Following extensive informal discussions, Sweden introduced in the First Committee on November 25 a draft resolution, ultimately sponsored by 17 states, which noted the reports of the Secretary General and invited the Diplomatic Conference to continue (1) its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any that might be deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and (2) its search for agreement for humanitarian reasons on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. The Secretary General was requested to report to the next General Assembly on relevant aspects of the Diplomatic Conference and of the 1976 Lugano Conference of Government Experts. The resolution also decided that in 1976 the Assembly's debate on this subject should be broadened beyond incendiary weapons to encompass "Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons."

Without a vote, the First Committee approved the draft resolution on December 4 and the General Assembly adopted it on December 11.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

In a general statement before the First Committee on October 30, Ambassador Martin referred to developments in the field of chemical weapons:

"Following their summit commitment to consider a joint initiative on chemical weapons at the CCD, the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union made contacts during 1975 with a view to finding an appropriate means of carrying out such an initiative. In addition, as I reported to the CCD last August, the United States has concluded that an initial CW measure should. deal with all lethal chemical weapons. In the months ahead, my government will continue its efforts in this field, with the hope that they will. point to promising approaches to a possible joint initiative at the CCD during 1976."

On November 21 Poland introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution, ultimately sponsored by 24 states, that reaffirmed the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all states; urged states to make every effort to facilitate such agreement; requested the CCD to continue negotiations on this subject as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures; and invited all states that had not yet done

so to accede to the Biological Weapons Convention and
to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The draft resolution,
which substantially reiterated the Assembly's 1974
resolution on the subject, was acceptable to the United
States since it was consistent with the commitment con-
tained in the Biological Weapons Convention to seek
effective measures for the prohibition of chemical
weapons.

The First Committee approved the resolution without a vote on November 28, the P. R. C. stating that if there had been a vote it would not have participated. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on December 11, also without a vote.

Cessation of Nuclear Tests

The General Assembly considered the question of a nuclear test ban under two agenda items, one brought forward from previous sessions entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban," and a new agenda item requested by the U.S.S.R. entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests." A resolution was adopted under each agenda item.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko proposed the new item in a letter of September 11 to the Secretary General. The letter reviewed past agreements toward halting nuclear tests and concluded that it was of the utmost importance to achieve an international agreement providing for the complete prohibition of nuclearweapon tests in all environments by all states. Annexed to the letter was a draft treaty providing for such a prohibition.

The draft treaty provided for control over compliance through national technical means and for referral of any violations to the Security Council. Excluded from the scope of the treaty were underground nuclear explosions conducted by nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes, which, if held outside of their jurisdiction, should be in conformity with the provisions of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and if held within their jurisdiction should be in conformity with a special agreement to be concluded with due regard to IAEA recommendations. The proposed treaty would enter into force only after ratification by all nuclear-weapon states and an unspecified number of other states.

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On September 23 the U.S.S. R. submitted a draft resolution noting its draft treaty and calling upon all nuclear-weapon states to enter into negotiations not later than March 31, 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In commenting on the Soviet proposal on October 30, the U.S. Representative said:

. . While we can agree that a complete halt to all nuclear-weapons testing by all countries must certainly be our objective, the Soviet draft does not appear to solve problems that must be solved if we are to achieve that objective.

"In particular, reliance on national means of verification is not, in our view, an adequate basis for clearing up uncertainties as to whether ambiguous seismic signals are caused by an earthquake or by a nuclear explosion.

"Moreover, the draft does not specify verification measures for PNE's but merely states that such explosions would be governed by a separate agreement. This approach leaves unresolved the critical question whether, under a comprehensive test ban, an adequately verifiable accommodation for PNE's can be worked out. . . .

An amended draft resolution, sponsored by 12 states, was submitted by the Soviet Union on December 2. The amendments added (1) a new preambular paragraph which reaffirmed that the potential benefits of PNE's should be available to nuclear as well as nonnuclear states, in conformity with the NPT, in such a way as to exclude any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and (2) language in the operative section providing for 25 to 30 nonnuclear-weapon states appointed by the President of the General Assembly to participate in the treaty negotiations together with the nuclear-weapon states. A further slightly revised draft was submitted on December 4.

The First Committee approved the resolution on December 5 by a recorded vote of 73 (India, U.S.S.R.) to 2 (Albania, P. R.C.), with 37 abstentions (France, U.K., U.S.). In an explanation before the vote, the U.S. Representative recalled his earlier comments on the proposal, stated that it was not realistic to expect all nuclear-weapon states to agree to join comprehensive test-ban negotiations in the near future, and concluded that under these circumstances the only sound course of action was to continue consideration of the test-ban issue in existing negotiating forums, particularly the

CCD. The General Assembly adopted the resolution on December 11 by a recorded vote of 94 (India, U.S.S.R.) to 2 (Albania, P.R.C.), with 34 abstentions (France, U.K., U.S.).

Under the other agenda item on cessation of nuclear tests, the Committee had before it (1) the report of the CCD; (2) a September 22 letter from the Chairman of the Mexican delegation transmitting a working paper which had been submitted to the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and which proposed a protocol to the Treaty under which the depositary governments of the NPT--United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.-would suspend their underground nuclear-weapon tests for a period of 10 years as soon as the number of parties to the NPT reached 100 and for additional periods upon accession by additional states; and (3) an October 27 letter from the Swedish Permanent Representative transmitting the text of a revised draft treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests or any other underground nuclear explosion, except those for peaceful purposes.

After much informal discussion and negotiation, Australia introduced in the First Committee on December 1 a draft resolution sponsored by 11 states. The fourth preambular paragraph noted (a) that the Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference considered the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests as one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race, expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT would take the lead in solving the difficulties on this issue, and appealed to those states to make every effort to conclude a comprehensive test ban agreement; (b) that the documentation of the Conference included a draft protocol to the NPT whereby the nuclear-weapon state depositaries to the NPT would agree on a nuclear-test moratorium which could become a comprehensive test ban embracing all nuclear-weapon states; and (c) that the desire was expressed by many delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT should conclude an agreement, with appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear-weapon tests for a specified time, whereupon the terms of the agreement would be reviewed looking toward a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

In its operative portion the resolution, inter alia, (1) condemned all nuclear-weapon tests; (2) deplored the lack of progress toward a comprehensive test ban agreement; (3) called upon all nuclear-weapon states to halt all nuclear-weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step toward the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement; (4) emphasized the particular responsibility of nuclear-weapon states which

are parties to international agreements where they have declared their intention to achieve an early cessation of the nuclear arms race; and (5) urged the CCD to give highest priority to concluding a comprehensive test ban. agreement.

Several recorded votes were taken on the resolution on December 4. The fourth preambular paragraph was approved by 88 (U.K.) to 0, with 28 abstentions (P. R.C., France, India, U.S.S.R., U.S.). The paragraph condemning all nuclear-weapon tests was approved by a vote of 80 (India) to 5 (P.R.C., France, U.K., U.S.), with 33 abstentions (U.S.S.R.). The paragraph emphasizing the particular responsibility of nuclear-weapon states was approved by 96 (U.K.) to 0, with 22 abstentions (P.R.C., France, India, U.S.S.R., U.S.). The draft resolution as a whole was approved by a vote of 92 (India) to 2 (P.R.C.), with 24 abstentions (France, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.).

In an explanation after the vote, the U.S. Representative said that the United States remained firmly committed to the objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban but had abstained because the draft resolution ignored or minimized the problems that must be solved if such an objective is to be realized. He pointed out that the basic security interests of states required sufficient confidence that the terms of the agreement would be fully respected, adding that:

this means that a verification system must be devised capable of performing two essential functions. Firstly, it must provide adequate assurance that clandestine weapon tests are not going undetected and unidentified. . . . Secondly, a verification system must assure participants that weapons-related information is not being obtained from nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes. At a minimum, such a system would have to provide confidence that peaceful nuclear explosions do not involve the testing of a new weapons concept, the use of a stockpiled weapon to verify its performance, or the carrying out of nuclear-weapons effect studies. "No solution to this complex problem has yet been found. .

Ambassador Martin also took exception to the tone of the paragraph condemning all nuclear-weapon tests and expressed strong objection to the paragraph deploring lack of progress toward a test ban. He noted that this ignored the achievements of the 1974 U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the CCD's study of the implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under a test ban.