Part III

Document III-1

Fifth Annual Report to Congress, February 15, 1966 (Excerpt)1

Activities of the

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 1-December 31, 1965

In 1965, despite the trials of the war in Viet-Nam, the United States pushed determinedly ahead in its search for ways to turn down the arms race. A U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was presented for negotiation to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) at Geneva." An existing U.S. proposal to cut off all production of fissionable materials for weapons was expanded to include the actual destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States also restated its willingness to explore the possibilities of a freeze in strategic nuclear deliv

1 H. Doc. 382, 89th Cong., pp. 3-11.

On Jan. 15, 1965, President Johnson requested from Congress a 4-year continuation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and an authorization of $55 million in appropriations for the period, July 1, 1965-June 30, 1969; see the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1965, pp. 144-146. Congress approved a 3year extension of ACDA and authorized $30 million in appropriations for the period, July 1, 1965-June 30, 1968 (Public Law 8927, approved May 27, 1965; 79 Stat. 118). The appropriation for ACDA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, was contained in Public Law 89-164, Sept. 2, 1965, and amounted to $10 million (79 Stat. 642). 2 Post, doc. III-27.

3 See post, docs. III-44 and 51.

ery vehicles which would limit further production to present levels and prevent the development of new and even more destructive types of missiles and bombers. The latest improvements in the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions were brought to the attention of international disarmament negotiators. The United States expressed a readiness to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the number and kind of on-site inspections for verifying compliance with a total ban on testing."

These activities took place under the general guidance of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which bears principal responsibility for the preparation and management, under the direction of the Secretary of State, of international negotiations in disarmament.

Throughout the year, in New York, Geneva, Washington, London, and Paris, U.S. negotiators pursued the urgent goal of an agreement to stop nuclear proliferation. In Vienna and Tokyo the United States joined with 93 countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its effort to bring worldwide power reactor development under improved international safeguards, and ACDA shared the scientific and diplomatic effort with U.S. agencies more directly responsible for this problem, so important to our non-proliferation objectives."

See post, docs. III-7 and 21. 5 See post, doc. III-35. See post, docs. III-76-77.

ACDA's Director, William C. Foster, who is principal adviser on arms control and disarmament to the President and the Secretary of State, spent over six months representing the United States at the international conference table.

On April 21, the long-dormant United Nations Disarmament Commission was called into session at the request of the Soviet Union on the ground that the U.N. dues dispute had made it impossible for the General Assembly to hold its usual disarmament debate. The United States agreed, although it would have preferred early resumption of the ENDC talks in Geneva. The meeting lasted eight weeks' and opened with a violent Soviet attack on U.S. policies in Viet Nam.10 The 117-Nation membership, however, was more interested in the problem of nuclear proliferation, and on June 16 wound up its deliberations with an overwhelming call for a return to Geneva "as soon as possible" in order to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty and the extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground testing."

Under this mandate, the Geneva Conference convened the following month, on July 27. There, on August 17, the United States introduced its draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." This question held the center of the stage during the short, seven-week session.

On September 16, when the 18Nation Committee came to its customary recess on the eve of the United Nations General Assembly, it was clear that any agreement on a non-proliferation treaty would come only after difficult negotiation. The Soviet Union had greeted the U.S. draft coldly, saying it offered "no basis" for negotiation," but had offered no alternate draft of its own.

Nevertheless, agreement of another kind had begun to emerge from the months of intense activity at the international conference table. There was an almost universal view that the further spread of nuclear

* Post, doc. III-4.

Post, doc. III-5.

In New York, Apr. 21-May 25, June 116, 1965.

10 Reference to a portion of doc. III-6,

post, not printed here.

11 Post, doc. III-16.

12 Cited in footnote 2, above.

1 See post, doc. III-32.

24

Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, he had characterized the problem of proliferation as the most urgent facing the world, and had called for a "simple and effective" agreement, along the lines of the "Irish Resolution", unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961. Such an agreement, he said, should obligate the nuclear powers not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons or provide assistance necessary for their manufacture to nations not now possessing them. As a corollary, the nonnuclear states should agree not to manufacture, seek or receive such weapons or data necessary for their manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons.

As the debate in the Disarmament Commission ran its eight-weeks' course, the sense of urgency expressed by Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. Foster on this issue was echoed by many UN members and attention was directed towards the need for a non-proliferation treaty and for a total ban on testing; the latter was widely regarded as an essential element in preventing further spread of nuclear weapons. In June, the Commission by a vote of 83 to 1 (with 18 abstentions, including the Communist states), called for the resumption of the Geneva Conference "as early as possible" in order that priority attention be given to drafting a non-proliferation treaty and extending the partial test ban treaty to the underground environment.25

The Commission's vote heralded a growing confidence in the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the best forum for the conduct of these complicated negotiations.

Some of the themes developed in New York were orchestrated at Geneva, as the 18-Nation Conference met July 27 for the first time since September, 1964. The Soviet Union continued in its long-held position that no agreement was possible on non-proliferation so long as the United States continued to hold open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO as the multilateral force or the allied nuclear force." These schemes, they

24 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1190. For Ambassador Stevenson's statement of Apr. 26, 1965, see post, doc. III-7.

25 Post, doc. III-16.
26 See post, doc. III-32.

contended, would constitute proliferation and place nuclear weapons within reach of additional countries, particularly Germany.

The consensus in New York that proliferation was a priority item had not extended to a formula for the best methods for preventing it. There was concern in some quarters that a single measure such as a treaty was not adequate and that a broad program was needed to accompany it. Certain of the non-nuclear states were worried about possible threats to their security should they forego nuclear weapons. Some advocated agreement to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, or prohibition of their use against non-nuclear states. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by the nuclear states were called for to match the self-denial by non-nuclear states in not acquiring or developing such weapons.

Throughout, the United States indicated its awareness of the responsibility of the nuclear powers to those states agreeing to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons." ACDA Director William C. Foster reminded delegates that the United States had offered a broad program of measures related to non-proliferation: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials, worldwide safeguards on reactors to prevent their diversion to military purposes, a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and support for the establishment of nuclearfree zones in certain areas of the world, such as Africa and Latin America.2

To the Soviet claim that proposals for nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO would constitute proliferation, the United States answered with its Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." This document, worked out in consultation with the Western members of the Eighteen Nation Committee (Canada, the U.K. and Italy), set out specific terms for an agreement for the first time. It would prohibit nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons, either directly or

27 See post, doc. III-44.

28 See post, docs. III-11, 37, 62, and 68. 29 Cited in footnote 2, above.

indirectly through a military alliance, or assisting in the manufacture of such weapons. Non-nuclear states would have a corresponding obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to manufacture them.

The draft treaty contains language which specifically prevents any increase in the present number of nuclear entities. Its provisions bind both nuclear and nonnuclear states "not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons."

Mr. Foster emphasized that "The United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. We seek no nuclear-sharing arrangement in NATO which could involve such dissemination. The treaty we have suggested would bar such dissemination since it would prevent the creation of any additional entity, whether a state or organization, having an independent power to use nuclear weapons." 30

Under the U.S. proposal a new organization having independent power to use nuclear weapons can come into existence only if one of the present nuclear nations voluntarily turns over its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a collective entity, thereby giving up its own national capability.

agreement would be maintained. This idea has not yet been actively pursued, given the continuing hope for agreement on a treaty within a reasonable time period.

The Eighteen Nation Committee recessed on September 16, 1965, in preparation for consideration of disarmament items at the Twentieth UN General Assembly. There, on September 24, the Soviet Union introduced its own version of a nonproliferation treaty." It was obvious that the treaty had been drafted in such a way as to preclude the type of nuclear-sharing arrangements which were currently under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The eight nonaligned members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference played an active role in the debate of the General Assembly's 117-nation First Committee." Their initiatives contributed importantly to the compromise resolution on non-proliferation adopted by the General Assembly on November 19.5

The Resolution calls on the ENDC to reconvene as early as possible to negotiate a treaty. It urges that "the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form." The United States considered this language to be consistent with its position. In voting for the resolution, Mr. Foster said:

We agree that there should be no loopholes, and the United States draft treaty permits none. (It) would not permit any non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons. What could not be done directly would not be permitted indirectly, through a military alliance.30

Soon after the completion of United Nations consideration of the five disarmament items, the Soviet and American Co-Chairmen of ENDC agreed to reconvene the Geneva conference on January 27, 1966. There the arduous negotiating task will continue as the Committee works to reconcile the differences in the two draft treaties.

33 Cited in footnote 15, above. 34 See post, docs. III-42-43. 85 Cited in footnote 15, above. 36 Post, doc. III-53.

Comprehensive Test Ban

37

It

The preamble to the limited test ban treaty of 1963 pledges its signatories to seek "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and to continue negotiations to that end. has not been possible, however, to conclude a comprehensive test ban agreement because of Soviet refusal to accept any on-site inspections. The USSR has maintained that national means of detection and identification can adequately verify observance of a ban on underground tests and that no on-site inspections are needed. The previous Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections was withdrawn shortly after the limited treaty was signed." The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have pointed out that some seismic events remain unidentified and for this reason, onsite inspection is necessary.“

39

38

Intensive research in seismological detection techniques has been carried out in the United States and the United Kingdom. By 1965, significant technical advances had been made and led to the construction of the first Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) installation at Billings, Montana. This facility is a part of the VELA Project-a multimillion dollar research program to improve the detection and identification of seismic disturbances. Representatives from 21 nations attended the public ceremony opening the array, on October 12, and technical discussions were held afterwards with foreign scientists. On that occasion Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pointed out that while LASA was a scientific tool whose potentialities were still not completely known, "it is clear that a world-wide system of such instruments will provide a major improvement to our capabilities for verifying a comprehensive test ban." President Johnson, in a special message marking the occasion, directed that "data from the new installation be made freely available to all countries of the world." 42

These encouraging developments are narrowing the gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions. But while Western seismologists have made progress in the techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and manmade explosions underground, remote instrumentation alone still cannot provide the necessary assurance that cheating is not taking place. Repeated attempts over the years to get Soviet scientists to join with those from other parts of the world for an appraisal of the present technical situation have been fruitless.

The greatest technical difficulties lie in identifying small seismic events as earthquakes; the larger events can be sorted out with a greater degree of confidence. For this reason, the idea of including them in the limited treaty has been suggested, first by Brazil in 1963," and later by other nonaligned members of the ENDC." In this approach, underground events over a "threshold" of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be banned in the belief that events of this size could be identified by seismic instrumentation alone, without on-site inspection.

At the 1965 session of the Geneva Conference, the United Arab Republic renewed its previous proposals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all other tests, and scientific and technical discussions on problems of detection and identification. The Soviet Union stated that it would accept the threshold, coupled with the moratorium, but it ignored the U.A.R. proposal for technical talks.* The United States made it clear that it would not agree to an unverified moratorium."

Throughout 1965, the non-nuclear states continued to press for a comprehensive test ban. The debate in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee reflected their sense of inequity in the proposition that they should foreswear development of a nuclear capability while the nuclear giants continued to improve their weapons through underground testing. The nonaligned Eight presented

43 See Documents on Disarmament, 1963 (U.S. ACDA publication 24, 1964), pp. 505509.

44 See ibid., 1964 (U.S. ACDA publication 27, 1965), p. 427.

45 See post, doc. III-26. 46 See post, doc. III-37. 4 See post, doc. III-39.