as follows: It is manifest that what does not even exist, cannot act. Every cause, then, must be something which exists, and whatever does not exist cannot be a cause. Therefore anything which comes newly into being cannot be caused by itself, because it could not have acted before it was. It must, then, have been brought into being by the agency of something else which was its cause. Every change in a thing which already exists is also, to a certain extent, itself a new existence, since it is a new mode of existence. It cannot, therefore, have been produced by itself, because it is a new mode, and it cannot be a cause before it comes into being at all. It must, then, be due either to some distinct existence, or to some other mode of existence of a thing which already exists. Thus if a door which was open is now shut, it must have been shut by something else—a current of air or what not. If a cat is now awake which was asleep, this must be due either to something external which has awakened it, or to some vital action of its own frame, which has aroused it from its dormant state. Again, all and every object made known to us by our senses is seen to be necessarily the product of some cause or causes external to itself. This is, of course, most manifestly the case with every product of human art; but no stone which we tread on, or no patch of sand or mud, can have come to be as it is, without antecedent causes and conditions which made it as it is and not otherwise. Not only the more or less complex structure of any solid body, but its size, position, divisibility, and its existence at the time it does exist, are all due to antecedent actions of other things which determined its various conditions of existence. Even a portion of matter which, so far as we know, is not made up of other material substances-such, eg, as a diamond or a piece of gold-demands a cause for its relations to things around, and for its own size and internal minute conditions; and the latter two circumstances would demand a cause for their being as they might happen to be, even if such a body existed alone by itself in the universe. Everything, then, which can be seen not to have a sufficient cause of its own existence within itself, must E Idea of power " be due to some cause or causes external to it. Only something which is absolutely simple, indivisible, and eternal, can escape from this law of universal causation. This perception of the need of a cause, is not a mere negative condition, due to an impotence on our part to imagine a thing we have never experienced. It is a positive perception. Let the reader test this for himself. Let him examine his own mind and see whether, when he considers the shape of a stone, he finds himself passively and blindly compelled also to imagine something fashioning it, or whether he does not actively and positively perceive that its shape, etc., must have been due to some antecedent cause or causes. It may be well here at once to direct attention to a very or "force." fundamental notion which is implied in the foregoing judgment, namely, the notion of "power" or "force." That such a thing exists we know through the exercise of our own bodily force, or power, and by our power of will. The idea of power is a primary, ultimate idea, which cannot by any mental dissection or self-examination be reduced to more fundamental constituent ideas. Such is the writer's conviction. If the reader thinks otherwise, let him try and ascertain of what more fundamental ideas the idea "power" consists. An objection and its answer. But the objective validity of our perception as to the universal truth of the law of causation has been denied on the following grounds: "We have often enough seen one thing or event follow another, but we have never once perceived any inflow of influence of one thing into another; and yet the law of causation implies the existence of such a thing. We have never really seen or felt 'causation,' but only sequences of one kind or another. Therefore there is probably nothing but sequence, and our idea of the inflow of influence in causation is a mere mistake derived from foolishly transferring in imagination to external things, that 'feeling of effort' which we experience in our own actions, such mistake being then perpetuated by custom." But this objection admits of a ready answer: It is quite true that we never see or feel physical causation itself, for the very good reason that it is invisible and intangible. But although our senses cannot perceive it, our intellect may; and there is one instance at least wherein the inflow and action of causation is distinctly perceptible to us. This is our perception of the inflow of the influence of motives upon our will. When we resolve from some motive to perform an act, we are conscious not merely of the existence of that antecedent state of things, which is named "a motive," and of that consequent which is our "resolve," but also of the motive as something urging us. We know and feel that it is active, and exerting an influence upon us; that it emits, as it were, a force stirring our will. We have also an experience of the force of causation when anything resists our will. In the latter case the influence. is antagonistic to an act of will already formed; in the former case, the influence excites towards the formation of such an act of will. So much may be said here in reply to this objection, but we might have adequately met it by simply repeating what was stated so fully in the first chapter concerning the pursuit of truth itself. It was there pointed out, with respect to fundamental truths, that what we have to ask is, not how we came to know them, but whether they are evidently true; not how their truth can be proved, but whether they are self-evident and need no proof. With respect to the "law of causation," we have seen that its truth is borne in upon us by its own evidence, not only spontaneously in each instance of it which comes under our notice, but on reflection also; and the more we reflect, the more we see the evident truth and universal, objective* necessity of the law that every new existence is due to some cause, which is as certain as is the law of contradiction itself; for if that which has as yet no existence could nevertheless be a cause, then it would no longer be the case that nothing can at the same time both be and not be. The declaration of our minds (both spontaneously and on reflection) tells us little about the nature of that cause to which every new existence must be due, save that it must be, in each case, adequate to produce the effects it has produced. Such a cause may itself be some change or new existence, or it may be some* See above, p. 43, for a reply to a sceptical objection. thing of indefinite stability and duration; as, e.g., a collision between two sidereal bodies may be due to the past existence during an unimaginable time of two such bodies proceeding along paths which ultimately coincide. After this preliminary inquiry in quest of some selfevident, fundamental truths, we may proceed to address ourselves to the consideration of the self-evident force of some arguments. CHAPTER V. REASONING. Ratiocination can make things known to us which were before unknown, by rendering knowledge actual and explicit, which was before but latent and implied. Such processes of reasoning are valid and absolutely trustworthy. Some reasoning must be valid-Inference denied to the syllogism— Shown to exist by examples—The syllogism makes implicit truth explicit-Difference between implicit knowledge and actual knowledge-A general principle may be more evident than a concrete example-Force of the word "therefore"-Logic-Inference implies imperfection of the intellect. reasoning valid. As we remarked towards the end of the first chapter,* no one who himself argues, or who listens to or reads, with any serious intention, the arguments of other men, can, without stultifying himself, profess to think that no process of reasoning is valid. If the truth of no mode of Some reasoning is certainly true, if we can make no valid must be inference, then all arguments must be useless, and to proffer or to consider them, alike vain. A forced abstinence from reasoning, due to such doubt, would, however, carry with it yet more disastrous consequences; for if we doubt about one self-evident truth, we may doubt about all, and we should thus be landed once more in that absolute scepticism we have seen to be so self-destructive and irrational. But the truth of the "inference that any given man will die, provided it be true that mortality is the lot of all men, is a statement the truth of which is self-evident. No one can possibly deny its truth, though some persons will * See above, p. 12. |