North VietNam), which calls itself the "Voice of the Thai People."

23 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 5, 1965, pp. 489 491.