sidered only a fair and moderate loss. So it was in Ladysmith, where there was more danger of the flag being struck. The investment was close, the bombardment heavy, the supplies short, the population large, the town badly situated for defence purposes, and the water saturated with fever. Several considerations probably weighed with General White in favour of withdrawing to a more suitable place than Ladysmith, such as Pietermaritzburg, before he was surrounded by superior forces. The fact that Ladysmith was the Aldershot of Natal, and that to abandon it meant the loss of £1,000,ooo worth of militia stores, led him to take up his stand in this unfortunate position which was commanded by guns placed on the hills that surrounded the place. That he maintained his position without flinching an inch from November 2, the day after the Nicholson's Nek disaster, when his communications were cut off, until March 1st, in spite of these natural forces working against him, in spite of the triple defeat of the relief column, in spite of personal sickness, and in spite of the raging fever and dysentery, marks him a man of uncommon pluck and ability. The siege was started on the British side with 12,000 fighting men and over 2,000 white civilians, besides the natives and Indian coolies. Although this garrison was much larger than that of the other garrisons, an enterprising force of the Boer strength, supported as they were by long-range guns and surrounding hills, could probably have taken Ladysmith in the early days of the siege. The English papers often attempted to prepare the British public for the shame of a surrender of the town, and the Boers thought of no other possible outcome of the siege.

General White had his headquarters in the centre of the town, with which the various stations of the regiments were connected by telephone. He acquired speedy information about the movements of the enemy's forces by this means as well as by a Balloon Intelligence Department. The saving in time by the telephone system can be

readily imagined when it is mentioned that it took half an hour to ride from headquarters to the Manchester's trenches on Cæsar's Camp.

The greatest annoyance to the British came from the fact that they were inferior to the Boers in artillery equipment. Large siege guns had been brought from the forts about Pretoria and were now trained upon the Ladysmith garrison. They had three Long Toms, a five-inch Howitzer, about a dozen twelve-pounders, four screw guns, and three Maxim automatics. Against these the British had about fifty pieces, including two 4.7 inch, four naval 12-pounders, 36 field guns, an old 64-pounder, and a three inch quick firer, two old Howitzers, and two Maxim-Nordenfeldts. The naval guns mounted by Captain Percy Scott, of H.M.S. Powerful, were the only weapons that could reach the long range shell-firers of the enemy. Only they could touch Pepworth's Hill or Bilwan. Besides, the Ladysmithians had to husband their ammunition. The Boers fired about twenty shells to their opponents'

one.

The siege was characterized chiefly by its dulness, which was interrupted only by several gallant sorties led by General Hunter. On January 6th, however, Kruger ordered an assault upon the town, and the Boers forsook their cautious policy for a daring one. They soon returned to their former tactics. The attack, desperate as it was, resulted disastrously to the Boer forces. Out of the only position they gained by the day's fighting, they were driven at nightfall by a gallant bayonet charge of the Devons. When they counted their casualties, if they did, they must have tallied a score that amount

ed to 1,200 or 1,500. The Ladysmith garrison also suffered severely.

Starvation and dysentery and fever played greater havoc with the garrison. Owing to casualties and sickness over 8,000 fighting men passed through hospital. The death rate remained small until January, and then increased, as the medical appliances had been nearly exhausted. A man once down was

practically lost. The reduced rations were just sufficient to keep men alive. Every day thirty old horses and mules were slaughtered for food, and converted into soup and sausages. The last fortnight of the siege saw the majority of the field batteries unhorsed, and the guns permanently posted on the defences. The total number of casualties during the investment were: Killed or died of wounds, 24 officers and 235 men; died of disease, 60 officers and 340 men ; wounded, 70 officers and 520

men.

Doubtless the garrison could have held out six weeks longer, but its privations from hunger and living in trenches or underground quarters were already great, and General White and his staff had difficulty in maintaining a cheerfulness in every quarter. The garrison was disappointed in not being relieved. Finally the continuous hammering and boring of General Buller discovered the road to Ladysmith. The advance of Lord Roberts and the capture of Cronje weakened the Boer forces in Natal, and Buller, after seven days of arduous toil and fighting, and after capturing Peter's Hill with the bayonet, was able to put the enemy to flight. Then Lord Dundonald, with 300 men of the Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Carbineers entered the town on the first day of March. It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the beleaguered garrison. Cheer upon cheer rang from post to post. The staff officers, civilians and soldiers flocked down to greet them at the ford of the poisonous Klip River. Women with children in their arms tearfully pressed forward to grasp the hands of the gallant band. Even strong men

shed tears at the contrast between the robust troopers of a dozen battles, and the pale, emaciated defenders of Ladysmith. General White and his staff met the troops in the centre of the town, and thanked them, but his thanks to the garrison for the assistance rendered him in keeping the flag flying were heartier and more deeply felt.

For four months the garrison in a town, unfitted and unprepared for

a siege, had maintained this strategic position against overwhelming odds. To them and their gallant commander are due all the honours to which heroes are entitled.

Here is something to illustrate the temper of Mafeking, B.-P's. little town, which was besieged from October 15th to May 17th-seven months: A correspondent wrote on February 9th. "Next Sunday we shall have a cricket match in the morning, cycle sports in the afternoon, and a grand concert in the evening, to celebrate the eighteenth Sunday of the siege. The bachelor officers will give a dance in the evening. We are all more anxious about Ladysmith than about our position here. Our advance posts are within 250 yards of the enemy's trenches. What a cheerful equanimity for a garrison nearer Pretoria than any British settlement, and not able to walk about the outskirts of the town, or raise a head in the trenches without meeting death nine times out of ten! Yet it was the temper of the garrison throughout a temper that strikes home to the hearts of all who can appreciate bravery, a temper that has made BadenPowell probably the greatest hero of the war.

He

He was certainly the man of the siege. Before the war began he expressed a wish to be in a tight corner, should arms be resorted to. was placed in the tightest corner assigned to any British leader in the war. For seven months he led the garrison in an heroic defence. On October 16th the first shot was fired of a bombardment that continued almost daily until the place was relieved. From that date the history of the little town and its gallant garrison has been a daily record of bombardment endured, attack repulsed, hand-to-hand fight sustained, amid conditions of constantly increasing privation, sickness and even famine. In its isolation it sent out only messages that were heroic in their cheerfulness.

Mafeking is a little town situated on the banks of the Molopo River, just inside Buchuanaland, and eight miles

from the Transvaal border. Its only preparations for siege were due to Lord Cecil, who made some successful efforts to bring in supplies before the siege began; and by Colonels BadenPowell and Plumer, who recruited a protectorate regiment of 500 men. The defending force consisted of this regiment, 250 Cape mounted police, 200 mounted police, about 100 volunteers, and two 7-pounders and six machine guns. The town was almost entirely devoid of fortifications when Colonel B.-P. assumed command.

In this brief review it is impossible to give an account of the incidents connected with the seven months' siege and of the hopes and fears of the garrison. The big Pretoria artillery got to work on October 22nd.

Thirty-five

hours afterwards Commandant Snyman sent to know if the garrison would surrender, adding: "Do not attempt to disguise facts. Your losses must have been terrible." The reply was: "No surrender. As for our losses, without disguise, they are terrible, and consist of one dog and an hotel window." The Boer forces about the place numbered probably about 4,000 men. In accordance with their custom they avoided as far as possible direct onslaught, yet the besieged and besiegers came into contact several times. On the first day of the heavy bombardment the Boers approached in force, but were driven back by the rifle fire. On October 27th Captain FitzClarence led a brilliant sortie with about 100 men, against Commandant Louw's laager, and attempted to take it by a bayonet charge. The attempt was unsuccessful and costly. Camwn Kopje, held by the besieged, was also a contested position for some days, but it was firmly held by its first occupants. On Nov. 7th the Boers made a general attack on the town, but Baden-Powell's resourcefulness repelled them. Then Cronje left for the Kimberley district. The dulness of the siege was frequently broken after this by sorties of the garrison.

A memorial sortie was made the day after Christmas when out of

sixty engaged on the British side only nine came out unwounded, while thirty were killed. On January more heavy artillery arrived from Pretoria and casualties from shell-fire increased. But short rations, poor water and unsanitary dwelling places were more fruitful causes of removal to hospital.

On March 20th, the western laager of the Boers was observed to be breaking up. From this time relief was daily expected. News of Colonel Plumer's march south arrived, but also that of the check he received at Lobatsi. The messages sent out by the garrison were still to the effect that they were well-" that grand and herioc lie". and that they could hold out till the middle of May. The locusts afforded a change of diet. Lord Roberts now asked the town to hold out until May 18, On May 7, Colonel Baden-Powell telegraphed "all going well; fever decreasing, garrison cheerful, and food will last till about June 10." How they strained themselves to do all and more than all that was required of them! On the 12th of May the Boers made a last desperate attempt to take the town by assault. But the garrison was still "game," and Baden-Powell was as resourceful and cunning as ever. So, although, the Kaffir stands were temporarily taken, Commandant Eloff and 120 of his men were made prisoners by strategy much similar to that employed by the Boers on various occasions. This closed the brilliant record of Colonel Baden-Powell and his plucky little garrison of irregulars and civilians in Mafeking. The relief forces under Colonel Plumer from the north and Colonel Mahon from the south effected a junction on May 14, at Jan Massibi's, on the Molopo River, 18 miles west of Mafeking. It is worthy of note that a battery of Canadian artillery joined Colonel Plumer the same day, having made a forced march from Beira in exceptionally short time. It rendered effective assistance in the relief. Some fighting was necessary before the Boers gave up the investment, but on the evening of May 16, Major Karl Davis

and eight men of the Imperial Horse entered the town. At three o'clock in the morning more forces entered and all the relief columns headed by Colonel Baden-Powell, Colonel Mahon and Colonel Plumer entered Mafeking at noon on the 17th. The garrison drew up on the market square and gave three cheers for the Queen. Then Baden-Powell went after his old friends the Boers. When we heard of that, we said for the fiftieth time "Isn't he game?"

THE THREE HEROES.

Although Colonel Kekewich is fortyfive years of age he is one of the men who had no public reputation before the war. He began his military career when he was twenty. He has been with the East Kents and the Inniskilling Fusiliers and recently lieutenantcolonel with the North Lancashires. He served in the Perak expedition of 1875-6 and in the Nile expedition of 1884-5, and was at Saukim three years later. Two of his uncles are well known in England; Mr. Justice Kekewich, and Sir George Kekewich of the Education Department. His grandfather His grandfather was Mr. Samuel Trehawke, who at one time represented South Devon in the British House of Commons. Among the earliest messages sent to Kimberley after the seige was one announcing that, by favour of the Queen, Lieutenant-Colonel Kekewich was promoted to be a full Colonel.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Stewart White, V.C., G. C. B., G. C.S.I., G.C.IE., was born in 1835. He is a Scoto-Irishman, who joined the army in 1853 and who has been on active service ever since. He first saw service in the Indian Mutiny. Up till 1880 he had only gained the rank of major, but from that time his promotion was rapid. In 1877 he was transferred to the Gordon Highlanders. In 1879 the Afghan war broke out, and his chance came. He was in the grand march from Cabul to Candahar under Roberts, and for his services was made C. B. Additionally he won the Victoria Cross.

At Candahar, on September 1st, 1880, Major White again won the Victoria Cross. He led his his men straight up a hill into an Afghan battery and captured the guns. In 1884 he served in the Nile expedition as quartermastergeneral. In 1885 he took command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade for the Burmese war. After the capture of Mandalay he was given supreme control of the Upper Burmese force. He received the thanks of the government, and was promoted to be major-general for distinguished conduct in the field. In 1890 he led the Zhob Valley force. He has since been commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, and is colonel of two battalions of Gordon Highlanders.

Colonel Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell was born February 22, 1857, in a rectory, being a son of Professor Baden-Powell, of Oxford and Langton Manor. He joined the 13th Hussars in 1876, and served in India, Afghanistan and South Africa. He served in the Zululand operations, and received mention. For work in Ashanti operations, where he was in command of native levies, he was made lieutenant-colonel. Afterwards in the campaign in Matabeleland, he was mentioned in despatches for conspicuous bravery. "B-P," as the Mafeking people affectionately call him, is a soldier whose accomplishments peculiarly fit him for modern warfare. He is an authority on cavalry tactics, and has written manuals on reconnaissance and scouting. He is a natural leader of men, and rallied around him at Mafeking not only a group of well-known officers of high social position, but also a seasoned band of frontiersmen and adventurers. His buoyancy, as displayed in his despatches from that isolated town, which even he could not see relieved for some time to come, will not be forgotten by the British public for many a long day. He has received more recognition from the military authorities than has any other officer in Africa, being made MajorGeneral immediately subsequent to the relief of Mafeking.