European union was, is, and remains the purpose of our policy.

The concept of, and the faith in, a united Europe has formed our political will and has given us hope. The old traditional European order does no longer stand up to the spirit and the demands of our present century. Alliances, treaties and individual arrangements in the old style will no longer do. A new, a united and great Europe must, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, acquire the standing that is in keeping with the historic, intellectual and cultural achievements of its peoples. Europe must take shape, politically, economically and militarily.

Developments over the past two decades have made us see even more clearly that this is the only chance for our old continent to be secured a world standing that will rest on a firm and durable foundation.

The policy of European unification which, to begin with, extended to co-operation of national economies, has entered a crisis. We have to state that the sense of solidarity that exists in European peoples does not yet seem capable of political organization. Still German policy must not and will not slacken in its efforts to achieve European unification. Our goal remains unchanged.

We shall in particular do everything in our power to preserve and safeguard what the three European communities have already achieved. We shall not proceed dogmatically, but, on the other hand, we shall carefully consider all dangers threatening the good work which has already progressed far, if the foundations of concluded and effective treaties were called in question. We are prepared to continue to render our contribution to European economic union. We must expect, however, that progress is accomplished evenly in the essential sectors of the Common Market: this includes in particular balanced economic progress of the communities in all spheres. To co-ordinate the interests of the European nations will require prolonged and difficult negotiations.

The Federal Republic of Germany has deliberately preferred a policy of European solidarity to one of national egotism. It will consistently

ment Center, and the Center continues to give all possible assistance to appropriate German authorities. German investigators have also in the past searched the documents at the Library of Congress and may, if they wish, again investigate these files.

The Government of the United States has returned to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany over 80 percent of the German documents originally stored in the National Archives at Alexandria. In 1960, officials designated by the German Federal Government searched these Archives for material which could be of use in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. In order to be certain, however, that no useful document which might still be in the Archives has been overlooked, the Government of the United States invites the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany again to search the German documents still remaining in the National Archives at Alexandria. Upon notification by the German Government of its desire to send competent and qualified authorities to visit the Archives, the Department of State will be pleased to make appropriate arrangements with the National Archives.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is aware that the Government of the United States of America has long had a deep interest in the efforts of the Federal Republic to find, prosecute, and convict Nazi criminals not yet brought to justice. The Federal Republic is

also undoubtedly aware of the concern of many American citizens that the scheduled expiration in May 1965 of the 20-year period under the German statute of limitations for murder might permit presently unknown Nazi criminals to escape prosecution. In light of these considerations, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is assured that the Government of the United States of America will continue to assist the Federal Republic in every appropriate way in its search for evidence of Nazi crimes and criminals.

Document IV-43

Note From the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, January 18, 1965*

Soviet Protest Against an Alleged Plan for an Atomic Mine Belt To Be Placed Along the Eastern Border of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been instructed by the Soviet Government to inform the Government of the United States of America of the following:

It has been learned from press reports and also from statements of official representatives of the United States and the Federal German Republic that a plan is being worked out for the creation of the so-called atomic mine belt on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, in direct proximity to the borders of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

It also follows from the abovementioned sources that the above plan was submitted by the West German side to the NATO Paris ses

By legislation which became effective on Apr. 21, 1965, the German Government extended the period for prosecution of Nazi war crimes until Dec. 31, 1969.

Department of State files (unofficial translation). Copies of the Soviet note to the U.S. Government were sent to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom. A similar note was sent to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

sion for consideration, and that special "nuclear blast charges" are already on the territory of the Federal German Republic.

The Soviet Union cannot leave unnoticed these new dangerous actions of the military authorities of the Federal German Republic which endanger the life of many millions of peaceful people not only in the Federal German Republic but in other countries bordering on it.

The realization of the plan for the creation of an "atomic mine belt" would, to a considerable degree, aggravate the political situation in Europe, and increase international tensions and the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict in which many countries could be involved even contrary to their will and desire.

The above actions of the military circles of the Federal German Republic and the encouragement they are getting from the military authorities of the United States in this matter constitute another violation of the Potsdam and other relevant agreements of the four powers.

They run counter to the U.S.commitments under the above agreements and are incompatible with the commitments imposed on the Federal German Republic as one of the legal successors of the former German Reich.

The provocative plan for placing nuclear mines on vast areas of central Europe only stresses once again the danger of equipping the Bundeswehr with the nuclear weapon. If today, when the military circles of the Federal German Republic do not yet have direct access to the rocketnuclear installations they, in defiance of everything, are prepared to turn large areas of West Germany into a zone of atomic death, it is easy to imagine what would happen to the security of the European peoples if these circles were given access to nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government finds it necessary to emphasize that in case of the realization of the adventurist plan for creating an "atomic mine belt," the responsibility for such ac

Reference is to the ministerial session of NATO, Dec. 15-17, 1964; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 507-508.

tions which jeopardize peace and security in Europe would rest, above ali, with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that, pending the conclusion of a German peace treaty, the United States alongside the USSR, Great Britain, and France continues to bear responsibility for the realization on the territory of the Federal German Republic of the demands and commitments jointly assumed by the governments of the four powers under the Potsdam and other international agreements aimed at eradication of German militarism and prevention of German aggression.

The Soviet Government hopes that the Government of the United States will give full attention to the considerations set forth in the present note and take measures to prevent actions incompatible with the tasks of safeguarding and strengthening international peace.

A Department of State spokesman made the following statement on Jan. 18: "There is no plan for the emplacement along the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany of a so-called 'atomic mine belt' as alleged in the Soviet note.

"The United States has made available to the North Atlantic Alliance and has stock-piled in Europe various tactical nuclear weapons required for the defense of Europe; these are retained under U.S. custody and control. Included among these are atomic demolition devices. These devices, like all other weapons available to the Alliance, are taken into account in NATO planning.

"It is difficult to look upon this note as anything but a propaganda exercise particularly since the Soviet Government has published it before the U.S. Government, to which it was addressed, had time to consider it." Department of State files.) A formal U.S. reply was delivered on Apr. 23 (post, doc. IV-52).

French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 216.

having at Rambouillet two weeks ago with Chancellor Erhard," and which enabled us to establish confident and friendly contact between us, the problem of Germany was, of course, considered. I will not tell you what was explicitly advanced by both sides on that very serious subject. But I can give you some indications of France's overall views, insofar as they have not already been formulated.

The German problem is, indeed, the European problem. European, you can guess, since the time of the Roman Empire, that is, when historic Europe ceased to confine itself to the Mediterranean basin and moved toward the Rhine. European, because of the location of the Germans in the center of our continent, between Gauls, Latins and Slavs. European, because a long and difficult history filled it with ferment and burdened it with sequels which left cruel rancor and manifold prejudices among all the neighbors of that country constantly in the making. European, because the German people are a great people, through both economic activity, as in the realm of philosophy, science and art, or in the area of military capacity, and because Europe sees in them a vital part of itself. European, lastly, because Germany has always felt an anguish, and at times a fury, created by its own uncertainty about its boundaries, its unity, its political system, its international role, so that the more its destiny remains undetermined, the more disturbing it always appears to the whole continent.

Is it necessary to say that the events which have occurred during the first half of this century have made this problem more disturbing and burning than ever? Already, because of the German Empire, the first World War had caused a gigantic shock in the west, east, north and south of Europe. But then the Third Reich's immense effort to dominate; its armies' invasion on one side as far as the Channel, the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Adriatic and the two shores of the Mediterranean, on the other as far as the Arctic, the approaches to Moscow, the heart of the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Aegean; the action of its submarines on all the oceans of the globe; its tyranny established over twelve

8 Jan. 19-20, 1965.

European States, its hegemony over four others; the violent death of forty million inen, military and civilian, as a result of its acts, particularly the systematic extermination of ten million prisoners-all that inflicted terrible wounds on the body and soul of the peoples.

Doubtless, the final crushing of the Third Reich put an end to the ordeal. Doubtless, the subordination imposed on the vanquished-demolished and decimated-the accomplished facts in the territories which were once East Prussia, Posnania and Silesia, the end of the Austrian Anschluss and of the "protectorate" over Czechoslovakia, the country's organic partition through the creation of zones and the Berlin statute, had first made the direct fears which Germany had for so long inspired recede. Doubtless, the reasonable and skillful policy adopted by Chancellor Adenauer's Government reassured many minds in the West. But the tragedy nonetheless left very deep scars. In short, it was with circumspection, indeed, even with some uneasiness, that public opinion in Western Europe sometimes viewed the economic expansion, military rebirth and political recovery of the Federal Republic, while the Sovietized regimes in eastern Europe made use of the peoples' instinctive distrust of the Germans to justify the cold war against the free world, inveigled, so to speak, by the "German revengers."

The problem has thus arisen once again in history. For France, everything can be reduced to three closely linked questions: to see that Germany henceforth becomes а definite element of progress and peace; on this condition, to help with its reunification; to make a start and select the framework which would make this possible.

It is true that, up to now, the issue has not always been considered in this light. Following the last World War, with the memory of the ordeals suffered and risks run by the peoples of the Old Continent, many sides envisaged preventing the return of such misfortunes by eliminating what had been the cause, that is, the German might. Hence the projects aimed at forbidding the reconstitution of a central government, at placing the Ruhr under international control and at keeping Germany disarmed. You know that

France was at first inclined, and for good reason, toward this concept. But the fact that the confrontation of the free world and the Soviet world became the major affair, and that Germany was one of its stakes, modified our outlook. Moreover, because in the depths of their misfortune our neighbors across the Rhine no longer seemed threatening, many were feeling, and despite everything, the basic attraction to them which their qualities deserved. Lastly and above all, the union of Europe-which became the indispensable condition for its independence and development-demanded reconciliation and cooperation between Germany and France.

However, the rivalry between East and West which was taking place on Germany's soil could only aggravate its political and territorial division. It is true that the Soviets, having in their zone imposed a regime modeled on their own, were trying to make it believed that, sooner or later, Germany could be reunited under a system of the same kind. But the Atlantic Alliance, the Federal Republic's economic and social success, the repugnance which communism created in the entire German population, made this pretention futile. For the Soviets to have had a chance of unifying Germany under a system like their own, they would have had to triumph in a world conflict.

Now, despite the tension they were maintaining in Berlin, they were careful not to start such a conflict. On the other hand, the United States, whose policy was at that time led by John Foster Dulles, could think that by strongly reinforcing NATO, the West would make Moscow withdraw and thus restore Germany's unity. But that was only

a

dream, unless someone made war-something which Washington and its allies were in no way disposed to do. Moreover, a large part of world opinion, while recognizing the precarious nature of what had become of the old Reich and while disapproving of the brutal ruse of the wall and barbed wire, accommodated itself to a situation which, for whatever it was worth, was not preventing coexistence. Twenty years have thus elapsed without determining Germany's new destiny.

Such indetermination, in such a region of the world and at such a