support in many ways. And these are states which have received the welcome of this Assembly. My Government-and, I am sure, all the members of this Assembly-have assumed that these states should be left alone to govern themselves, to develop their own institutions, to develop their own course of national conduct, which has been our privilege; that diversity is not weakness but an asset; and that what these states need most of all is support and assistance-not calls for further violence or subversion.

One cannot help asking, therefore, what Chou En-lai has in mind when he talks about all of Africa being "ripe for revolution." Revolution by and against whom? Revolution for what purpose?

But we have an explanation in Marshal Lin Piao's now famous article of September 2, in which he explained that:

1. "... the Marxist-Leninist theory of . . . revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence";

2. The proletarian revolution is "the inevitable sequel to the national-democratic revolution";

3. The proletarian revolution "can only be, nay must be, led by the proletariat and the genuinely revolutionary party armed with Marxism-Leninism, and by no other class or party";

4. "The more thorough the national-democratic revolution, the better the conditions for the proletarian revolution"; and, finally

5. "This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries." *

32

In other words, Peiping reserves to itself the right to designate any country or continent as being "ripe" for revolution or liberation, to decide which political movements within that country or continent qualify as "national liberation movements," and then, in the exercise of its selfassumed duty, to give every possible form of active aid and support to

See post, doc. IX-21.

that movement-disregarding the principle of nonintervention, the existence of national boundaries, and even the existence of national governments with which Peiping itself maintains diplomatic relations.

That is an unacceptable condition under our charter, which respects national sovereignty and the equality of all states.

I am aware that many who favor seating Peiping in this organization do not deny for a moment that Peiping's international behavior has been, and continues to be guided by these discredited principles. Some contend, however, that Peiping must be represented here so that the United Nations will be closer to the goal of universality.

But, we have to ask ourselves, would this in fact be a move toward universality? Many of those who most strongly advocate the seating of Peiping just as vociferously call for the expulsion of the Republic of China. And Peiping itself clearly opposes membership for all sovereign states. Indeed, as a condition of its participation here, as I have plainly shown from its own statements, it demands the expulsion of a charter member, as well as those unnamed members which qualify for the label of "imperialist puppets." Peiping's representation here would run contrary to the only true principle of universality for which this organization should strive. As envisaged in article 4 of the charter, this is a universality of all peaceloving states "which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

I should like to ask this question: From Peiping's past and current record in Asia, who can seriously contend that Peiping is peace-loving? Given these direct statements as to the conditions for its admission, who can seriously contend that it adheres to the purposes and principles of the charter? Who can seriously contend, given its ideological commitment to the use of force, that Peiping would be able and willing to carry out its obligations in the charter? Who can contend that Peiping would be willing to settle its disputes by peaceful means or refrain from

the threat or use of force in its international relations?

So to contend is to fly right in the face of experience. Surely it has not been forgotten in this body how readily Peiping joined with Prime Minister Nehru to subscribe to the famous five principles of international conduct, which parallel those of the United Nations.33 Nor has it been forgotten that Peiping took part, indeed, a leading part, in the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, at which it readily subscribed to the 10 principles of peaceful coexistence." But there is no evidence that these commitments restrained Peiping's action toward India or other sovereign Afro-Asian states. Indeed, the reality is quite the re

verse.

In 1962 Peiping undertook an armed attack against India and but a few weeks ago, as this Assembly is well aware, threatened new attacks." Laos, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam were all participants in the Bandung conference. Yet, at this very moment, Peiping is supporting armed insurrection against the neutralist Government of Laos. It is encouraging aggression against the Government of South Viet-Nam, a participant in the Bandung conference, and is threatening the Government of Thailand, a member state, as being next on Peiping's list of countries ripe for liberation.

Those who argue that Peiping's international behavior and ideology will be moderated by exposure to world opinion should also ponder Peiping's role in killing the second Afro-Asian conference and the

history of its relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. In all these cases Peiping has demonstrated its readiness to adopt and maintain a posture of splendid isolation, its total unwillingness to moderate views and position in deference to the wishes of others-indispensable if this orga

33 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1075, footnote 9.

34 Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2352.

35 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1015-1027; also, post, docs. IX-25-26.

35 See post, docs. VIII-4-8.

nization is to continue-and its complete dedication to having its views prevail, in their entirety, even at the cost of destroying the very movement in which Peiping is represented.

Finally, with respect to Viet-Nam, who was the one who said that the war in Viet-Nam would go on and should go on for 10 or 15 or 20 years? It was not the United States. We seek a peaceful solution, sooner rather than later, and it was the regime in Hanoi, supported by Peiping, who said that.

With these realities in mind, we would be as unrealistic not to believe Peiping when it states, as it has repeatedly, that its international behavior and foreign policy will not be affected in any way by its participation in the United Nations as we would be not to recognize that a decision by this Assembly to accept Peiping in our midst would be seen as a sign of our weakness and Peiping's strength, as a vindication for its past and present bellicosity, as proof positive that political power, on the international as on the domestic plane, does indeed grow out of the barrel of a gun.

18 of the Charter," that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question,

Affirms that this decision remains valid.

1380th plenary meeting."

43 Which reads in part: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting." For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

44 Subsequently at this meeting on Nov. 17, 1965, the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 47 to 47 (including the U.S.), with 20 abstentions, rejected a draft resolution, sponsored by the representatives of 12 member states, which would have recognized representatives of the "People's Republic of China" as the only representatives of China to the United Nations and would have expelled the representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations and all the organizations related to it (U.N. doc. A/L.469).

A move by the Soviet Union in the Credentials Committee on Dec. 17 to have the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of China considered invalid proved unsuccessful. On Dec. 21 the report of the Credentials Committee was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 45 to 1, with 58 abstentions. "The U.S. Representative asserted that there was no question about the validity of these credentials, either on the grounds of procedure, since they were in complete accord with the relevant rules of procedure of the General Assembly, or on the grounds of substance, for the General Assembly had earlier in the session upheld the right of the Government of the Republic of China to represent China in the United Nations." (U.S. Participation in the UN, 1965, p. 133.)

Document II-44

Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Goldberg) Before the U.N. General Assembly, September 23, 1965 (Excerpts) 1

"What We Seek for

Our Own People in a
Great Society at Home,
We Seek for All Mankind"

What we seek for our own people in a Great Society at home, we seek for all mankind.

President Johnson, I think, has said this very well, and I quote him:

We seek not fidelity to an iron faith but a diversity of belief as varied as man himself. We seek not to extend the power of America, but the progress of humanity. We seek not to dominate others but to strengthen the freedom of all people.2

And the diversity of which our President speaks is the diversity represented in the membership of the United Nations-diversity in its needs, in its philosophies, in its races, and in its institutions-yet united by a common bond of commitment to the obligations of the charter and dedicated to justice and social progress and the peaceful settlement of conflict.

There is regretfully, however, a contrasting doctrine of world order. It was put before us earlier this month by the Defense Minister of Communist China in a "manifesto" published in all of Communist China's newspapers and republished broadly throughout the world."

The doctrine laid bare by Marshal Lin Piao starts from the premise that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It rests, he said,

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1965, pp. 578-587. For another excerpt, see post, doc. III-44.

2 Ante, doc. I-1.

3 Post, doc. IX-21.

This incredible manifesto is the antithesis of everything this organization stands for. It is a call to change world order by force and violence in a period where force and violence can lead to the most disastrous consequences for the entire world. It leaves no room for difference of tradition, of culture, or of national aspiration, or for the legitimate right of every people, large and small, to choose their own social and economic order their own way. It leaves no room for genuine selfdetermination. It seeks to squeeze every nation and every people within the grip of Chinese Communist conformity. It should be read—I know it has been read and pondered by everyone in this Assembly.

The apostles of this philosophy are today attempting to transform the country of South Viet-Nam into a proving ground for their theories. This challenge must be met, not in the interests of any single nation but in the interests of each member of this organization. It must be met in particular in the interests of the smaller nations who cherish their right to choose and follow their own path of national development.

We are helping to meet this threat because we believe it must be met. And our goals in South Viet-Nam are plain and simple.

We seek only to insure the independence of South Viet-Nam, with freedom from attack and the opportunity for its people to determine their own future. We seek no territory for ourselves, no preferential position, no permanent military presence. We stand ready to withdraw our forces when Communist aggression has ended and South Viet-Nam is left alone to determine its own destiny in its own way by principles of self-determination.

And, above all, we seek a peaceful solution. We have repeatedly stated our willingness to enter into uncon

ditional discussions-and I reaffirm that willingness here today. And we have asked the members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to help bring about such discussions." We have asked the members of the Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral to help get negotiations started. And we have offered to join in a massive cooperation program for the economic development of Southeast Asia."

The members of the United Nations, under the charter, share a common responsibility to demonstrate to those who use violence that violence does not pay. And we can meet that responsibility by using every means to persuade the regimes of Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone and to begin serious discussions for a resolution of this conflict.

And we must also meet that obligation by denying United Nations representation to the regime that denies, in word and in deed, the fundamental restraints on the use of force in our charter and hurls insult upon the peaceful efforts of the members of the United Nations to compose this and other disputes."

The experience in Cyprus, the continuing aggression in Southeast Asia, the shock of violence erupting in Kashmir-all lead to an inescapable conclusion: There is an urgent need to strengthen the United Nations capacity to keep the peace.

We urge as one such step the continued development of a flexible United Nations callup system along the lines proposed by our distinguished Secretary-General."

4 See post, doc. IX-110.

5 See ante, doc. II-2.

* See post, docs. IX-137, 140. See post, docs. IX-1-4. See ante, docs. II-42-43.

We

if

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant said: "It would be extremely desirable. countries would, in their national milltary planning, make provision for suitable units which could be made available at short notice for United Nations service and thereby decrease the degree of improvisation necessary in an emergency. .. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have for some time now engaged in joint planning of a standby force comprising various essential components to be put at the disposal of the United Nations when necessary. It would be a very welcome development if other countries would consider following the lead of the Scandinavian countries in this matter." (Address before the Harvard Alumni Association, Cam

hope member states in all regions of the world will earmark and train units for such purpose.

We believe also that the military staff now supporting the SecretaryGeneral is inadequate and needs to be strengthened. The added experience and burdens of Kashmir and Cyprus have conclusively demonstrated in particular that the military staff available to the SecretaryGeneral at headquarters is overburdened. We must provide him with an enlarged staff whose size is commensurate with the tasks we entrust to him.

The peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations is too basic to its purposes and to its very existence to allow it to be frustrated by any one member. For this reason-and in this we are joined by the overwhelming majority of United Nations members-we continue to believe that the General Assembly must retain its residual authority to initiate peacekeeping operations when the Security Council is unable to act. Means must be found to pay for future peacekeeping operations which allocate the burden fairly. In cases where this cannot be done by assessment of every member, we must find other means, including assessment of those willing to be assessed, nonobligatory apportionment, or voluntary contribution.

Less dramatic, but equally important, is machinery to promote peaceful change and to allow the satisfaction of just claims. Without a strong international institution, able to help in doing this, nations, like individuals, are tempted to take matters into their own hands. We consequently believe it is time to breathe new life into article 33 of the charter,10 a provision of the charter referred to specifically in the Security Council resolution adopted just the other day in the Kashmir dispute." It has atrophied too long. We must develop workable methods to resolve disputes before they reach the point of potential or actual conflict.

[Doc. II-44]

127