1 We cannot say, and our knowledge of its existence. "The mind does not exist," without knowing that we affirm and understand something, and whatever affirms and understands, must at least exist; while the only intelligent existence we directly and immediately know, is our own-our own mind. It is possible, without self-contradiction, to deny that there is an unintelligent, material substance the body-co-existing with that which thinks and understands; but manifestly we cannot, without the utmost absurdity, think that our own being does not think. All, then, that any denial of the mind's existence can really mean, is a denial that there is any fundamental distinction between-mind and matter. This latter denial is equivalent Monism. to an assertion that mind and matter are but two modes, forms, or modifications of something else which is different from both, and more fundamental. This latter assertion characterizes that way of regarding the universe which is known as "monism." According to this system, "thought" and "extension" are two attributes of one eternal substance which is different from both. This strange conception conflicts with the direct teaching of our intimate experience, which tells us that in our own being we may be aware both of that which thinks and gives us no sign of "extension"-the intellect--and that which does not think, but which is extended-such as various parts of our bodywhile we have no particle of evidence that there is anything in our being which is neither mind nor body, but which underlies both. Certainly a power of thinking is no attribute of our hands or feet, or of many other portions of our frame. We know also, if the independent existence of the external world be admitted, that we have on all sides of us a multitude of things-the air, the clouds, the water, and the soil -which do not in any sense think. Any one who affirms that in all this we are mistaken, and that these apparently unintelligent bodies have really some form of intelligence which escapes our ken, are at least bound to bring forward some very convincing evidence of the fact asserted. No such evidence, however, has been brought forward. To deny the distinction between what is intelligent and what is not intelligent is to deny a fact, the truth of which our experience continually assures us of; while to deny it, and at the same time to affirm that the only thing which really exists is something which is neither the one nor the other, is at the same time to deny what seems to us to be the plainest truth, and to affirm gratuitously a paradox which has no shadow of evidence in its favour. The theory of monism, however, will have to be further considered under the head of pantheism.* Yet another way of reconciling idealism and materialism has been proposed. According to this last mode, mind, in some rudimentary form, is everywhere diffused through the universe, each particle of matter possessing its share of a hypothetical substance, which has been called "mind-stuff." Such a belief, however, can be entertained only by those who for some reason desire to entertain it, or who neglect to note the differences between the objects they perceive, attending only to resemblances, or rather to the analogies, which they may happen to exhibit. We cannot, of course, prove that a table is not intelligent, any more than we can prove any other negative. But the common sense of mankind clearly apprehends that a table is not intelligent, and if a calculating machine be called "intelligent," it can only be so because it gives evidence of the intelligence which has been exercised in its construction. Common sense, however, judges that so to speak is to misuse words, and pervert their true meaning. As, however, we are here somewhat anticipating what has to be more fully stated in our twenty-sixth chapter, we desire to say no more than seems to us necessary in order briefly to bring to the notice of readers certain different modifications of idealism to which we think their attention ought to be called. Such, then, is idealism in its oldest form and in some of its more recent popular manifestations in this country. We claim to have shown that it is not consistent with reason on two accounts: (1) it contradicts that conception of the universe which the advance of science makes more and more convincing and secure; and (2) it asserts that we have not that direct knowledge of the world about us which our own minds assure us we certainly have. * See below, chapter xxvi. Reviewing our progress thus far, we may, it seems, affirm-if the reasons here urged are valid—that by building upon the direct declarations of consciousness as a foundation, we can be certain that we really know an external world, and many qualities of independently existing things, and not merely our own feelings, or a mere amalgam made up from ourselves and from external bodies. In this way the teachings of science can be seen to harmonize absolutely with the dictates of reason, while on the idealist hypothesis they can only be accepted through an act of blind, unreasoning credulity. According to the arguments hitherto advanced, we may repose securely in our spontaneous trust in the truthfulness of our faculties, when matured and employed with attention and care in the quest of real and objective truth. We may be absolutely certain that an external world really exists independently of us, and that its various parts really possess those very powers and properties which our senses and our reason combine to assure us such objects do in fact possess. The proof of realism gives validity* human testimony and the dictates of common sense, and supplies us with the means of apprehending a countless multitude of clearly evident facts of the greatest use to us in the investigation of our own nature and of the world about us, to which we may now proceed successively to address ourselves. *See above, p. 65. to |