We are constantly receiving new warnings. Two days ago, at Stuttgart, Western Germany, the German revanchists once again held a meeting at which, exactly as in the days of Hitler, predatory claims to the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia were voiced.

That is the heart of the matter. We cannot agree, we cannot accept any formulation of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which fails to take into account and totally ignores the important considerations put forward by the USSR and the other socialist countries.

I should like to add one further observation. The wording of the paragraph dealing with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as given in the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 not only evades the question of denying the West German revanchists access to nuclear weapons, but complicates it further by making the solution of this question, which is highly important in itself, dependent upon the solution of a whole series of other complex problems. The draft resolution also has a number of other shortcomings, both major and minor, but I shall not dwell on those now.

To sum up my analysis of the draft resolution, I must state that we do not, of course, cast any doubt on the sincerity of its authors. Nor have we any doubt that they had excellent intentions and wanted to make a constructive contribution. With all respect to them, however, we are compelled to state that, in the light of the observations I have made, this draft resolution cannot remotely be considered a common denominator, as Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, has described it. The adoption of such a draft resolution would not, of course, make the prospects of future disarmament negotiations any brighter or more favourable.

If the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 is put to the vote, the USSR delegation will vote against those preambular and operative paragraphs which I have mentioned as being unacceptable to us. Similarly, we cannot support the draft resolution as a whole if it is put to the vote in its present form. Frankly, we see no merits in this draft resolution which would warrant giving it priority.

With regard to the United States draft resolution [DC/220/Rev. 1], I must point out that its substance has in no way been changed by the introduction of a few amendments. All the criticisms of and objections to operative paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the United States draft resolution which we expressed at the 90th meeting of the Commission on 2 June still remain valid. Consequently, even in its revised form, the United States draft resolution is totally unacceptable to us.

There now remain the two USSR draft resolutions: one concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries and the liquidation of foreign military bases [DC/218]," and the other concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [DC/ 219]. Both these problems are extremely pressing and it is becoming increasingly important to find a solution to them without delay.

The attempts by representatives of the Western Powers to brush these proposals aside by claiming that their implementation would disturb the balance of military power are now being refuted by the military authorities of these same Western Powers who understand a question such as the balance of military power much better than those representatives who have misused this term to block any progress in the disarmament negotiations.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that the United States delegation has not advanced a single serious argument against prohibiting the use of nuclear weaponsnothing but the unsubstantiated and unsupported assertion that a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would not be observed. That is no argument.

Positive solutions of the questions which we have raised would be of enormous significance in normalizing the international situation and would certainly make a most effective contribution to progress in the solution of questions of disarmament. As we all realize, however, the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, as also the prohi

17 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 206-207. 18 Ibid., pp. 207-208.

bition of the use of nuclear weapons, require the consent of the United States. Without the agreement of the United States, without its consent, these measures cannot be implemented. We must therefore take into account the fact that the adoption of these draft resolutions in the face of United States opposition would doom them to remaining a dead letter.

Naturally, no great good would come of the mere adoption of such resolutions if the United States refused to implement them. In such circumstances, these resolutions would promote neither the withdrawal of foreign troops, nor the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories, nor the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The situation which has arisen in the Commission has caused concern to many of its members. The USSR delegation has carefully studied the statement made by Mr. Pazhwak, the representative of Afghanistan, at our 96th meeting. Mr. Pazhwak expressed the hope that

efforts will be made to enable us to adhere to an almost traditional way of approaching the disarmament question in the United Nations.

Mr. Pazhwak went on to say that in deciding

what should be done and what measures should be taken in the future, unanimity in decisions is of particular importance. After examining the different draft resolutions, my delegation-he stateddoes not think that this will be impossible at this stage.19

This optimistic remark by the representative of Afghanistan shows that there is still a ray of hope.

We, for our part, hope that the United States will reconsider its position and, in a show of good will, agree to the measures we have proposed, which are in the interests of all nations. Then we shall be able to conclude the present session of the Disarmament Commission having achieved important positive results. If the United States fails to respond to this appeal, then the members of the Commission must continue to look for a solution which would be supported by all and not one which would harden the differences of opinion. The idea advanced at today's meeting by Mr. Lekic, the

Yugoslav representative, could be helpful in this regard.

I should like to say a few words on this point. Mr. Lekic has just made a number of observations on the possibility of drafting a resolution which would receive general support. The USSR delegation shares Mr. Lekic's view that we should secure a unanimous recommendation concerning future disarmament negotiations. The Yugoslav delegation's proposal that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 should make further efforts to improve it is consistent with this approach. If we are indeed seeking to ensure the adoption of a resolution which might meet with general support, we must first eliminate from this draft all those provisions which give rise to serious differences of opinion. And, if we can manage it, we should add other provisions which can command unanimous support.20

Document III-16

Resolution Adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission, June 15, 1965 21

Call for Progress

Toward General Disarmament
Under Effective

International Control and
for Related Measures
Aimed at Lessening
International Tension

The Disarmament Commission,

Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the

20 No revisions were made in the resolution (infra).

21 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 260-262. This resolution, sponsored by the representatives of 29 member states, was adopted by a vote of 83 (including the U.K. and the U.S.) to 1 (Albania), with 18 abstentions (including France and the U.S.S.R.). The Albanian vote was directed against the call on all states to adhere to the partial test ban treaty (cited in footnote 25 below). After the adoption of this resolution, the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) said that his delegation would not ask for a vote on its two draft resolutions (cited in footnotes 80-81 to doc. III-12, ante). The United States likewise did not press its draft res. to a vote; see ante, doc. III-12 and footnote 1 thereto.

Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,20

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 435-440.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1291–1294.

Text ibid., 1963, pp. 1039–1040.

This par. was approved by a vote of 71 (Including the U.S.) to 12 (including the USSR.), with 18 abstentions (including France). For the text of the nuclear test ban treaty, see ibid., pp. 1032-1034. See ibid., 1964, p. 1104.

While we need to comment on certain portions of this resolution, we believe that the hard work, patience and moderation which led to the successful passage of this resolution is something of which each of the sponsors should be extremely proud.

Of course, we support the first, second and third preambular paragraphs. With respect to the third, we believe that most of us would agree that last year's discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, despite the fact that nonspecific agreements were reached, did contribute to the process of elaboration and clarification of the various proposals before that Committee. Several of these were first presented in 1964. When the Committee recessed in September of last year, all participants had a clearer understanding of both the

30 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 262-265. For the text of the U.N. Disarmament Commission res. on general disarmament and related measures, see supra. 31 Supra.

opportunities and the difficulties in the way of further progress.

We share the view expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph, deploring the fact that no agreement has been reached on discontinuing all nuclear weapons tests. Without such agreement, the United States finds it necessary, in the interests of its security, to continue underground tests as permitted by the Partial Test Ban Treaty.32 The Soviet Union is also conducting such tests.

We also agree with the fourth preambular paragraph in so far as it deplores the nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere by a Power which has not adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. We strongly endorse the reiteration in the first operative paragraph of the General Assembly's call on all States to become parties to the Partial Treaty and to abide by its provisions, and we wholeheartedly agree with the priority accorded, in operative paragraph 2(b), to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests.

The United States is prepared to engage in negotiations on this most important problem without any preconditions, and certainly without demanding that the other side a priori accept our position.

We agree that the memorandum of 14 September 1964, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, can assist us materially in getting the negotiations under way.33

We fully endorse the sixth preambular paragraph, which expresses the conviction that absence of a treaty or agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is fraught with the most serious consequences. The United States has stated on a number of occasions, as a matter of basic policy, that it would not take any action inconsistent with the spirit and purposes of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI). My Government sincerely

34

32 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032-1034. 33 See ibid., 1964, p. 1104.

34 Text ibid., 1961, p. 1190.

Paragraph 2(c) draws attention to "suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures". It is our understanding that this does not in any way imply that such measures form part of a single programme, nor do we understand that it suggests delay in the implementation of those measures which are possible now until we can implement others as well. That surely would be a backward step which could only increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. We had hoped, however, that given the amount of effort that we understand went into the drafting of this paragraph, all members of this Commission would be able to support it, notwithstanding the improvements which some of us thought desirable from our own respective standpoints.

My delegation believes that no one here can disagree with the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs. We hope that all of us are in agreement on the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal. We trust that the omission of reference to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, on which any such progress or agreement must be based, does not imply that some of the sponsors of the resolution are seeking to detract from the validity of those principles.

36

Likewise, we are confident that reference to the proposals made at

See footnote 98 to doc. III-12, ante. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.

the present session of the Disarmament Commission, at the Organization of African Unity and at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, does not imply exclusion from further discussion in the EighteenNation Disarmament Commission of other proposals which have been, or may yet be, made.37

The resolution refers both in preambular paragraph 9 and operative paragraph 2(d) to the utilization of resources expected to be released as progress is made in disarmament. Over the years, the United States has given ample proof of its desire to assist developing nations in their efforts at economic and social development. Our massive assistance programmes were initiated in times of huge defence expenditures and have continued regardless of changes in the levels of our defence budget. Naturally we look forward to the day when savings resulting from the implementation of disarmament agreements can be utilized to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere.

The resolution, however, attempts to establish a principle regarding the utilization of savings from defence expenditures. In preambular paragraph 9, reference is made to resources released through disarmament. This appears to be in keeping with the view embodied in many resolutions of the General Assembly and the specialized agencies that part of the savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament should be utilized for the economic and social development of developing countries. But we would have preferred a formulation closer to the spirit of those resolutions, and we therefore would have abstained had it been voted on separately.

In operative paragraph 2(d) reference is made only to "resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures". We would also have abstained on this paragraph because we do not believe assistance to developing countries should be related to fluctuations in national military expenditures

37 See footnotes 27-28 to doc. III-16, supra.