Under article I countries having nuclear weapons would have the following obligations. First, they could not transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not assist any such country in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they could not take any other action to increase the number of nuclear Powers in the world. By "nuclear Powers" I mean any entity having independent power to use nuclear weapons, whether it be a State, a régime or some other kind of organization. As we all know, power to use nuclear weapons now rests only in national hands.

Article II of the treaty would impose corresponding obligations upon the countries not having nuclear weapons. First, these countries could not seek or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into their national control. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not manufacture nuclear weapons or seek, receive or grant assistance in such manufacture. Thirdly, they could not take any other action which would cause an increase in the number of nuclear entities in the world above the existing number. This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the number of nuclear Powers. You will all remember President Kennedy's fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a world with a growing number of nuclear Powers. This draft would

84

83 Ante, doc. III-16.

$4 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 978-984.

ensure that there would be no increase in the number, even by one.

85

Under article III all parties would undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application to their peaceful nuclear activities of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent. Unlike other provisions of this draft, this article does not set forth a precise or completelyformulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement: namely, that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries. It is implicit in their undertaking that they would work to see that this is done as rapidly as possible. A number of countries have begun to accept safeguards on their own peaceful reactors. We hope that this process can be expedited.

Moreover, countries which supply uranium and reactors can cooperate in facilitating the application of safeguards in other countries by insisting that this be done with respect to any material or equipment which they supply. I shall want to speak at greater length on this important question in a later intervention; but let me say now that the United States regards this as one of the key provisions which enunciates an important policy. And the application of adequate international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities is not a matter which is of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, it is the non-nuclear Powers which should be especially interested in a system of safeguards to help assure each of them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.

We have drafted the provision in its present form to take account of the views of all countries; including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances. The United States will be especially interested to receive suggestions from the nonnuclear members of this Committee on means of strengthening this provision.

The next article, article IV, contains an important definition. It says that by using the phrase

85 See post, doc. III-76.

"nuclear State" in this draft treaty we mean a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of a particular date. Our view is that that date should be the day when the treaty is opened for signature. Our hope, of course, is that this would be very soon.

Article V is an accession clause quite similar to that in the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty. It provides that the treaty will be open to all States for signature. We have suggested this clause because of our belief that the treaty should have world-wide application. The clause would not of course affect the recognition or status of any unrecognized régime or entity which might decide to file an instrument of accession to the treaty.

Under international law and practice recognition of a government or acknowledgment of the existence of a State is brought about as the result of a deliberate decision and course of conduct on the part of a government intending to accord recognition. Recognition of a régime or acknowledgment of an entity cannot be inferred from signature or ratification of or accession to a multilateral agreement. We believe this viewpoint is generally accepted, and it is on that basis that we have suggested this clause.

One important change in this draft from the limited test-ban Treaty language is that paragraph 3 of article V explicitly recognizes the importance of obtaining wide adherence to the treaty if it is to be effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It does this by requiring adherence by a certain number of governments before the treaty goes into effect. We have left a blank for that number. In our view the number should be sufficiently high so that the treaty will be a significant anti-proliferation measure, but not so high as unduly to delay its entry into force.

Article VI is a withdrawal clause fashioned after the provision in the limited test-ban Treaty. It contains two important additions to that provision. First, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions set forth must give notice three months in advance to the Security

86 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1032-1034.

Council of the United Nations as well as to other parties to and signatories of the treaty. This notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. These requirements have been added because they provide an additional brake on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of withdrawal. In addition, Security Council notification and explanation are clearly appropriate in view of the serious security ramifications of withdrawal.

The second addition to the limited test-ban Treaty formula is a provision calling for review of the treaty, after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. This was included in part because of the wide concern recently expressed by many participants in the discussions here and in the Disarmament Commission that a treaty such as this should be accompanied by progress to halt and reduce rising nuclear stocks. One of the preambular paragraphs explicitly recognizes this concern. It calls attention to the desire of all of us—

to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals.

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of and to reduce nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a treaty such as we have tabled today is signed. But we do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. Let us proceed on all such proposals at the same time, making progress wherever we

can.

The last article of the draft treaty, article VII, deals with the problem of authentic texts. It adds Chinese, French and Spanish to the languages set forth in the corresponding clause of the limited test-ban Treaty. This change has been made to signify once again our desire for world-wide adherence.

The draft treaty I have just described may not be a perfect instrument, nor is it necessarily complete in its coverage of pertinent issues. We earnestly hope, however, that our discussion will focus on such improvements as can be agreed upon and that we shall not be urged to

incorporate elements which, however desirable in theory, are not now attainable. Insistence on such an approach would be a sure way to prevent agreement. We also hope that our discussions will not be rendered pointless by the imposition of unnecessary conditions or demands from any quarter.

As I said in an earlier intervention, the danger of proliferation is worldwide. It is not the special concern of any one country; nor can it be averted by concentrating our attention on any one country. Let us examine this draft, therefore, from the standpoint of our common goal. If our common goal is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing the security of all nations, then that and that alone must govern our arguments. Any other approach would be a monumental folly for which we and future generations would pay dearly and for which we should deserve the condemnation of mankind.

Document III-29

Statement by the President (Johnson), August 17, 1965 *

"The Time To Halt Nuclear Spread Is Before Its Contagion Takes Root"

Document III-30

Statement Made by the U.K. Representative (Chalfont) Before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, August 19, 1965 (Excerpt) 88

United Kingdom Insistence on a Veto by Existing Nuclear Powers in Any Multilateral Force Over Use of Nuclear Weapons

The draft before us is concerned with non-dissemination. It is no part of its purpose to place an

87 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1965, pp. 466-467.

88 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 355-361.

So Ante, doc. III-27.

embargo on all arrangements for sharing the control of nuclear weapons within NATO or any other alliance so far as they are not disseminatory-and I would emphasize these words, so far as they are not disseminatory.

It is precisely because we, like others, are concerned about this matter that my Government is anxious to eliminate any possibility of dissemination, however theoretical it may seem. Indeed, it is our view that the present draft of articles I and II of the treaty does leave open one possibility, which may well have more theoretical than practical importance but which we would prefer to see closed. Although fairly tightly drafted, these two articles, as we read them, do not rule out the possibility that an association of States might be set up with the capacity to make use of nuclear weapons by the decision of a majority of its members: in other words, without the veto of an existing nuclear Power.90 It is true that such an association could not, under this draft, come into existence unless one of the existing nuclear Powers had at the same time, or previously, abandoned its independent nuclear capability, so that in any event the total number of nuclear entities would not be increased.

And I am bound to add that my Government is, and will continue to be, irrevocably opposed to any formulation for the Western alliance which might have the effect of making the use of nuclear weapons subject to a majority vote as distinct from a unanimous vote, or at least a

In this regard, the U.S. Representative (Foster) said at a press luncheon in Geneva, Aug. 18, 1965, that the U.S. position "is that the charter of any Atlantic force must provide for our [U.S.] consent to the firing of nuclear weapons. If, however, the nations of Europe were to achieve the kind of political authority capable of deciding on behalf of all members on the use of nuclear weapons, we feel that reconsideration of provisions of the charter for the Atlantic force would be appropriate. But even then, any revision of the charter would be possible only with the approval of all its parties." There was only one possibility, Mr. Foster said, that such a force could change to some form of majority control. "That would arise," he said. "if one of the [existing] nuclear participants were to turn over to the force all of its weapons and also give up its veto over them. That would be in conformity with the draft treaty since

it would not involve any increase in the number of nuclear decision-making entities." (Facts on File, vol. XXV, No. 1295, Aug. 19-25, 1965, p. 299.)

91 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current_Documents, 1964, pp. 505-506. 92 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1965, p. 476.

93 See ante, docs. III-27-28.

94 For reports on criticism of U.S. nonproliferation proposals by former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany, Aug. 19, 1965, and by former German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, Aug. 26, 1965, see The New York Times, Aug. 20, 27, 1965.

95 See post, docs. IV-61 and 70.

does the draft treaty tabled [on 17 August] ... provide for the complete and unconditional prohibition of access to nuclear weapons, whether in a direct way, that is through national ownership, control or disposal, or in an indirect way, that is access to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like? 97 In other words, are we to understand the United States draft as precluding any possibility of the establishment of a NATO multilateral or similar force with the participation, in one form or another, of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany? 9s

So far we have not received a reply to this question from the United States representative. However, on the very day that the United States draft was submitted Mr. Foster told Press correspondents that the draft did not preclude the establishment of a multilateral or Atlantic NATO nuclear force. Commenting on the United States draft on 19 August in the Committee the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, said:

It is no part of its purpose to place an embargo on all arrangements for sharing the control of nuclear weapons within NATO or any other alliance so far as they are not disseminatory..

99

These statements of the United States and United Kingdom representatives confirm our fear that the Western Powers are sticking to their old position in this matter.

96 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 362-363.

97 See ante, doc. III-27. 9S ENDC/PV.224, p. 40.

99 Ante, doc. III-30.

In general it has to be noted that the discussion which has so far taken place both within and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons shows that there is still no common basis for an agreement on this subject. It is obvious to everyone that in the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons there is a clash between two positions-or rather two approaches to the solution of the problem, two conceptions.

The Soviet Union sees in an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons a practical means of really stopping the process of the continuous extension of access to nuclear weapons, whether through the emergence of new nuclear Powers possessing their own nuclear weapons, or through access to them in the form of participation in collective ownership, collective use or collective control of them within the framework of a military alliance or in any other way. Only such a solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons-one that does not allow of any loopholes or exceptions-is of any value for the cause of peace. We have insisted, we insist and we shall continue to insist on this.

However, the approach of the Western Powers to the solution of this problem is different. Their main concern is not so much to shut off access to nuclear weapons to nonnuclear States as to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the nuclear club through a NATO multilateral force or in some other way. That is precisely where the great threat to the security of the peoples of Europe and the entire world lies.

That is the fundamental difference between the solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as the Western Powers would have it, and the solution as it really should be in order to answer the purpose before us: namely, to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in the interests of the security of all peoples.

Unfortunately it must be noted that our Western colleagues do not treat the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons conscientiously. They are concentrating all their abilities and energy on manoeuvring in this mat