any suggestion that a settlement is being imposed from the outside. This is a pragmatic approach, and I think necessarily so: it assumes that the other parties will find it in their own best interests to agree to a settlement arrived at among the parties within the Republic itself. 128. Secondly, I see a need to draw attention to the expressions "community" and "communities", to explain the meanings-for they are at variance-which the opposing sides attach to them, and to make clear the sense in which I myself generally refer to them in this report. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as also for the Turkish Government, the two communities are distinct legal entities recognized as such by the Constitution of 1960 and differing in status only in so far as the provisions of the Constitution establish such differences. From their standpoint there is no such thing as a "majority community" or a 'minority community" in Cyprus. It is fundamental to the Greek Cypriots' argument, on the other hand, that the organization of the Republic should be based on the existence of a majority capable of governing and a minority entitled to the protection afforded by a normal democratic system. It is not of basic concern to their viewpoint that the present majority and the minority should happen to be identifiable by their ethnic origins. This difference of approach is obviously one that can only be resolved by a settlement of the Cyprus question as a whole, and not by any opinion which I could put forward. For my own purposes, and for no other reason than convenience, I use the words "community" and "communities" without any legal or political connotation and simply to identify the two ethnic groups. a period of many months, my discussions with many of its citizens, and my consultations with representatives of all the parties concerned have made it difficult for me to see how any proposed settlement which leaves open the possibility of enosis being brought about against the will of the Turkish Cypriot minority can secure agreement at present or in the foreseeable future. Serious warnings have been given that an attempt to impose such a solution would be likely to precip itate not only a new outbreak of violence on Cyprus itself but also a grave deterioration in relations between Turkey on the one hand and Cyprus and Greece on the other, possibly provoking actual hostilities, and in any case jeopardizing the peace of the eastern Mediterranean region. The question can be raised, consequently, whether it would not be an act of enlightened statesmanship as well as a sovereign act of self-determination in the highest sense-if the Government of Cyprus were, in the superior interests of the security of the State and the peace of the region, to undertake to maintain the independence of the Republic. This would imply, of course, a decision on the part of the Government to refrain, for as long as the same risks persisted, from placing before the population the opportunity to opt for enosis. Should the Government of Cyprus undertake such a course of action, I am confident that the Government of Greece, in the same spirit, would be prepared to respect it. I must emphasize again that in view of the sovereign prerogatives which the Cyprus Government would enjoy. this decision would naturally take the form of a voluntary act on its part. To maintain the independence of Cyprus would have to be a free undertaking on the part of the Government and people of Cyprus and not a condition to be imposed upon them. It would remain open to the Government, if it wished the population as a whole to share directly in this exercise of the right of selfdetermination, to seek through some such means as a referendum its approval of the proposed terms of settlement including the undertaking to maintain the independence of Cyprus. I should like to emphasize here my view that the whole of any proposed settlement based on continued independence, and not the question of independence alone, should in that case be put to the people. My reasons for this will become obvious from the rest of my report. At this point, I need only add that I am convinced that the present leaders would be in a strong position to explain such proposals to the people and to gain the understanding and acceptance of the majority. It would also be open to the Government, if it wished to use this further means of encouraging the whole population to vote freely, to invite the United Nations to observe the referendum. 155. ... If the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the State, and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership claims, in the "impossibility" of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots learning to live together again in peace. In those parts of the country where movement controls have been relaxed and tensions reduced, they are already proving otherwise. should be provided. It will need not to be forgotten that the Turkish Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London Agreements 34 a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future. In addition, it would be just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life. Appropriate assistance should also be provided, without discrimination, to rehabilitate all those whose property has been destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the disorders. This will be a task of reconstruction for which, I am confident, external assistance, including that of the United Nations family of organizations, would be forthcoming at the Government's request. 169. I have not felt it appropriate at this stage to set forth precise recommendations or even suggestions of a formal kind for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. I have tried instead, by analyzing the positions of the parties and defining their objectives as I see them, to make apparent certain directions which they themselves should explore in the search for a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement. I have done so because it became clear to me that the purpose of mediation could not be further served by my continuing to hold separate consultations with the parties under the existing circumstances. 170. If I have any formal recommendation to make, it is that the parties concerned should try, in the light of the observations I have made in this report, to see their way clear to meet together-with or without my presence, according to their wishes at a suitable place on the earliest possible occasion. In my view the procedure most likely to produce fruitful results would be for such a meeting or series of meetings to take place in the first instance between representatives of the two principal parties who belong to Cy 34 See ibid., pp. 765–775. 35 prus: the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. I have explained earlier [see paras. 126 and 127] my reasons for holding this view. However, my suggestion by no means precludes other alternatives that may prove acceptable-whether initial meetings between all of the parties concerned, or a series of meetings, consecutive or even simultaneous, at different levels and among different groups of the parties. Moreover if, as I believe, the most useful beginning can be made at the level of the Cyprus communities, this does not alter the fact that, as I have stated earlier, an "agreed settlement" in the context of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) must have the adherence of all the parties mentioned in the resolution. Any agreement arrived at between the Cyprus communities would therefore require endorsement by the other parties concerned. 171. I do not suggest a formal agenda for these meetings, nor do I expect that at present it would be feasible for the parties concerned to provide one. They may be agreeable, in the first instance, simply to take the observations in my present report as the basis for an exchange of views-all the more so should they agree to accept the report, as I intend it, as a document for which I alone am responsible. 172. Should this procedure lead the way eventually to an agreement on all major issues at the leadership and governmental level, and should it then be found necessary to refer the terms of settlement to the people of Cyprus directly, I consider that it would be essential to put to the people the basic settlement as a whole. They should be asked to accept or reject it as a single package, and not in its various parts. This is because any settlement which might be arrived at will necessarily be in the nature of a compromise involving concessions to be made by both sides from their original positions. It seems to me inevitable that it will have to be a carefully balanced series of agreements, each relying on the other and all of them on the whole. It will also be accepted, I believe, that should there be a majority vote against the terms of the settlement, this should not be con 25 Not printed here. strued as a vote in favour of any other particular solution. Instead, it would only signify that the process of seeking an acceptable form of settlement would have to begin anew. 173. I reiterate and emphasize my conviction that every endeavor must continue to be made to bring about a peaceful solution and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. By any and all appropriate means, the search must go on, with patience, tolerance and good faith. The wellbeing of the Cypriot people demands it; so does the cause of international peace and security. 30 U.N. doc. S/6267. The Turkish Government, according to this letter, was distressed because Galo Plaza had "proceeded to express his convictions as to the substance of the problem by way of observations, views, or suggestions." Presumably, Turkey resented Galo Plaza's expressions of doubt about the feasibility of a physical separation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (see supra, par. 155), and his assertion that future guarantees of Turkish Cypriot minority rights could not be expected to equal those of the London and Zürich agreements (see ibid., par. 161). The Vice President of Cyprus, Fazil Kutchuk, voiced the complaint that Galo Plaza's report did not rule out enosis with Greece (see U.N. doc. S/6279). The reactions of the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government were generally favorable to Galo Plaza's report and to the continuation of his mission as mediator (see U.N. docs. S/6275/Add. 1, and S 6280). Secretary-General Thant, in a reply to the Turkish representative, dated Apr. 1, took note with regret of the latter's objections to Galo Plaza's report, but added that he did not feel that he should terminate the Mediator's functions at this time. Mr. Thant did not feel that the Mediator had exceeded the mandate enunciated in the resolution of Mar. 4, 1964 (U.N. doc. S/6267). 182. Although it has been relatively quiet in Cyprus for the past Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1965, pp. 161-171 (excerpt from p. 163). Another excerpt from this address is printed ante, doc. IV-8. 38 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a published statement on Jan. 21, 1965, had suggested a possible federal solution for the Cyprus problem based on physical separation of the ethnic groups, a position sympathetic to the views of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots (see The New York Times, Jan. 22 and 23, 1965; also the editorial, ibid., Feb. 14, 1965 for a brief summary of conciliatory moves by the Soviet Union toward Turkey). See also post, doc. IV-91. More recently there had been reports of purchases of Soviet missile equipment by the Government of Cyprus in accordance with the Soviet-Cypriot Agreement announced on Oct. 1, 1964 (text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 597); see The New York Times, Mar. 30, 1965. UN. doc. 8/6426. three months, the basic situation remains unchanged, and there has been no real progress in solving the fundamental problems. The quiet which prevails in the island is tenuous and, in fact, it is very likely that without the United Nations Force there would be an early recurrence of fighting. 183. At present the Force also provides the only mechanism by which civilian, administrative, judicial and economic activities in the island can be carried out across communal lines. The problems which have been encountered in attempting to achieve further progress toward a return to normality have been described in some detail in this report and provide an indication of the kind of breakdown in the life of the island which might occur if UNFICYP were to be withdrawn. 184. With these considerations in mind, I feel obliged to recommend to the Security Council that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus be extended for a further period. Indeed, I would hope that the idea of a six months' extension at this time, instead of the usual three, might be acceptable to the members. An extension for the longer period would appear to be consistent with the realities of the Cyprus situation at this stage. Among a good many advantages, a longer extension would facilitate greatly the planning and efficient operation of the Force; and it would be a more economical arrangement. Exploratory consultations with those Governments contributing contingents have indicated no objection on their part to the longer period. It may be emphasized that an extension for six months, of course, would not mean at all that the Force would be firmly committed to remain in Cyprus for six months beyond 26 June. Should developments occur at any time in the six-month period which would raise the issue of withdrawal of the Force before the expiry of that period, I would, as a matter of course, submit the question without delay to the Security Council for its consideration and appropriate action. In this sense, there would, in effect, be no significant difference between a three and a six months' extension. 185. In this connexion, it is necessary for me to draw the attention of the Council to the financial section of the report which indicates that The Atlantic Community and Western Europe [Docs. IV-77, 781 511 voluntary contributions pledged to date leave a deficit of $1.6 million for the period now ending." It will be necessary to obtain this sum, as well as pledges, to cover the costs for any further extension of UNFICYP. 186. Unless the mandate were to be changed, which seems unlikely, or real progress were to be made toward a political solution or to more normal conditions, the current strength of the Force is, in the firm view of its Commander, the absolute minimum for the effective performance of its duties." 187. The dominating factor of the prevailing situation is the armed confrontation between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community. The disengagement programme announced by the Government on 21 April 1965 has provided a starting point from which to deal with this situation. But the full potentialities of such a scheme can be realized only when it has been extended to areas where tension is high, such as in the Walled City of Nicosia. The Government has indicated its intention of extending the disengagement programme to all areas, if and when circumstances permit. In this connexion, I take the opportunity to urge both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community to co-operate increasingly in making disengagement a reality. If the Government is to be urged to extend the geographical scope and the detailed implementation of the programme, then it is necessary also for the Turkish Cypriots, on their part, to react positively and helpfully and to reciprocate with similar disengagement measures on their side under the protection and guarantee of the Force. 188. The maintenance of armed confrontation disrupts normal life and security for all the inhabitants of the island and generates a constant risk of clashes as well. I would like also to appeal to the Cyprus Government and to the Turkish Cypriot community to co-operate 40 Pars. 176-179 (not printed here) stated that 38 governments, including 4 nonmember states, had pledged $25.5 million for UNFICYP costs through June 26, 1965. Estimated expenses, however, were $27,125,000 41 Par. 5 (not printed here) stated that as of June 10, UNFICYP consisted of 6,346 men: 6,171 military personnel and 175 civilian police. with the Force in measures to eliminate inflammable and precarious situations, such as those prevailing in Lefka-Ambelikou and in parts of Nicosia, where closeness of the confrontation between military elements is such as to render it impossible for the Force, by interposition or any other means, effectively and reliably to carry out its function of preventing a recurrence of fighting. 189. The mediation function, due to circumstances fully known to the Council through previous reports on the subject, is inactive at the present time.42 Though unfortunate, this does not preclude a continuation of the efforts, as recommended by the Mediator, to bring about discussions and negotiations among the parties concerned, at any level, looking toward the settlement of the political problems. In this regard, it is known that bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey are taking place and the hope may be expressed that they will be productive." In addition, I have long believed that it would be very helpful if talks could be arranged locally between officials of the Cyprus Government and leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. Efforts will continue in this direction. |