a memorandum to the ENDC on September 15, calling for an immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests.45 This memorandum noted, however, that agreement on a comprehensive test ban could be facilitated by international cooperation in the work of seismic detection and in the exchange of scientific information-a suggestion that was strongly endorsed by the United States and a number of other countries.

49

A few weeks later, at the UN General Assembly, the Geneva Eight drafted a resolution urging that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended and calling on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to continue its efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, "taking into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection." This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 92 to 1 with Albania casting the dissenting vote. The Communist States abstained, apparently because the injunction to take "into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection" implied a need for the scientific and technical discussions which the USSR opposed.

Denuclearized Zones

Continuing interest in the idea of nuclear-free zones in certain areas of the world was heightened in 1965, in part because of its obvious relationship to nuclear proliferation, and in part because of the progress being made by the Latin American nations in working out plans for the denuclearization of their area. Also, twenty-eight African nations sponsored a resolution, overwhelmingly adopted by the 20th General Assembly, calling upon all states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclearfree zone.50

The United States has encouraged the creation of nuclear-free zones in areas of the world where such zones would not disturb existing security arrangements and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance. It is, of course, also important that

See post, doc. III-43.
Cited in footnote 18, above.
Cited in footnote 20, above.

The proposal was a significant one. In connection with an existing U.S. proposal for a verified cutoff of fissionable materials, and a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, the new proposal provided for the destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons to obtain the materials for transfer. The United States had earlier suggested such a transfer in the ratio of 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 for the U.S. to 40,000 kilograms for the USSR. This amount of material, if completely fissioned, would be equivalent

51 See post, docs. III-11 and 60.

52 Post, doc. III-55.

53 Post, doc. III-44.

54 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1026-1028.

At the time of the September 17, 1964, adjournment, the Committee was working on the Stage I agenda item covering nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition to conventional arms, nuclear disarmament, and military bases (on which there has been some discussion), there still remain to be taken up Stage I agenda items on armed force levels, military expenditures, outer space measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to reduce the risk of war, transition from First to Second Stages, and establishment of an International Disarmament Organization.

During the single and relatively short session of the conference in 1965, discussions centered on nonproliferation and the suspension of all nuclear weapon tests and no progress was made in developing a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Twentieth UN General Assembly, without a dissenting vote, called on the ENDC to continue its efforts "on the question of general

55 For the Soviet and U.S. proposals, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1143-1146 and 1156-1165.

50 See Documents on Disarmament, 1962 (U.S. ACDA publication 19, 1963), vol. II, pp. 679-681.

57 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1073-1076.

and complete disarmament under effective international control as well as on collateral measures." 58 World Disarmament Conference

60

The idea of a World Disarmament Conference, while not a new one, was revived in 1964 at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo. In the spring of 1965, a groundswell of sentiment favoring such a conference began to develop in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Commission, in a resolution on which the United States abstained, asked the General Assembly to take up the question when it met in the fall. From the outset, the United States expressed reservations about the idea, on the grounds that such an unwieldy gathering would require the most careful preparation, and even then was unlikely to advance disarmament. However, when the question of preparing for a world conference eventually came to a vote in the General Assembly, the United States voted in favor since it was clear that governments could reserve their positions until satisfied that adequate preparations had been made. The resolution called for preparatory work to be done towards the convening of the Conference no later than 1967. It was then approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 112-0, with France abstaining.

62

In voting for the resolution, Ambassador Goldberg made clear that the United States continued to maintain its initial reservations, but was willing to go along with the decision "in principle" to convene such a conference. He went on to note that the United States had been struck by "the elementary common sense" in the approach taken by the delegate from Saudi Arabia (who had suggested that the United States, the United Kingdom, USSR, France and Communist China might want to explore whether there was in fact a constructive basis for convening a world conference). He indicated a U.S. willingness to participate in a small "exploratory" group as a step preliminary to the preparatory work

63

58 See footnote 21, above.

59 The proposal of the nonaligned countries for a world disarmament conference is quoted in doc. III-6, post. 60 Post, doc. III-14.

61 See footnote 19, above. 62 Post, doc. III-57.

63 See Documents on Disarmament, 1965 (U.S. ACDA publication 34, 1966), p. 532.

Document III-2

Statement Made by the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, January 26, 1965 (Excerpt)1

Venting of Radioactivity
From a Soviet Underground
Nuclear Test,
January 15, 1965

.. On January 15 the explosion took place and on January 16 the United States made this announcement:

The United States yesterday recorded seismic signals from an event in the Soviet nuclear testing area in the Semipalatinsk region.2

On January 19 there was a further development of what we knew and that was a statement by the AEC:

As previously reported, the United States detected through seismic signals a Soviet underground nuclear test in the Semipalatinsk area on January 15 with a yield in the intermediate range. The U.S. detection system has now detected a certain amount of venting connected with the test. The amounts of radioactivity measured to date will not produce measurable exposures to persons. In view of the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, the Department of State has asked the Government of the Soviet Union for information on this event.3

Yesterday the Soviet Ambassador came in with an oral message in response to that question. In an oral reply to our inquiry the Soviet Government has stated that a nuclear explosion was carried out deep underground on January 15 and that some radioactive debris was released into the atmosphere. However, the oral reply states that the amount is

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1965 (U.S. ACDA publication 34, 1966), pp. 9-10. 2 AEC press release H-13, Jan. 18, 1965. AEC press release H-16, Jan. 19, 1965.

so insignificant that the Soviet Government excludes the possibility of a violation of the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The United States is continuing its own evaluation of the facts involved.

Further than that we have come to this conclusion: This particular event-which on the basis of what we now know appears to have been accidental-may have been a technical violation-but again, on the basis of what we know now, it does not by itself represent a threat to our national security or to the purposes of the test ban treaty, nor standing alone does it represent a resumption of testing prohibited by the treaty.

This point of view is not just my own, but represents the considered judgment of the Committee of Principals. Because of the importance of the subject, however, the matter is under continuing study."

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032-1034.

5 "Policy recommendations are made to the President by the Agency's Director through the Committee of Principals' whose members in addition to the Director of ACDA are the highest ranking officials of each interested government agency-the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency." (Quotation from p. 22 of the U.S. ACDA Fifth Annual Report, not printed supra.)

At a news conference on Nov. 19, 1965, the Deputy Director of the Office of News (Wright) Department of State, said the United States "had several discussions with the Soviet Government on this subject [of venting from the Jan. 15 Soviet nuclear test] and we have concluded that the effects of the event were the result of a miscalculation by the Soviet Union. We have requested the Soviet Government to take all precautionary measures to ensure that the Limited Test Ban Treaty will be observed." (Department of State filles.)

[Statement Issued by the Department of State February 9, 1965Post, doc. III-71

[Establishment of

More Secure Procedures Regulating Participation Abroad by United States Firms in Maritime Civil

Nuclear Propulsion Projects]

Document III-3

Announcement Issued by the Atomic Energy Commission, February 15, 1965

United States Decision

To Reduce the Rate

of Production of

Enriched Uranium

The Atomic Energy Commission will reduce the rate of production of enriched uranium beyond the decreases announced in early 1964. This action was approved by the President on the basis of a recommendation by the Commission after a reassessment of the production level necessary to meet projected military and civilian requirements. A copy of the Commission's letter to the President is attached."

The new reduction will become effective in steps beginning in mid1966 and extending into 1969, at which time power consumption in the AEC's three gaseous diffusion plants will reach a level of 2000 megawatts. This is a decrease of 970 megawatts beyond the reductions announced on January 8, 1964, and April 20, 1964.10 When all power reductions are completed, the diffusion plant operating power level will be about 60 percent below the 4850megawatt level planned prior to the 1964 cutbacks.

The Commission emphasized that the lower level of enriched uranium production will meet currently projected military and civil use requirements. In future years, however, as

a result of the growth of civilian nuclear power now anticipated, increases in the production levels of the diffusion plants will be required.

The three gaseous diffusion plants for the production of enriched uranium are located at Oak Ridge, Tenn., Paducah, Ky., and Portsmouth, Ohio. The new power cutback of 970 megawatts is made up of the following components: 205 megawatts of Tennessee Valley Authority power at Oak Ridge; 240 megawatts of TVA power at Paducah; 325 megawatts of Electric Energy, Inc., power at Paducah; and 200 megawatts at Portsmouth supplied by the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation. The new power reduction, when completed, will reduce the Government's annual power costs by about $34 million. The new reduction, when added to the reductions announced in January and April 1964, will ultimately save the Government approximately $100 million in annual power costs.

The employment level at the three AEC diffusion plants is expected eventually to be reduced by a total of about 100 positions as a result of the latest power cut. However, since the power reduction will not begin for some time, it is expected that the personnel reduction will be accomplished by normal attrition. The Oak Ridge and Paducah diffusion plants are operated for the Commission by Union Carbide Corporation and the Portsmouth facility is operated by Goodyear Atomic Corporation.

The power curtailment will not affect existing AEC commitments for the purchase of uranium concentrates, nor will it result in further cutbacks in the AEC uranium feed processing plants.

Document III-4

Letter From the Soviet Representative at the U.N. (Fedorenko) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), March 31, 1965 11

Soviet Request for
Convening the United Nations
Disarmament Commission

On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet So

11 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 30-31.