agreement in Yemen between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia" in the effort to ensure against any developments in the situation that might threaten the peace of the area. As I reported to the Security Council on 2 July 1964, the Mission observed only a disappointing measure of disengagement, in particular with regard to the withdrawal of the troops of the United Arab Republic, and I appealed most urgently to the parties concerned to meet at the highest level with a view to achieving full and rapid implementation of the disengagement agreement. I also warned the Council that in my opinion the Mission should be terminated in September 1964, if no improvement in the situation was by then evident. The parties concurred in the termination of the Mission on 4 September. Since that time there have been favourable developments, culminating in consultations and agreement at the highest level among the parties, which I had always felt to be essential to a solution of the situation in Yemen.

As far as the United Nations Mission was concerned, its mandate was so limited, being restricted to observation and reporting only, that inevitably the results achieved were widely interpreted as disappointing. There is little doubt that the Mission could have accomplished much more if its functions had been broader and stronger. Yet, in the circumstances, I believe that the Mission actually accomplished more than could have been expected of it and that, during its fourteen months of existence, it exercised an important restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. The problem continued inevitably to rest between the two principal countries involved, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, whose Heads of State have now successfully brought their statesmanship to bear on finding an agreed settlement.

VIII

In the introduction to the annual report last year, I recalled the continued efforts of the United Nations in the field of decolonization and referred to the major questions in that field for which solutions had to be found through peaceful means and which therefore called for attention by the General Assembly.

"See ibid., pp. 603-605.

Text ibid., 1964, pp. 726-727.

In the intervening period, another former dependent territory, the Gambia, acceded to independence and constitutional progress towards self-government and independence was made in some of the remaining dependent territories. However, the problems to which I referred last year remain without any positive movement towards peaceful solution. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which continued to discharge its mandate as established by the General Assembly in resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963," accordingly gave priority in its work to examining the situation in those territories which continued to give cause for serious concern.

With regard to Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government found it necessary, in view of its concern about the possibility of unconstitutional action by the Government of the Territory, to reiterate its warning of the serious consequences which would flow from a unilateral declaration of independence by that Government. It also reaffirmed its intention of pursuing the search for a political settlement based on general consent. However, no progress can yet be recorded in this regard and it is to be hoped that a basis for early independence, acceptable to the majority of the population, will soon be found which, in conformity with United Nations resolutions, will embody full democratic freedom and recognition of the equal rights of all the inhabitants.

In the case of the territories under Portuguese administration, there was no change in Portugal's position of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions and in its refusal to co-operate with the Organization in implementing them. Far from recognizing the right of the inhabitants to self-determination, as laid down by the General Assembly, it pursued its policy of closer political and economic integration of the territories with Portugal.

Likewise, South Africa has maintained its disregard of United Nations resolutions concerning South

39 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 164–166.

West Africa and its attitude of nonco-operation in this respect. In addition to continuing the application of apartheid policies in the territory, it has taken preliminary steps to implement some of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission which, in the view of the Special Committee, would lead to the partition of the territory and its absorption into South Africa.40

In regard to the territories mentioned above, the Special Committee gave increasing attention to the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence. It is the hope of the Special Committee that a study of these activities will result in greater appreciation of some of the factors impeding the implementation of the Declaration.

At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly, following a recommendation by the Special Committee and in response to an invitation by New Zealand as the administering Power, authorized the supervision by the United Nations of the elections in the Cook Islands, including observation of the proIceedings concerning the Constitution in the Legislative Assembly to be elected." The report of the United Nations Representative appointed for the purpose remains to be considered by the General Assembly." It is hoped that the Assembly's deliberations and those of the Special Committee will lead to increased cooperation between administering Powers and the Organization in regard to dependent territories.

Another development of note was the decision of the Special Committee to hold meetings in Africa during May and June 1965 in order to establish direct contact with peoples under colonial rule in the continent and to acquire a deeper knowledge of their situation as well as of their aspirations.

In the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa, emphasis was placed on the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to secure the effective exercise and enjoyment of the

40 See ibid., 1964, p. 211, footnote 33.

41 See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, pp. 570–574.

42 U.N. doc. A/AC.109/L 228 and Corr.1.

rights set forth in the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)." In one of these resolutions, the Special Committee recommended that the Security Council and the General Assembly should take the positive measures laid down in the Charter to ensure respect for the rights of the African populations in Southern Rhodesia, in Territories under Portuguese administration, in South West Africa and in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland." At the same time, the Special Committee requested all States and all international institutions to refuse assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and the minority settler régime of Southern Rhodesia, so long as the latter failed to renounce their policy of colonial domination and the practice of apartheid.

IX

The situation in the Republic of South Africa presents no less dark and disturbing a picture than previously. As a result of further study by the United Nations organs, it was also revealed in clearer detail than ever before. The Expert Committee established under the Security Council resolution of 18 June 1964 17 submitted its report at the end of February 1965. The Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa continued to follow the situation constantly and submitted two reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council, with a number of recommendations for action."

It is to be regretted that the South African Government has failed to respond to the invitation of the Security Council to accept the main conclusion of the Group of Experts that "all the people of South Africa should be brought into consultation and should thus be enabled to decide the future of their country at the national level". Such consultations are crucial to any efforts to find a solution which would take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of all the people of South Africa. Attempts to impose solutions by force, when a great majority of the people do not have representation in the sovereign Parliament, can only lead to increased bitterness, tension and conflict.

The Security Council and the General Assembly are due to consider the situation soon in the light of the most recent developments, which have in no way diminished its seriousness. The overwhelming feeling among Member States is clearly that it is essential to secure an abandonment of the policies of apartheid and a resolution of the situation through the full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all the inhabitants of South Africa, regardless of race, colour or creed, in order to forestall serious dangers to peace and to fulfil the objectives of the United Nations. I would hope, therefore, that earnest efforts will be

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 802-804. See post, doc. VIII-27.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 809-811; and post, doc. VIII-27.

Cited in footnote 48 above.

made to overcome differences about procedures and specific measures and that effective action commanding the widest support in the Organization will be taken.

Such action, in my opinion, should make it clear that the solution sought by the United Nations is one which takes full account of the legitimate rights and concerns of all the people of South Africa, and which emerges through free discussions among representatives of all the people. It should express the readiness and willingness of the United Nations to assist those people in the search for such a solution. In view of the grave dangers of tension and conflict, the United Nations should give the utmost attention to political and humanitarian measures which would not leave violence as the only means of fulfilling legitimate aspirations, and which would help counteract the growth of racial bitterness and tension. In this connexion, I wish to express my appreciation to several Member States who have responded to the appeal in General Assembly resolution 1978 B (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 for assistance to families of persons persecuted for their opposition to apartheid.1

Meanwhile I have been taking steps, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, to establish a programme for the education and training of South Africans abroad. A few fellowships and grants have been awarded for the academic year 1965-1966, and the full programme is expected to come into operation next year. I hope that this programme will receive the generous support of Member States.

X

I feel bound to emphasize that the actual financial crisis, in which the Organization has for too long found itself placed, has by no means been dispelled by the consensus reached by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and, in effect, accepted by the General Assembly on 1 September 1965.52 As I write these words, our financial difficulties remain serious, and it seems appropriate for me to restate them here in factual terms.

51 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 700–701. 52 Post, doc. II-33.

During the first eight months of this year the Organization's cash outgo to meet its current operating expenses and to settle some of its most pressing debts from prior years exceeded its cash income. As a result it was necessary on several occasions during this period to borrow money temporarily from special funds and accounts in my custody, in order to meet the payroll and other day-to-day expenses.

Between 1 January and 31 August 1965, the Organization received a total of approximately $73.6 million from Governments consisting of advance payments towards the regular budget and United Nations Emergency Force expenses for 1965 ($35.4 million); payments of assessed contributions to the regular budget, and to the accounts of the Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo for 1964 and prior years ($18.5 million); voluntary contributions to assist the Organization out of its present financial difficulties and voluntary contributions to the Emergency Force and Congo accounts ($18.5 million); and deferred payment for a United Nations bond ($1.2 million). During the same period miscellaneous income, other than from staff assessment, was received in an amount estimated at $4.3 million in respect of the regular budget and Emergency Force accounts.

The Organization's expenses for the same eight-month period in respect of the regular budget and the Emergency Force are estimated as having totalled approximately $72 million. Since, in addition to paying current operating expenses, it was necessary to settle some of the more pressing debts from prior years, all the income received in the first eight months of 1965 was disbursed, the relatively modest cash balances which the Organization had available at the beginning of this year were drawn down, and it became necessary to resort to the borrowings referred to above.

My estimate is that, as of the beginning of September, an amount of approximately $100 million would be required to enable the Organization to liquidate in full the obligations currently outstanding against the special accounts of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operation in the Congo; to meet in full the additional

obligations that will be incurred, in the case of the Emergency Force, between 1 September 1965 and such time as a decision will have been reached at the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the future of that operation and its financing; to restore the Working Capital Fund to its authorized level of $40 million; and to cover amounts due to Member States as adjustments on assessed contributions for the costs of the two peace-keeping forces.

It has been agreed, in the terms of the consensus referred to earlier, that these financial difficulties should be solved through voluntary contributions by Member States. At the time of writing, such contributions paid or pledged total somewhat less than one fifth of the amount required. I have already made an urgent appeal to all who have not yet done so to come forward with contributions. I should like to reiterate this appeal; and I do so with some confidence that, on reflection, Governments will see the clear and pressing need to enable the Organization to solve its financial difficulties, in view of the stake they have in its survival and the value they attach to its present and potential usefulness.

The amendments enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and alter the number of votes necessary for decisions by the Security Council. In order to give effect to the amendments, elections will be held during the twentieth session of the General Assembly to fill both the new seats and those which will become vacant on 31 December 1965 in the two Councils. This procedure is consistent with As1991 sembly resolution (XVIII), which provides that elections to fill both old and new seats should be held at the same time. In accordance

5 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 73-75. 54 See supra and infra.

with rule 140 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the term of office of the members of the Councils will begin on 1 January 1966.

It will be a matter of general satisfaction that the wish of the Organization to see the composition of two of its principal organs reflect more adequately the present membership will thus be fulfilled with a minimum of delay.

XII

I referred at the beginning to certain developments on the international scene which have inevitably had their repercussions on the United Nations. Of these, perhaps the most important is the escalation of the conflict in Viet-Nam, even though, paradoxically, the problem of Viet-Nam is one in regard to which the Organization has not been able to take any constructive action. This of course is to some extent understandable. The settlement reached at Geneva in 1954 prescribed no role for the Organization in the settlement that was to follow. Neither North Viet-Nam nor South Viet-Nam is a Member of the United Nations, and most recently the parties directly interested in the VietNam conflict have openly voiced the view that the United Nations as such has no place in the search for a solution to the problem of Viet-Nam. This last factor, of course, cannot by itself prevent the United Nations from discussing the problem, but it does militate against the Organization being able to play a constructive role at this stage.

It is because of the profound effect that the Viet-Nam situation is having on problems of global as well as regional importance, and the shadow it casts on almost every area of international co-operation, that I have devoted considerable personal effort in the realm of quiet diplomacy to getting the parties concerned to stop the fighting and to start the discussions which alone, in my view, can lead to a solution. I remain as fully convinced as ever that total victory or total defeat for one side or the other is out of the question and that military action cannot bring peace and restore stability to the

For the rules of procedure of the General Assembly as of Dec. 31, 1965, see U.N. doc. A/520/Rev. 8.

See American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 750-788.

area. The only way to those goals is the way of discussions; and it is clear, as I have stated previously, that those discussions can yield fruitful results only if there is a willingness by all sides to make major concessions.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the profound and dangerous effect which, however paradoxical the circumstances, the present situation in Viet-Nam is having on the atmosphere in the United Nations, reflecting in turn the impact of the dispute upon the relations between East and West. Patient and persistent efforts over several years, within the United Nations as well as outside it, had brought East and West closer together than at any other time in the past decade and had opened up many real possibilities of fruitful collaboration. Signs at last were present of a thaw in international affairs which could be encouraged not only to endure but also to spread around the world. The conflict over Viet-Nam has cruelly set back that trend and has served to revive, to intensify and even to extend some of the attitudes of the cold war. The conflict engages not only the lives of the soldiers and civilians who are caught up in the present fighting. It threatens also to affect the peace of the world and the fate of all mankind. It must be stopped.

One of the issues before the United Nations on which the situation in Viet-Nam has had a noticeable impact is disarmament, on which I have made some comments elsewhere in this introduction. The lack of substantial progress, both in the discussions of the Disarmament Commission in New York and the subsequent meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, is one obvious result of the intensification of the cold war. I feel most strongly, however, that the time has come when the nuclear Powers must agree on the total banning of nuclear tests, including underground tests, and take at least the first positive steps towards the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that progress in these two directions is in the interest of all countries-whether they be large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear and I very much hope that the deliberations of the twentieth session of the General Assembly will