more communicative and could respond much more to their suggestions and to their recommendations on the future of India and their 5year plan, and Pakistan and their plan, if our visit could follow the enactment of some of these bills instead of preceding them, because if it preceded them, I could not speak with authority. I would not know what the Congress would do. We have spent in excess of $10 billion in that area, and this year we will propose expenditures of more than $1 billion. But if the Congress said no to me and didn't pass the foreign aid bill or materially reduced it, I would have made a commitment that I could not support, so I said, "If you would like to come now in the month of May or June, during this period, we can have a visit, but we will not be able to be as responsive as I would like to be if you could come a little later in the year." 10 I have been host a few times in my life and when you put things that way, most people want to come at the time that would be most convenient to us, to the host, and would be most helpful to them. We communicated that to the appropriate people, and the answer came back that they would accept that decision. I think it was a good decision in our interest and I think it was a good decision in their interest. I am very sorry that our people have made a good deal of it, but the provocation of the differences sometimes comes about, and I regret it. So far as I know, it is a good decision, and a wise one, and one that I would make again tomorrow." Document IX-57 Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked at 10 See footnote 65 to doc. XII-9, post. 11 President Ayub Khan's visit was rescheduled for mid-December (see post, doc. IX-58), while Prime Minister Shastri was to come to the United States early in Feb. 1966; he died, however, on Jan. 11, 1966. I am quite sure that it would be important for President Ayub and President Johnson to have a personal review of the situation and to discuss our total relationships and where both of us go from here. We have very important common interests with Pakistan. We have always felt a very deep interest in the safety and the prosperity of Pakistan and have demonstrated that in many different ways. I think it will be very helpful for the two Presidents to get together and review where we are and help shape our plans for the future.13 12 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 27, 1965, pp. 1009-1010. 13 See infra. 14 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1966, p. 7. For the texts of remarks made by the two Presidents in the course of the visit, see ibid., pp. 2–7. 15 This visit was scheduled originally for Apr. 25-26, 1965; see ante, doc. IX-56. 18 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 696–700. 1 See post, docs. IX-61 et seq. President Johnson reaffirmed that the United States regards as vital to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan and expressed the continuing interest of the United States in Pakistan's economic and social development. President Ayub reaffirmed the importance that Pakistan attaches to a close and cooperative relationship with the United States and expressed the continuing desire of his Government to contribute to this objective. The two Presidents agreed on the need for a peaceful resolution of all outstanding differences between India and Pakistan, so that the energies and resources of the peoples of the subcontinent would not be wastefully diverted from their efforts to meet their vitally important social and economic problems. Within the context of a review of world-wide developments, the two Presidents discussed in depth the problem of achieving peace and stability in southeast Asia. They expressed the hope that the conflicts in that area would be peacefully resolved. They agreed that their diplomatic representatives would remain in close touch on these wider and critical Asian problems. THE PHILIPPINES Document IX-59 Statement Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy), Manila, March 8, 1965 21 United States Attitude on the Laurel-Langley Agreement As you know, this matter [parity question] was discussed between 18 Post, doc. IX-71. 19 Post, doc. IX-77. 20 Post, doc. IX-80. 21 Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1965, p. 664. Mr. Bundy made the statement upon his arrival at Manila en route to Baguio for an annual conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East. President Macapagal and President Johnson last October, and this was noted in the communique." Since then there have been continuing consultations, and my Government has given the matter careful consideration. 1974 is a long way off, and it may be premature to be talking about what kind of agreement should replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement. That agreement is a very special contract between our two sovereign countries, and I think it has served well both Philippine and U.S. interests in its first 10 years of operation. During the life of the present agreement, its provisions will naturally continue to be operative. We believe that both countries will want to have a framework for continuity of a trade and investment relationship which will be mutually beneficial when the present agreement ceases. As far as the parity article is concerned-article VI of the agreement we are aware of Philippine interest in seeing that this provision expires in 1974, and on our side I can say that we have no intention of seeking its extension. We assume, of course, that rights acquired prior to 1974 will be protected in accordance with the Philippine Constitution. 24 22 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 946-949. 23 The United States-Philippine Trade Agreement. TIAS 3348; 6 UST 2981; see also American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2360-2363. 24 The terms of art. VI "mutualize as between citizens of both countries the right to use and exploit natural resources and operate public utilities on the basis of national treatment." (Ibid., p. 2363.) Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 30, 1965, p. 358. 2 Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, signed at Manila and entered into force Aug. 10, 1965 (TIAS 5851; 16 UST 1090). now a part of the military bases agreement of 1947 which governs the presence of U.S. forces and bases in the Philippines.” The new arrangement, patterned after the NATO status-of-forces formula, provides for U.S. primary jurisdiction over American servicemen present in the Philippines in connection with U.S. bases there in cases involving offenses arising from acts or omission done in performance of official duty, offenses solely against the property or security of the United States, and offenses solely against the person or property of U.S. personnel. The Philippines has primary jurisdiction in all other cases, including those on U.S. bases. Each country has exclusive jurisdiction regarding offenses punishable under its own laws but not by laws of the other country. THE RANN OF KUTCH AND THE KASHMIR QUESTION Document IX-61 Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, May 26, 1965 28 United States Position on the We, of course, fully support the efforts made by the British Government. It is in touch with both sides to try to arrange a cease-fire and a resumption of political discussions of differences that divide these two great countries of the subcontinent." We are in touch with both Governments frequently on this matter, and 27 Text in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 869-881. Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1965, p. 945. During the first half of 1965, there was increased tension between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch along their western frontier, culminating in armed conflict between the two countries in April. During this period, the two Governments addressed a series of communications to the U.N. Security Council concerning the situation. See U.N. docs. S/6281, S/6291, S/6308, S/6321, S/6322, S/6340, S/6340/Add.1, S/6389, S/6423, and S/6466. we would hope very much that these discussions could come to a good conclusion. I think as far as details are concerned that I wouldn't want to elaborate at this point, because I think the processes of peace here are too important to get into prematurely and I wouldn't want to make things more difficult for those who are trying to work out a peaceful settlement in both countries and between both countries. Document IX-62 Agreement Between India and TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN CONCERNING THE RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE Whereas both the Governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to a cease-fire and to restoration of the status quo as at 1 January 1965, in the area of the Gujarat/West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border; Whereas it is necessary that after the status quo has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat/West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area; Now therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area: Article 1 There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hours, Greenwich mean time, i.e., 0530 hours West Pakistan standard time, or 0600 hours, Indian standard time, on 1 July 1965. 30 U.N. doc. S/6507. The text of the agreement was annexed to a letter, dated July 6, 1965, from the Pakistani Representative at the U.N. (Amjad Ali) to the President of the U.N. Security Council (Fedorenko). Article 2 On the cease-fire: (i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw; (ii) This process will be completed within seven days; (iii) Indian police may then reoccupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on 31 December 1964; (iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to 1 January 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to 1 January 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964; (v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with each other, and in particular will act in accordance with the West PakistanIndia border ground rules, agreed to in January 1960; (vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (iii) to (v) above and to agree on the settlement of any such problems. Article 3 (i) In view of the fact that: (a) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well-established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground. (b) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th parallel, as is clear from several pre-partition and postpartition documents, and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory. (c) At the discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute. As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in article 2, paragraph (vi), which in any case will not be later than one month after the cease-fire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceedings before the tribunal referred to in article 3, paragraphs (ii) and (iv) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full. (ii) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached, within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communiqué of 24 October 1959, have recourse to the tribunal referred to in paragraph (iii) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and evidence produced before it and the decision of the tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties. (iii) For this purpose there shall be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government, and the third member, who will be the chairman, shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the chairman within three months of the cease-fire, they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the chairman." (iv) The decision of the tribunal referred to in paragraph (iii) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both 31 On Dec. 14, 1965, the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (U Thant), at the request of the two Governments, nominated Judge Gunnar Lagergren of Sweden as chairman of the arbitral tribunal (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 160). Document IX-64 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), September 3, 1965 (Excerpt)31 The Situation in Kashmir Purpose of This Report 1. This report on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to recent extensive disregard for the Cease-Fire Agreement and the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir (CFL), together with the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is submitted in order to provide information for the use of the Council. In the course of my recent consultations with members of the Council, a need for a report from me was generally expressed. The report will serve to inform the Members of the grave situation that has developed in Kashmir, of my deep concern about it, and of the steps I have been taking in past weeks in seeking to avert further deterioration of that situation and to restore normal conditions in the area. For this same purpose, I presented to the Council members individually on 31 August an informal and confidential paper, which was made available also to India and Pakistan. Gravity of the Situation 2. There can be little doubt that the Kashmir problem has again become acute and is now dangerously serious. Implicit in it, in my view, is a potential threat to peace not only between India and Pakistan, but to the broader peace. As SecretaryGeneral, my primary concern at this stage has been necessarily with the current breaches of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL. There is, of course, a long and extensive background to the Kashmir problem, of which the Cease-Fire Agreement is but one aspect. No effort is made in this report to assess the political background of the problem or the possible root causes of the recent unusually large number of violations of the CFL. Thus, reference to the political factors in the broad Kashmir issue, past and present, and political assessments or judgements are avoided here. Though fully 34 U.N. doc. S/6651. This and subsequent reports were submitted to the U.N. Security Council. |