among the leaders of the two communities of sufficient earnestness and intensity to lead them toward those mutual accommodations in viewpoint and position which are essential to pacific settlement. The international community can only help and assist. The key to a settlement, however, lies in the last analysis, with the parties. Unless they are prepared to move towards resolving their basic differences, the prospects of an early solution are dim indeed. It is not without significance that fruitful negotiations on agreements covering local situations in Cyprus, such as that recently achieved at Famagusta, have usually come on the heels of serious fighting.

214. The financial situation affecting the operation in Cyprus can only be described as acute. As I have indicated in my report to the Council of 19 November 1965 (S/6954), the voluntary contribution method of financing the Force provided for in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575), has failed by far to provide adequate revenue. The Force has been supported up to now by the generosity of a relatively small number of Governments. This generosity from the same sources cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. Some of the donors have already begun to manifest reluctance and some have warned that their contributions in the future may depend upon evidence of an earnest attack on the causes of conflict and progress towards a solution.

215. Obviously, the ranks of the contributors should be considerably broadened. There is, to be sure, no legal obligation on any Member Government to make a voluntary contribution, but since the action was taken by unanimous vote of the Security Council, there is a moral obligation on all members, particularly on the members of the Security Council itself, and more especially on the parties directly concerned.

216. A political impasse has paralyzed the mediation effort and present indications are that it cannot be easily broken." Yet, it must be clear that mediation in some form offers the main hope for a breakthrough to future harmony and tranquility in that troubled isle.

217. My Special Representative, Mr. Carlos Bernardes, and the Com72 See ante, docs. IV-75-76.

mander of the Force in Cyprus, General K. S. Thimayya, all members of that Force, and all of the civilian personnel engaged in the mission are to be highly commended for their contributions to the remarkable success of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus. They have shown dedication, skill and courage in carrying out the functions of this quite unique operation.

218. It is my considered view that the Force in Cyprus should be extended after 26 December, preferably for a period of six months," but also that assurances of the necessary financial support to sustain it should be forthcoming in advance of a decision to extend the Force.

Document IV-83

Statement Made by the Deputy U.S. Representative (Nabrit) in the U.N. Security Council, December 17, 1965 74

United States Support for

Extension of the Mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Once again, Mr. President, this Council meets to consider the extension of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. We meet in the wake of the debate on Cyprus in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

In that debate my delegation, in commenting on the magnificent job which UNFICYP has done in carrying out its mandate, cited the efforts of Ambassador [Carlos Alfredo] Bernardes and General [K.S.] Thimayya in the dangerous Famagusta episode as one more example of their skill and dedication.” That recent flareup in Famagusta points up the need to keep the U.N. Force in Cyprus.

In emphasizing the imperative necessity for the extension of the

73 See post, docs. IV-83-84.

74 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 7. 1966, pp. 210-211.

75 See footnote 67 to doc. IV-82, supra. Gen. Thimayya died on Dec. 18, leaving UNFICYP under the acting command of Brig. A. J. Wilson.

76

U.N. Force in Cyprus, however, my delegation spoke of the grave concern over the financial problems with which the Secretary-General deals in some detail in the report that he has placed before us. With your permission, Mr. President, I will repeat what Ambassador [Charles W. Yost said on this subject in the Political Committee of the present Assembly on December 13.

If essential funds are not forthcoming, this operation simply cannot continue. I it should be interrupted or reduced to a point at which it is no longer effective, the United Nations would have suffered a major setback. There would be the gravest risk that the bloody events of late 1963 and early 1964 would be reenacted and the United Nations would have falled in a major peacekeeping responsibility. Therefore, to those who have already given to this operation, I would join the SecretaryGeneral in asking that they not withhold even greater support at this critical hour. To those countries who have not yet contributed, I particularly appeal for tangible support of the United Nations in its mission of peace and stability. To the parties directly concerned in the Cyprus problem who are the chief beneficiaries of UNFICYP's efforts, I would direct an especially urgent appeal for them to do much more."

I urge this Council here today to go on record in a strong appeal in support of the Secretary-General's request for additional contributions for UNFICYP from all U.N. members.

Mr. President, serious as the financial problem is, I do not think that we would be wise to delay a decision on a further extension of the Force. My delegation, along with several others, has been actively engaged during the past weeks in attempts to supplement the efforts of the Secretary-General to stimulate additional contributions. We will continue those efforts. As we indicated in the Assembly, my Government is prepared to make an additional contribution toward the current financial deficit, provided such contributions are also received from a substantial number of other states. The United States will also continue its financial support of the U.N. operation in Cyprus if the Council, as we believe it should, decides to extend that operation.

December 13, my delegation also stated:

The world community is entitled to expect that, when a dispute is brought before the United Nations and the United Nations acts to keep that dispute within bounds and to promote a climate conducive to negotiations, the parties involved will feel an obligation to bring the dispute promptly to a close.78

It was almost a year ago that we said in this Council that the time for sterile recrimination, for clinging to rigid positions, had passed. The parties owe it to the world community and to those who have actively supported the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations to be about the work of solving the dispute. I repeat that advice here today with the utmost seriousness.

An accommodation does not require compromise of principle. What is required, and what appears to date to have been lacking, is a sense of urgency and a will to conciliation. The Secretary-General's report underscores the absence of such a will. It is the duty of this Council, Mr. President, to carry home to the parties the message that the United Nations expects them to move forward toward a resolution of their differences and to do so with all dispatch.

In this connection my delegation looks with favor on the constructive appeal to the parties made by our distinguished colleague, the representative of the Netherlands, to enter into negotiations looking to an early solution of the dispute and requests the Secretary-General to give every assistance in facilitating such negotiations and to reactivate the mediation effort, which has been in abeyance these past several months. We recognize that the role of the "third man" in a dispute as complex and deeply rooted as that with which we are dealing is an unenviable one, and we pay tribute to the dedication with which the late Ambassador [Sakari] Tuomioja and his distinguished successor Señor Galo Plaza pursued their efforts. A resumption of the mediation effort need not, in our view, exclude direct diplomatic contact among the par

ties concerned. What is needed, as I emphasized earlier, is a breaking of the ice, the stimulation of a disposition by the parties to look for areas on which agreement may be possible and to progressively narrow the differences until the shape of a settlement will become apparent.

80

My delegation has an open mind on the question of whether the U.N. Force should be extended for 3 months, as stated in the draft resolution just circulated, or for 6 months, as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. We understand and share the misgivings which we know are in the mind of the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, and indeed of other delegations, concerning the indefinite continuation of the U.N. operation in the absence of clear progress toward an agreed solution. We note that the Secretary-General in his report refers to the danger that an overreliance by the parties on the United Nations to prevent resort to armed force and to maintain the status quo may reduce the sense of urgency felt by the parties in coming realistically to grips with the underlying political issues and endeavoring to resolve them.

Mr. President, my delegation welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to make a further cut of 740 men in the strength of UNFICYP. We welcome this announcement particularly in view of the acute deficit in UNFICYP financing. We note that, in the judgment of the Force Commander, such a reduction can safely be made without impairing the effectiveness of the Force or changing its mandate. I hope that the SecretaryGeneral will continue to keep the question of UNFICYP strength under review, with the view to further reductions as they may become possible.

To conclude, Mr. President, my delegation supports the extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and appeals to all member states to contribute to the maintenance of that Force. We will support also a clear call upon the parties concerned to recognize their responsibility to bring this dispute

80 Infra.

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1965,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions of 4 March (S/5575), 13 March (S/ 5603), 20 June (S/5778), 9 August (S/5868), 25 September (S/5987) and 18 December 1964 (S/6121), the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964,84 and its resolutions 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June and 207 (1965) of 10 August 1965;

85

2. Extends once again the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1966.

81 U.N. doc. S/7024. This resolution was adopted unanimously.

82 Ante, doc. IV-82.

83 Texts cited in footnote 2 to doc. IV-72, ante.

$1 Text cited in footnote 24 to doc. IV-74, ante.

85 Ante, docs. IV-74, 79, 81.

SUN. General Assembly Official Records, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/6014), pp. 9-10. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 47 to 5 (Albania, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, U.S.), with 54 abstentions. The United States opposed the resolution principally because its language omitted any reference to treaty obligations still binding on the interested parties to the dispute. For references to these treaties, see footnote 4 to doc. IV72, footnote 28 to doc. IV-75, and footnote 31 to doc. IV-75, ante.

Texts cited in footnote 2 to doc. IV–72,

ante.

Ante, docs. IV-74, 79, 81.

Text cited in footnote 24 to doc. IV-74,

ante.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 695.

3. Recommends to the Security Council the continuation of the United Nations mediation work in conformity with Council resolution 186 (1964).

91 Ante, doc. IV-75.

02 U.N. doc. A/6039.

93 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.