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of the views of all those interested in acceding. Many countries are increasingly accepting IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities, and we welcome this trend. My own country has placed one of its large nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards," and the United Kingdom has done likewise."1

In terms of a non-proliferation treaty, however, the application of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities should not be viewed as of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, international safeguards should be of special interest to the non-nuclear States as a means of assuring them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.

Our discussions at Geneva were most useful in clarifying points of view and in highlighting the major issues which must be resolved on the way to agreement on a treaty. Unfortunately, those discussions could not progress further towards agreement because the Soviet Union sought to impose certain prior conditions which are unnecessary and unreasonable. In doing so, the Soviet Union appeared to maintain its preoccupation with the achievement of certain of its political objectives in Europe, a preoccupation which unfortunately it has so far permitted to have priority over the world-wide danger of nuclear proliferation. Once more today, the Soviet representative has given priority to that preoccupation."

As I made clear at Geneva, the United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. We seek no nuclear sharing arrangement in NATO which could involve such dissemination. The treaty we have suggested would bar such dissemination since it would prevent the creation of any additional entity, whether a State or organization, having an independent power to use nuclear weap

ons.

If the Soviet Government is as determined and prepared to prevent proliferation as its representative would have us believe today, then I

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1114-1115.

See footnote 32 to doc. III-77, post; and UK. Treaty Series No. 70, Cmnd. 2753. Supra.

think it would be highly preferable that we address ourselves objectively and dispassionately to the problem. Sterile polemics about the Federal Republic of Germany will not help us to achieve agreement, and to continue on this plane would not augur well for the future of our discussions.

The Soviet representative also sought to make us believe that his Government is and has been second to none in its determination and readiness to act to prevent proliferation. The facts do not bear this out as regards the past. Judging by actions, rather than words, Soviet interest in halting proliferation is belated. But, if they say that their interest today is deep and genuine, we do not question it. If the Soviet Union will now suit its actions to its words, then we should be able to conclude the agreement which we all want.

I can only note with regret that the Soviet Union did not appear to be moved by the same sense of urgency as the United States in Geneva. However, the fact that the Soviet Union has now offered a draft treaty of its own for discussion may indicate that there is basis for hope that the urgency of countering proliferation is coming to be recognized." In its present form the Soviet draft continues to focus narrowly on Soviet preoccupations with NATO and does so in a manner which we cannot accept. Yet we are encouraged by the fact that perhaps the Soviet Union is now prepared to negotiate. If the possibility of real negotiations now finally exist, we can view this as a sign of progress. I propose that we return to Geneva as soon as possible with the firm resolve to seek to agree on a treaty which we all can support.

An important trend of recent discussions, whether in the United Nations Disarmament Commission or the Eighteen-Nation Committee, has been to view the problem of nonproliferation in the context of a broad group of related measures of which a non-proliferation treaty would be the central measure. It has been suggested by some, however, that these related measures should be a necessary step on the part of the nuclear Powers to accompany the foreswearing of nuclear weapons

93 See ante, docs. III-46 and 49.

by States not possessing them." It seems to us that to pose the problem in this fashion obscures the essential fact that the spread of nuclear weapons is at least as much-and in some instances more-of a threat to the security of the present nonnuclear States of the world than it is to the nuclear States. The probability of nuclear weapons being used will almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases. And so it is imperative to make progress where we can, when we can, remembering that agreement in one area can often be the catalyst to precipitate in another area agreement that may have long eluded us.

This does not mean that the United States does not attach equal importance to efforts to make progress as quickly as we can on other measures related to non-proliferation. We have, in fact, introduced new elements of flexibility into our positions to increase the possibilities of agreement.

The measure related to non-proliferation efforts that is foremost in the minds of most is a comprehensive test ban. I need not stress the great importance which we continue to attach to the limited test ban treaty, to which over one hundred countries have subscribed. We continue to hope and to urge that it will be universally accepted. President Johnson stated only last week:

The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 represents real progress and we are continuously trying to move forward to a comprehensive and lasting ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.95

At Geneva my delegation indicated that we are ready to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the numbers and modalities of on-site inspections for verification of a comprehensive test ban." Representatives from many members of the United Nations attended the inauguration of our large aperture seismic array in Montana last week, which is one important phase of our research effort to improve our capabilities for monitoring a comprehensive test ban.

94 See ante, docs. III-25 and 42.

95 Ante, doc. III-48.

See ante, docs. III-35 and 39.

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As we seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot forget the vehicles for delivery of these weapons of mass destruction. The United States has therefore proposed exploring a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. As Ambassador Goldberg announced on 23 September, if progress could be made on the freeze, the United States would be willing to explore also the possibility of significant reductions-I repeat, significant reductions-in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles." Here is a measure that would give graphic assurance to the non-nuclear States of the willingness of the nuclear States themselves to halt and to turn back the nuclear arms race.

97 Ante, doc. III-48. 8 See ante, doc. III-40. "Ante, doc. III-44.

In working towards the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, we have also sought agreement to halt and reduce mounting stockpiles of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. I refer in this connexion to our proposal for a verified cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and for the transfer to peaceful uses of agreed sizable quantities of such materials. As illustrative figures-and I underline the word illustrative-we have proposed that the United States transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of U235 and the Soviet Union 40,000 kilogrammes to peaceful uses.1

I should like to call particular attention to Ambassador Goldberg's announcement to the General Assembly on 23 September of the new United States proposal for the actual destruction of nuclear weapons. We propose the demonstrated destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear weapons from their respective stocks to obtain the 60,000 kilogrammes of U235 to be transferred to peaceful uses by the United States and the 40,000 kilogrammes to be transferred by the Soviet Union. We are prepared also to include the plutonium from these weapons, if the Soviet Union would do likewise.

When the United States had earlier proposed a cut-off of fissionable material production and transfer to peaceful uses of these illustrative amounts of 60,000 kilogrammes and 40,000 kilogrammes respectively of U-235, the Soviet Union replied that this was not disarmament, but rather control without disarmament. We cannot agree with this Soviet contention. A cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons would, even by itself, be a very important step in halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. But if there were earlier misgivings on the part of the Soviet Union, unfounded though they may have been, everyone will agree that the new proposal made by the United States most assuredly is disarmament, for we are proposing that fissionable ma

1 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 920-923. 2 Ante, doc. III-44.

terial be removed from actual weapons, that the weapons-the casing and all internal mechanisms-be destroyed, and that the fissionable material be transferred for exclusively peaceful purposes. I repeat, this is disarmament. The number of weapons to be destroyed would be very substantial, and I shall have more to say about this weapons destruction proposal later in our discussion."

Before concluding my remarks, I should like to touch on one or two other points relating to non-proliferation. The first is the problem of ensuring the security of nations that forswear the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It has been suggested that non-nuclear States should have some assurance that their security I will not be weakened by their forswearing of nuclear weapons. United States policy was stated last October by President Johnson:

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.

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until agreement on a non-proliferation treaty is reached, for that opportunity may not present itself again under such favourable conditions as today, if ever. At the same time, the United States wishes to move forward as rapidly as possible towards a comprehensive test ban treaty; a freeze and then a reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials and transfer of such materials to peaceful purposes, involving the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. These involve complex and difficult negotiations. In the opinion of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at the end of its last session, as is stated in the Committee's report before us:

6

extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of views of member Governments.

The report adds:

The Committee believes that these discussions and exchanges of views may facilitate agreements in the further work of the Committee.

My Government looks to the discussions commencing today in this Committee to contribute further to the better understanding and the will to succeed that are essential if negotiations at Geneva are finally to bear fruit. We hope that the General Assembly will, therefore, urge that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament promptly reconvene upon completion of our discussions here and give renewed priority to the question of a non-proliferation treaty and related measures.

It is my Government's strong wish that the next report of the EighteenNation Committee on Disarmament will contain an agreed non-proliferation treaty acceptable to all Governments which share our wish to act now to prevent proliferation.

• Reference is to the Sixth Interim Progress Report by the Eighteen Nation Committee to the U.N. Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, Sept. 16, 1965. The report noted that "the Committee did not reach any specific agreement at this session either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension." (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 427-430; quotation on p. 429.)

Document III-51

Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Foster) in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, October 27, 1965 (Excerpts)'

United States Elaboration

of Its Proposal for the Demonstrated Destruction of Several Thousand Nuclear Weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of, and to reduce, nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a non-proliferation treaty such as we have tabled is agreed upon and signed. We do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. While we believe that the drafting of an agreed non-proliferation treaty should have special priority when we return to Geneva, we wish to proceed on all such measures, making progress wherever we

can.

In my statement of 18 October, I stressed the significance of one such measure-the new United States proposal for the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons.' We are gratified at the interest many delegations have expressed in this proposal. This new proposal should meet the concern of those who have alleged that the standing United States offer to cease production of fissionable material for weapons and to transfer agreed quantities to peaceful uses is not disarmament. We have never understood how those who make this assertion can really contend that a halt in the build-up of fissionable stocks and their actual reduction by transfers to peaceful uses is not disarmament. But the newly expanded United States proposal should remove any doubt on that score.

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ferred to peaceful uses be removed from actual weapons and that the weapons themselves-the casings and internal mechanisms-be destroyed. The number of weapons to be destroyed would depend, in the first instance, on the agreed quantities of fissionable materials which each side is to transfer to peaceful uses. It would also depend on the size and nature of the actual weapons which each side offered for destruction.

One thing is clear. In order to obtain the amounts of fissionable material which, on an illustrative basis, we have suggested be transferred to peaceful uses, namely, 60,000 and 40,000 kg, respectively, by the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to destroy a very large number of weapons. To be more specific, the United States would have to destroy several thousand weapons; the Soviet Union would, in turn, have to destroy thousands of its weapons. I repeat, the number would have to be of the order of several thousand.

Moreover, we are suggesting the destruction of nuclear weapons, including fusion and fission types, which could have yields extending up into the megaton range. We are, in short, talking of a substantial measure of disarmament. And the large amount of fissionable material contained in these weapons would become available for peaceful uses under safeguards which would prevent its future diversion to weapons

use.

Another promising feature of this proposal is that the verification of the destruction of weapons would be simple. Indeed, we have referred to it as the demonstrated destruction of weapons because, in essence, it involves nothing more than observation at the spot. Each country would establish a depot on its own territory, and the destruction of weapons would be carried out there under its own supervision. Observers from the other country would be present to see for themselves that weapons were actually taken into the depot to be destroyed and that the agreed quantities of fissionable materials were removed to be set aside for peaceful purposes. For its part, the United States would welcome the presence of additional ob

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