The Arab Kings and Presidents have reviewed the situation in the African continent and seriously considered the positive role that the Organization of African Unity has played in the liberation and progress of the continent. They support the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, and so-called Portuguese Guinea for their liberation. They denounce the policy of Apartheid in South Africa, and denounce equally the attempts at the proclamation of independence by Southern Rhodesia in such a way as to give power to a minority. They support the OAU's efforts to resolve this problem and solidify themselves to oppose imperialist and Zionist infiltration efforts in Africa and Asia.

They support disarmament and the prohibition of the proliferation

of nuclear weapons. They call for the liquidation of foreign bases that threaten the security of the Arab region and international peace.

They affirm the necessity of establishing equitable economic relations between states in order to achieve economic and social prog

ress.

They express their satisfaction at the resolution of the crisis faced by the United Nations.28

They are convinced of the necessity of strengthening world organization by all methods in the service of peace and international cooperation.

Responding to the invitation of Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and President of the Council of Ministers of the Algerian Democratic Popular Republic, the Council decided to hold its next session at Algiers in September 1966.

700,000 for the support of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 1965. This contribution, as in the past, will be both in cash and in foodstuffs. The volume of foodstuffs being provided under this pledge will, of course, continue to be affected by fluctuations in prices on world markets, which have recently, for the most part, shown an upward trend.

As in the past, the U.S. contribution will be made available to the extent that it does not exceed 70 percent of the total contributions by all governments. We continue to feel, however, that the United States is bearing an unduly high proportion of UNRWA's expenses, and accordingly we plan to reduce the total U.S. contribution for next year by $1 million.3

The increasing costs of both relief and education will oblige the contributors, the host countries, and, in fact, all the members of the U.N., to focus more sharply on the problem of UNRWA finances. During the past year the United States undertook, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, a global campaign to raise more funds for UNRWA. We will continue to encourage increased contributions to the agency, but at the same time we believe that the states directly concerned should themselves assume a larger responsibility in seeking contributions for UNRWA and the Arab refugees.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the costs are increasing to such a point that some cuts in expenditures must be made. The United States concurs, therefore, in the reduction in the relief budget for 1965 recommended in the Commissioner General's annual report. We believe that the necessary economies can in fact be accomplished by the long-needed rectification of the relief rolls without affecting the provision of relief to genuinely needy refugees. Rectification would not only result in the elimination of a significant number of ineligible recipients, acknowledged by both UNRWA and the host governments to be presently on the relief rolls, but would insure that the recipients of the agency relief pro

See post, doc. VII-19.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 705-706.

gram were, in fact, the truly eligible and truly needy among the refugees.

As we stressed last year in making our pledge, we continue to support an increased emphasis on educational and vocational training programs." Accordingly, in making our pledge, we do so not only on the understanding that the agency will undertake the projected reduction in the relief budget as proposed in the Commissioner General's annual report but also on the understanding that funds allocated for education, health, or other sections of the budget will not be transferred to the relief services budget. We believe further that any existing surplus should be conserved for future educational needs.

Finally, let me take this opportunity to express our appreciation and support to the Commissioner General [Lawrence Michelmore] and his staff for the work they have so successfully carried out in the past year. We wish them all success in their difficult and essential undertakings this year and offer them our fullest support.

Document VII-9

Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, February 25, 1965 (Excerpt)'

United States Desire "To Put Some Ceilings on This . . . [Arab-Israel] Arms Race in the Near East"

We have been interested in some sort of reasonable balance in the armed forces in the area [-the Near East]. As you know, Western Europe has been the primary supplier of arms to Israel. We ourselves have tried not to be active in the Near East in the arms field, although we have taken some steps in that regard because for some years we have been trying to find some way in

See ibid., 1963, pp. 578–579.

Total pledges to UNRWA for fiscal year 1965 amounted to $34.1 million; see U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1965 (Department of State publication 8137), p. 76.

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15, 1965, p. 367.

which to put some ceilings on this neighborhood arms race in the Near East. We have been working with the governments concerned to find out whether it is possible that this arms race might somehow be turned downward.s

Document VII-10

Reply Made by the Director of the Office of News (McCloskey), Department of State, to a Question Asked at a News Conference, April 23, 1965

United States Approval of
"Any Initiative Designed
To Bring About a Permanent
and Peaceful Solution of the
Arab-Israeli Dispute"

We welcome wholeheartedly any initiative designed to bring about a permanent and peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. President Bourguiba has made some suggestions which could form the substance for negotiations.1o

Now, I should add that, while any comment by us on these suggestions at this time would be inappropriate, I would say that the forthright way in which President Bourguiba has broached this subject offers hope that fresh approaches may be made to this difficult problem.

* See ante, doc. VII-2.
'Department of State files.

10 On Apr. 21, speaking before the National Council of the National Federation of Destourian Students in Tunis, President Bourguiba had proposed a settlement by the Arab nations with Israel on the basis of the U.N. resolutions of Nov. 29, 1947, and Dec. 11, 1948 (texts in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 820-839, 851-853). This would have meant surrender by Israel of approximately one-third of its presently held territory; President Bourguiba felt that the Palestinian Arab refugees could then be resettled in the areas surrendered by Israel. Such a solution, of course, would have involved Arab acceptance of the state of Israel.

Arab reaction to President Bourguiba's proposal was not favorable (see post, docs. VII-11-12, 14). Israel, while it welcomed from an Arab State the suggestion of a peaceful solution, was unwilling to accept one based on the 1947-48 U.N. plans. (See The New York Times, Apr. 23, 25, 29, 30, and May 18, 1965.)

The Near and Middle East

Document VII-11

Message From the President of Tunisia (Bourguiba) to the President of the U.A.R. (Nasser), April 27, 1965 (Excerpts)11

Tunisian Proposal for a Solution to the Arab-Israel Dispute on the Basis of the 1947 and 1948 United Nations Resolutions

It is my duty, as a brother and as an Arab, to speak to you about a matter which is dear to all our hearts. and which has been the subject of many exchanges of views between us; and on which I thought we were in agreement regarding the main issues.

This is why I consider it useful for me to address you directly. I shall do so with the frankness I have always shown during our private talks, as well as in the public statements I have made on various occasions.

We are all agreed that the Arab states, in the present circumstances, are unable to wage a war against Israel to liberate Palestine and return it to its rightful owners. In this connection, I would remind you of the proceedings of the conferences held at Cairo and Alexandria.1 In so doing, I don't think I am disclosing any secret. At the present time, the Arab states are not in a position to conduct an offensive operation for two main reasons:

(1) They are not prepared either to face a war or to accept the principle of the infiltration of armed commandos into Palestine.

11 Department of State files. The source text is a translation of the French version which was printed in L'Action, Tunis, Apr. 30, 1965. This message was not delivered directly to President Nasser prior to its publication (see infra). The Tunisian Ambassador in Cairo had been ordered home for consultation because of anti-Tunisian demonstrations at the Embassy there which took place in response to earlier attacks in Tunis upon the Syrian Consulate and the U.A.R. and Iraqi Embassies after the governments of those countries had criticized President Bourguiba's Apr. 21 statement on Palestine (see footnote 10 to doc. VII-10, supra).

12 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 675-676, 688-691.

[Docs. VII-10, 11] 591

(2) International conditions preclude the possibility of a war because both the East and the West camps are agreed on the maintenance of peace and they are also prepared to put down any attempt to change, by force, the status quo of the region.

While nothing at present gives one reason to hope for a change in this situation in the near future, defense expenditures are an increasing burden on the Arab states, limiting their development capabilities and, therefore, their chances of achieving both power and security.

I have often had the opportunity to discuss this problem with leaders of the Arab East. They invariably said that they deeply regretted to see the Arabs persist in negative attitudes regarding the solutions proposed by the United Nations. You yourself said during a talk on the same subject that you had started a wave of dissatisfaction when you stated, at the Bandung Conference,13 that what the U.N. had offered in 1947 and in 1948 could be considered a satisfactory solution." I answered by saying that I was willing to make this a public proposal and I added, in jest: "I hope that I will not then be attacked by the Cairo radio and by the Voice of the Arabs!"

In fact, the plan I suggested in Jericho, Jerusalem, and Lebanon,15 and which I had the opportunity to develop and clarify in subsequent statements, is no different in substance from the position you took in 1955. Indeed, it was this same plan that I proposed in the address I gave during the first Arab summit conference, held in Cairo in January 1964. It is a plan aimed neither at relinquishment nor at accepting half-solutions, as some people believe. On the contrary, it aims at reactivating a matter long mired in stagnation and decay, a matter which international public opinion was about to forget and which our friends of the non-aligned and third worlds are unanimous in considering a closed case. Therefore, our

13 See American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 23442352.

14 Texts of the U.N. resolutions referred to are printed in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 19411949, pp. 820-839, 851-853.

15 President Bourguiba made a tour of several Near Eastern countries in Feb.Mar. 1965.

bounden duty is to save it from degradation by again including it among the problems of international

concern.

It is also our imperative duty not to ignore the role of political strategy and not to count exclusively on force because, as I have said, it cannot give positive results. Hence it is necessary to win allies and to prepare international public opinion to help us in one way or another. That is why I suggested that we consider once again the possibility of accepting the U.N. resolutions-the one on partition, which would result in returning to the Arab states a large part of Palestine now occupied by Israel, and the one concerning the return of Arab refugees.

I expected-and the facts proved me right-that Israel would refuse to abide by the U.N. resolutions. In so doing Israel, against her will, strengthens our position because the Arab countries, in their fight for Palestine, will appear as the defenders of legality and affirm their devotion to the principles of the United Nations.

I was convinced-and there again, facts proved me right-that the great powers would condemn Israel's refusal to comply with the U.N. resolutions, and this would be bound to benefit the Arab states indirectly, to the very extent that any strife between Israel and her supporters would not fail to shake the foundations of Zionist colonialism.

There are two alternatives: either Israel finally recognizes the decisions of the International Organization-this is the least likely possibility-and consequently agrees to the return of the refugees and the surrender of part of the occupied territory. Thus the facts of the situation will change in favor of the Arabs and new possibilities may arise, showing the way to a final settlement.

Or else and this is more likelyIsrael is adamant in her refusal. In this case, the Arabs will enjoy the stronger position, even in the event of war. In any event, the important thing is to take the problem out of the freezer and reactivate it. Then it will of necessity move quickly toward the phase that will inevitably

16 See footnote 10 to doc. VII-10, supra.