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This theory assumes that an alliance between the Communists and the non-Communist left in a popular front is an act of nature. This is really not different in essence from the Marxian theory that Communists are "in the vanguard" of all truly revolutionary movements.

In Western Europe this theory has been proved false. By and large, Communists have failed to seize power there because European reformers were their most determined and effective opponents. In contrast, non-Communist revolutionaries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere have formed popular fronts with Communists.

The need to distinguish between a reform movement allied with the Communists and a movement dedicated to reform in freedom should be emphasized over and over again. Indeed, it is precisely the failure to make this distinction-the tendency of some to lump all "reformers" together and to evaluate them solely on the basis of their rhetoric-that causes a great deal of the confusion.

Many of you will recall De Tocqueville's conclusions about the causes of the Reign of Terror, which detracted from the real achievements of the French Revolution:

When we closely study the French Revolution we find that it was conducted in precisely the same spirit as that which gave rise to so many books expounding theories of government in the abstract. Our revolutionaries had the same fondness for broad generalizations, cut-and-dried legislative systems, and a pedantic symmetry; the same contempt for hard facts; the same taste for reshaping institutions on novel, ingenious, original lines; the same desire to reconstruct the entire constitution according to the rules of logic and a preconceived system instead of trying to rectify its faulty parts. The result was nothing short of disastrous; for what is a merit in the writer may well be a vice in the statesman and the very qualities which go to make great literature can lead to catastrophic revolutions.

Even the politicians' phraseology was borrowed largely from the books they read; it was cluttered up with abstract words, gaudy flowers of speech, sonorous cliches, and literary turns of phrase.

Popular fronts do not have as their principal objective the noble purpose of democratic reform. Their

principal objective is political power. They are often formed by those who want the Communist vote in order to get elected to office. Sometimes they are formed because the help of disciplined Communists is needed to overthrow a government. They are sometimes formed by politicians already in power to "buy their peace." The rationale I have heard is a revealing one: "I know they are dangerous. But I can control them." Sometimes this estimate proves to be correct. More often it does not.

As President Kennedy said in his address at the Free University of Berlin on June 26, 1963:

As I said this morning, I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger.5

But the point I wish to make is that Communist participation is not necessary in order to carry out reforms. There are several governments I can think of which are not allied with Communists and which are doing a pretty good job of reform. I am not conscious that this great country of ours has, in cooperating with these and other countries, become a prisoner of any group.

Moreover, popular fronts serve Communist ends. Communists gain from them a respectability they do not deserve. They use this respectability to infiltrate their partisans into the educational system, organized worker and farm groups, the mass media, and, of course, the government itself. In participating in popular fronts politicians usually have in mind a short-term, personal, political, selfish gain. On the other hand, Communists are content to work today in order to prepare for tomorrow.

We do not really have to choose between reaction and leftist extremism. There is a large and growing number of people in Latin America

56 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 536-539.

dedicated to rapid and far-reaching reform. New political movements, organized on an institutional rather than a personalized base, give promise of organizing and leading those who so desperately want to build modern societies. The Latin American military contain in their ranks many able and dedicated men who do not deserve to be smeared with the brush that ought to be reserved for the few. The church is providing leadership in many areas of social progress. Many of the younger men from all sectors of society are conscious of the need for change and are helping to promote it. Organized labor is growing in strength and could be a powerful influence for progress.

It is also said that our country is not much in sympathy with revolution and that our Revolution of 1776 was not much of an upheaval compared to the Russian and other revolutions.

Perhaps these words are to be interpreted as suggesting that in our revolution the violence was confined largely to the battlefields and that, consequently, it cannot be compared with the number of civilians killed under the guillotine or with the millions who disappeared in the familiar Communist purges. If so, I fail to see why violence itself should be considered a desirable end.

If, on the other hand, it is intended to say that the basic values of political and economic freedom, which were the principal motive force of the Revolution of 1776, are inferior to others, then there are differences in opinion which are indeed significant. Our political, economic, and social systems have produced a greater degree of individual freedom, a more even-handed, impartial administration of law, higher levels of income, a more equitable distribution of an everrising national product, more equality of opportunity, more religious freedom, a greater appreciation of the value of the spirit and of the dignity of man than has been hereto

fore achieved by any nation in history.

Our revolution did not start and end in 1776. It is a continuing phenomenon. The frontiers of opportunity, of knowledge, of health, of social justice and economic and political progress in our land are being expanded still further in President Johnson's program for the Great Society.

Certainly if one compares the achievements of our system with that of others, we have no need to be apologetic or defensive. On the contrary, we can take great pride in our accomplishments and in our determination for even greater improvement in the future.

Document X-53

Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), January 5, 1966 7

Continuation of a "Very Tense and Unstable” Situation in the Dominican Republic

1. Further information on the situation in the Dominican Republic has been received from the Office of my Representative there since the publication of my report on 27 December 1965 on the subject (S/7032/Add. 3).

2. On 29 December, the Dominican Central Electoral Board announced that foreign technical advisers for the elections scheduled to take place on 1 June 1966 would arrive in the Dominican Republic at the beginning of January 1966. These technical advisers were being sent by the Organization of American States at the request of the Provisional Government.

3. Although terrorist activities had somewhat declined, two incidents of a serious character were reported. The first incident occurred during the night of 31 December. On that

57 UN. doc. S/7032, Add. 4.

night, the "27 February camp" where some 700 former "Constitutionalists" were concentrated, was fired on for a short period. Shots apparently came from the areas of the Port and the Lighthouse. The firing stopped when troops of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) stationed around the camp reacted with warning shots. The second incident took place on the night of 1 January when a small fragmentation bomb was thrown at an IAPF vehicle, wounding two IAPF soldiers and five civilians, four of them children. One child has since died.

4. On 2 January, the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic issued a public manifesto announcing a "compromiso de honor" (promise of honour) of the Dominican Armed Forces and the National Police not to permit communism to take over the country.

5. On the evening of 3 January, President Hector García-Godoy addressed the nation on the Santiago incident of 19 December 1965. After recalling that the Government had ordered an investigation into the incident, the President stated that he had studied the documentation relating to the investigation and had reached the conclusion that the only certainty was that human lives had been lost in Santiago on 19 December. He believed that the responsibility for the incident lay not with the military alone but with the tragic division between brothers. He went on to state that this was not

58 Shooting had broken out in Santiago between Dominican Air Force contingents and "Constitutionalists" after Col. Caamaño and a convoy of some 100 cars had arrived there to attend a memorial service. President García Godoy asked the InterAmerican Peace Force to assist in restoring order. Twenty-two deaths resulted before the incident was over. Meanwhile, tense, angry crowds gathered in Santo Domingo and violence, resulting in 3 deaths, erupted in many areas of the city. Order was restored there after mixed elements of the IAPF and the Dominican Armed Forces patrolled the capital and after the Government repeatedly broadcast messages of assurances. President García Godoy then appointed a committee to investigate the Santiago disturbances. (U.N. doc. S/7032, Dec. 20, 1965.)

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decision)" and an explanatory map of the directly affected areas."

Under the arrangements agreed upon for a 5-year period, the United States through the Interior Department's Bureau of Reclamation will, subject to the availability of appropriations, undertake to construct by October of this year an extension of the drainage channel of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in Arizona. The extension will permit discharge of Wellton-Mohawk drainage into the Colorado River either above or below Mexico's Morelos Dam, as Mexico may request. The discharges above Morelos Dam would be diverted for irrigation of Mexican lands, while discharges below the dam would flow to the Gulf of California.

All Wellton-Mohawk drainage will be accounted for as a part of the water delivered to Mexico under the treaty of 1944. The United States will control the flows in the river reaching Morelos Dam during the winter months so that, excluding this drainage, those flows will meet Mexico's minimum scheduled deliveries under the treaty. The discharge of Wellton-Mohawk drainage above Morelos Dam is to be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with Mexico's scheduled deliveries in order to minimize the salinity of its irrigation water.

The International Commission will keep the operation continually under review. Both Governments reserve all legal rights.

Essentially, the proposed works would be operated so as to discharge the most highly saline drainage water from the Wellton-Mohawk District below Mexico's principal diversion point during the winter months when irrigation requirements in the Mexicali Valley are at their lowest. During this period, this would be accomplished by pumping

"Not printed here. Not printed here. 63 59 Stat. 1219.

the most saline drainage water into the extension channel for discharge below Morelos Dam.

At other times, when Mexico schedules increased deliveries of irrigation water, drainage water would be pumped from the less saline wells in the Wellton-Mohawk District so that most or all of it may be discharged from the extension channel into the Colorado above Morelos Dam. There it would mingle with other Colorado River flows and be diverted by Mexico for irrigation.

[Agreement Between the United States, Mexico, and the International Atomic Energy Agency for a Preliminary Study of a Nuclear Electric Power and Desalting Plant, Signed at Washington and Entered Into Force, October 7, 1965— Post, doc. XII-201

Document X-55

Joint Communiqué Issued at Washington, October 16, 1965"

Initial Meeting of the
Joint Mexican-United States
Trade Committee

The Joint Mexican-United States Trade Committee held its initial meeting in Washington from October 13th to October 15th of 1965 to discuss mutual problems in United States-Mexican trade. The Delegation of Mexico was headed by the Ambassador of Mexico to the United States, the Honorable Hugo Margáin and the United States Delegation by Mr. Joseph Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Trade Policy and Economic Defense.

64 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8. 1965, p. 738.

The creation of this Joint Committee represents the first effort by both governments to initiate and maintain a permanent institution for the regular exchange of views on ways that will promote mutually beneficial trade.

The discussions ranged over a wide variety of subjects affecting trade between Mexico and the United States. Included were discussions on the respective commercial policies of the two countries; impediments to the expansion of trade; export promotion activities of the two countries; and the role of certain international bodies in promoting international trade.

The Committee agreed to hold its second meeting in Mexico City in 1966. It was also agreed that there would be a continuing exchange of views on many of the matters discussed during the course of the meetings through normal diplomatic channels.

Initiation of these mutual trade talks between Mexico and the United States offers great promise for increasing trade and understanding between the two countries.

The cordiality and friendship that characterized the meetings augers well for future trading relationships between Mexico and the United States.

Document X-56

Announcement Issued by the White House, Austin, Texas, December 30, 1965 65

Mexican-United States Proposals Concerning the Salinity Problem of the Lower Rio Grande

President Johnson joined with President [Gustavo] Diaz Ordaz of Mexico on December 30 in announcing recommendations made by the International Boundary and Water Commission for a proposed agreement between the United States and Mexico for solution of the salinity problem of the lower Rio Grande. The problem is caused by the discharge of the highly saline drainage

65 Ibid., Jan. 24, 1966, p. 118. The White House press release was dated Dec. 29 and released Dec. 30, 1965.

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