what part we play in trying to organize our production in a way to do our part in the total world food situation.

Now, we have discussed various forms of aid with various countries as a part of our total bilateral relationships with those countries. But we are not using food as leverage in that sense. The question is part of our total relationship, and on what basis we ask our own citizens to come up with taxes and to bear the burdens that we bear in order to provide assistance, and what steps the other side might be taking to increase its own production and to make it possible for this form of aid not to be permanent or semipermanent in character.

2 H. Doc. 57, 89th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-2. On Oct. 20 President Johnson announced the transfer of responsibility for the_Food for Peace Program from the White House to the Department of State, effective Nov. 1, 1965. Richard W. Reuter, who had been Director of the Food for Peace Program and Special Assistant to the President, became Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace). At the same time, President Johnson requested recommendations from Secretary of State Rusk on "additional steps .. to further strengthen the Program as an integral part of our foreign policy program." (See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, vol. II, pp. 1067-1068; also Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1965, pp. 925-926.) Mr. Rusk's recommendations were included in President Johnson's message to Congress on Food for Freedom legislation, Feb. 10, 1966 (text ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, pp. 336-341). See footnote 6 below.

37 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. For amendments affecting Public Law 480, see post, doc. XII-6; see also ante, docs. VII-31, 32, 34, 38.

in the past, initiating imaginative new approaches to spur self-help, and facing an array of difficult challenges. The increasing pressure of world population growth was the most disturbing indicator in a year otherwise highlighted with promise in the war against hunger and malnutrition. Population growth of 2 percent a year-increasing to 3 percent in some of the underdeveloped countries-made it difficult to increase per capita food consumption. There was more food grown in 1965 than in 1964. But there were 64 million more mouths to feed.

In simplest terms, the task of bringing food and population into balance while maintaining progress in health, education, and economic growth-is the most critical challenge many countries are facing today. It will probably remain their most urgent challenge in the immediate years ahead. The world's capacity to respond will dramatically affect the course which individuals and nations choose in confronting their problems and their neighbors in coming generations.

This is a world problem. The stakes are too large, the issues too complicated and too interbound with custom and commerce, to leave the entire solution to those countries that have supplied, or received, the most food assistance during the postwar era. The experience, the ideas, the skills, and the resources of every nation that would avoid calamity must be significantly brought to bear on the problem.

The United States Congress recognizes the moral and practical implications of hunger and malnutrition. Over the years its members have taken the lead in developing programs to prevent famine and to improve diets. The basic instrument Congress has used for this effort has been Public Law 480-the authorizing legislation for the Food for Peace program.

It is not easy to measure the achievements of a program with such multiple objectives as Food for Peace-aiding the needy, assisting economic development, supporting U.S. foreign policy, increasing trade, bolstering American agriculture. Yet as we look back on more than a decade of effort, the accomplishments are remarkable by any test.

Hundreds of millions of people have directly benefited from American foods. The lives which otherwise might have been lost the grief which otherwise might have occurred-could have dwarfed the total casualties of all the wars during the period. I tend to think historians of future generations may well look back on this expression of America's compassion as a milestone in man's concern for his fellow man.

Food for Peace, however, is aimed at more than individual survivaland individual growth. It is directed toward national survival-and national growth. P.L. 480 has been an important resource in the growth process. With the day-to-day difficulties which countries face, we sometimes fail to recognize how far many of the nations we have aided have come in their development effort. An analysis of Food for Peace programing-which constitutes

more than a third of our total economic assistance effort is a good yardstick to measure such achievement. Frequently a country's development is directly reflected in its graduation from being a recipient of heavily subsidized food aid.

Consider, for example, the countries receiving our food and fiber for local currency in the first full year of operation a decade ago. There were 27 of them in mid-1956. Today, more than half have reached a point of economic development where they no longer require such aid. This group which had graduated from Title I programs, last year purchased more than $2 billion in agricultural commodities through commercial channels. This is more than triple their combined dollar purchase of a decade ago. Even excluding Britain, France and West Germany-today's big dollar customers who purchased only small amounts under P.L. 480 and left the program early-the gains are still impressive. Dollar sales of U.S. farm products to the other Title I graduates were well over a billion dollars last year-more than four times the amount in 1956.

Growing economic strength is also

Title I, the heart of the original enactment under Public Law 480, provides for sale of U.S. agricultural commodities to friendly countries with payment in the currency of the receiving country.

evident in that group of 13 countries receiving Title I food a decade ago which continued to buy U.S. farm commodities for local currency in FY 1965. They still face economic difficulties, but together these nations have more than doubled their dollar agricultural purchases from the United States over the ten-year period.

Global generalizations are difficult. But the broad pattern clearly shows substantial progress.

Indeed, the problems today are in many ways more serious than those facing the Congress when it enacted this law. The critical food shortage in India, though aggravated by drought, should be read as a warning that a crisis in food and population trends is already at the world's doorstep. The Food for Freedom legislation which I have proposed to Congress faces up to these problems. It takes into account the experience and lessons of P.L. 480, along with the changing conditions in food needs and supplies. It recognizes that the program will be judged in the long run by its success in encouraging self-help programs and attitudes in the recipient countries.

We have progressed a great deal during the past decade. We now know that food assistance can:

• make an important contribution to economic development

• serve the highest objectives of U.S. foreign policy

⚫ help American agriculture

• strengthen the habit of international cooperation

• help to dispel Malthusian fears which have historically haunted mankind.

By any standards, this nation can be proud of its Food for Peace program. It gives me pleasure to submit to the Congress the annual report on the 1965 activities carried on under Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as amended.

See ante, doc. IX-27.

See footnote 2 above. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 was approved on Nov. 11, 1966 (Public Law 89-808; 80 Stat. 1526).

Part XII

Document XII-1

Message From the President (Johnson) to the Congress, January 14, 19651

Request for Appropriations for the Foreign Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1966

I

We live in a turbulent world. But amid the conflict and confusion, the United States holds firm to its primary goal-a world of stability, freedom, and peace where independent nations can enjoy the benefits of modern knowledge. Here is our difference with the Communists and our strength. They would use

1 H. Doc. 53, 89th Cong., pp. 1-8; also Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1965, pp. 126-132. Due to differences of opinion in Congress regarding the proper form and scope of a foreign assistance bill in 1965, President Johnson's proposals were not introduced to Congress in a single administration bill. Senator J. W11liam Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, advocated legislation including the economic and administrative but not the military elements of the President's message. As enacted, however, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 contained these three elements (post, doc. XII-6). The Senate approved Senator Fulbright's plan to extend the foreign aid program for 2 years but this provision was dropped from the bill as enacted because of the opposition of the House of Representatives.

their skills to forge new chains of tyranny. We would use ours to free men from the bonds of the past.

The Communists are hard at work to dominate the less-developed nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Their allies are the ancient enemies of mankind: Tyranny, poverty, ignorance, and disease. If freedom is to prevail, we must do more than meet the immediate threat to free world security, whether in southeast Asia or elsewhere. We must look beyond—to the long-range needs of the developing nations.

Foreign assistance programs reach beyond today's crises, to offer

Strength to those who would be free;

Hope for those who would otherwise despair;

Progress for those who would help themselves.

Through these programs we help build stable nations in a stable world.

II

Acting on the experience of the past 4 years, I am presenting a program which

is selective and concentrated;

emphasizes self-help and the fastest possible termination of dependence on aid;

provides an increasing role for private enterprise;

improves multilateral coordination of development aid;

reflects continuing improvement in management.

Specifically, for fiscal year 1966 I recommend

no additional authorizations for development lending or the Alliance for Progress; existing authorizations for those purposes are adequate.

authorizations of $1,170 million for military assistance;

$369 million for supporting assistance;

$210 million for technical cooperation;

$155 million for contributions to international organizations;

$50 million for the President's contingency fund; and

$62 million for administrative and miscellaneous expenses.

I am also requesting a special standby authorization for use if necessary in Vietnam only.

My appropriation request for fiscal year 1966 under these authorizations is for $3,380 million: $1,170 million will be used for military assistance; $2,210 million is for the other categories of aid."

This is a minimum request, the smallest in the history of the foreign aid program. It is $136 million less than requested last year,' and will

2 For fiscal year 1966, $600 million; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1196-1244 (especially pp. 1212-1213); and ibid., 1964, pp. 1267-1275 (especially p. 1269). See also ante, doc. X-5.

3 President Johnson subsequently increased the request for foreign assistance appropriations by $89 million (ante, doc. IX-1).

4 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1244-1251.

impose the smallest assistance burden on the American people since the beginning of the Marshall plan in 1948.5

This minimum request reflects my determination to present to the Congress the lowest aid budget consistent with the national interest. It takes full account of the increasing efficiency of the assistance program, and the increasing availability of assistance funds from international agencies in which the costs are shared among a number of countries.

I believe that in carrying out this program the American people will get full value for their money. Indeed, we cannot afford to do less. Russia and Red China have tripled their promises of aid in the past year. They are doing more than they have ever done before; the competition between them has led to increased efforts by each to influence the course of events in the developing nations.

If, during the year, situations should arise which require additional amounts of U.S. assistance to advance vital U.S. interests, I shall not hesitate to inform the Congress and request additional funds.

III

I am requesting $1,170 million for the military assistance program. This is an increase of $115 million over the total appropriation for military assistance for the current fiscal year. In order to meet urgent requirements in southeast Asia during fiscal year 1965, we cut back programs in other countries which are under pressure. Some of the fiscal

5 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 1299-1321.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1275-1280.

7 "Total grant aid Military Assistance for Far East countries in the fiscal year [1965] amounted to $698 million. Laos and Viet-Nam claimed more than half of the total for all Far East countries. Funds available for other Far East countries were reduced to less than the amount planned and $12 million less than the comparable figure for fiscal year 1964." (The Foreign Assistance Program: Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965 (Washington, U.S Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 25.)