The northern part of the New York pool, which has a winter season annual peak compared to Con Ed's summer annual peak, appears to have sufficient reserve capacity for the summer. Trouble had been experienced earlier with both a 620-megawatt nuclear unit at Niagara Mohawk's Nine Mile Point plant on Lake Ontario and a 517-megawatt nuclear unit at Rochester Gas & Electric's Ginna plant, also located on Lake Ontario. Both of these units are now back in service after repairs.

The upstate New York systems, as well as Canadian utilities and others, have provided supplemental power to Consolidated Edison and have thereby prevented the necessity of arbitrary load curtailments in the metropolitan area. Transmission into the Consolidated Edison service area is somewhat limited, however, and it is doubtful that the existing facilities can satisfactorily handle much larger transfers than some which have been experienced on July 28. At 4:30 p.m. on July 28, 1,458 megawatts were being transmitted into the Consolidated system. To bring you up to date at this juncture here, I would like to depart from my prepared statement. On Wednesday, July 29, the peakload net megawatts from 11 a.m. to 12 noon was 6,980. On Thursday, July 30, 6,696 from 3 to 4 p.m., with reserves of 382 MWE; and on Friday, July 31, 6,635, from 2 to 3 p.m., and with reserves of 450 MWE.

On Wednesday, July 29, the actions taken by the company required a 3-percent voltage reduction at 10:05 a.m. for most of the system. On Thursday, the 3-percent reduction went into effect at 10 a.m., and on Friday, at 10:10 a.m.

A 5-percent voltage reduction went into effect on Wednesday, July 29 at 1:43 a.m., 11:08 a.m. on Thursday, July 30, and Friday, July 31, none.

An appeal to curtail load was made to the general public on Wednesday, July 29, at 9:50 a.m.; on Thursday, July 30, at 11:15 a.m.; on Friday, July 3, at 11 o'clock. An appeal to large customers went out on Wednesday at 9:50 a.m., Thursday at 10 a.m., Friday at 11 a.m.

The New England electric system, just for the sake of completeness, had a peakload on Wednesday, July 29, of 9,622 MWE, 9,892 between 11 and 12 on Thursday, July 30, and 9,680 between 11 and 12 Friday, July 31. Their reserves, July 29, 30, 31, respectively, were 577, 566, and 599, relatively constant.

Actions taken: In New England there was a 5-percent system voltage reduction which went into effect on 10 a.m., Wednesday, July 29; Thursday, July 30, 9:30 a.m.; Friday, July 31, at 9 a.m. There was a voluntary curtailment of 184 MWE on Wednesday, July 29.

Delays which have been experienced in the construction of new transmission circuits have limited the maximum amount of power which can be supplied to Con Ed from the outside. The most notable instances are the delays on the 500-kv. system of PJM and the associated lines in New York which will eventually connect PMJ through Ramapo substation to the Millwood station in Westchester County. Public opposition to construction in the Hudson Valley area has delayed completion of the New York lines. Consolidated Edison's planning engineers have advised us that an additional 450 MWE could be transferred into the Consolidated Edison system if the BranchburgRamapo-Millwood line was available.

I will skip over the top of page 9 where I summarize the net dependable capacity report for the New England area at 12,081 MWE and 1,852 MWE reserves.

On June 2 and 3, 1970, there was an outage of a 560-MWE unit near Sandwich, Mass., a 350-MWE unit at Bridgeport Harbor, near Bridgeport, Conn., a 575-MWE unit at Connecticut Yankee Plant near Haaddam Neck, Conn., and a 500-MWE unit at Brayton Point plant near Somerest, Mass., which caused deficiencies which resulted in sufficient reduction in available generating capacity that voltage reductions of 5 percent in the New England area were used for several hours. This, of course, is in combination with large demand loads in the system.

On July 27, the New England power exchange-NEPEX, socalled-reported to FPC that, because of unscheduled outrages of generating equipment, it would be necessary for the New England systems to reduce voltages. A 5-percent reduction was put into effect at 11 a.m. and continued until about 4 p.m. The difficulties stemmed from the loss of 1,737 MWE of capacity because of forced outages and unexpected maintenance work. In addition to a number of smaller unit outages, major units out of service included the 340 MWE Merrimac No. 2 (Public Service Co. of New Hampshire), the 147-MWE Salem Harbor No. 3 (New England Power Co.), the 250-MWE Brayton Point, another plant of New England Power, and a derating of about 150 MWE at New Boston plant (Boston Edison Co.). In addition, the New England systems honored a commitment to provide 100 MWE to Consolidated Edison. No interruption of service accompanied the voltage reduction in that area either.

Because of continued deficiencies on July 28, the New England Power Exchange went into 5-percent voltage reduction at 8 a.m. and requested voluntary load reductions during the afternoon. A part of this was again attributable to efforts of the New England systems to assist Consolidated Edison or be ready to assist during the power shortage being experienced in its service area.

PJM, to the south of New York, interconnection began the summer with an expected reserve capacity of 2,380 MWE, or 9.3 percent of projected summer peakload of 25,724 MWE. An 820-MWE unit at the Keystone plant is out of service and will not be available for the rest of the summer.

PJM reduced voltage on several days in May 1970 when loads were greater than expected, due to abnormally high temperatures for that time of year, and a number of generating units were out of service for scheduled maintenance.

Thus far, the highest peak this year on PJM is 22,518 MWE, which was registered on June 12. Loads have been somewhat lower than earlier forecasts and the difference is perhaps attributable perhaps to curtailments in industrial use associated with current economic conditions.

The effect of the weather pattern this year, I think, also may have contributed to a lesser load, although this I have not documented. PJM has experienced great difficulty in building parts of its 500-kv. system which will eventually constitute new ties to the New York network. The Whitpain-Branchburg line, that I referred to earlier, is an outstanding example of the types of delays that can result from public

opposition. The major area of dispute at present involves right-ofway for a line section in Bucks County, Pa., across farms of a few landowners who constitute the Honey Hollow Association. The Honey Hollow area was officially registered as a national historic landmark in August 1969. Because of the national landmark considerations, the Department of the Interior has been interested in the transmission line right-of-way questions and the National Park Service has interceded in the Pennsylvania public utilities hearings concerning a permit for construction of the line in question. Alternate routes have been proposed and considered, but it appears that no line route through the Bucks County area can avoid some infringement on lands considered to have great historic value.

The problems and delays which have plagued the planning and construction of this much needed transmission link, about 6 to 7 years, by the way, point clearly to the necessity of developing means, as you stated earlier, Senator Muskie, of dealing with problems of this general nature. Recommendations concerning the development of ways for resolving these problems are included in a later part of this report which deals with our suggestions for both management and legislative actions to resolve some of the current problems confronting the Nation's electric utility systems in their efforts to provide adequate and reliable facilities for meeting future electric power needs.

Regarding the 10-year plans I don't think that at this particular juncture I should take the time of the committee to read what is a concise summary, first just to show the format here, first the recommendation which we made to Consolidated Edison as the result of study which we started last August and, second, down below, the proposed answer of Con Ed as to what they have done in response to these recommendations. They are all important but I feel that possibly in the Consolidated Edison testimony without even knowing what it is, that these probably will be gone into somewhat. I will do whatever the pleasure of the committee is; return to it later or go into it now, whatever you wish. It is five pages of pretty detailed material.

Senator MUSKIE. I think we might want to go into them depending upon the time.

Mr. NASSIKAS. Let me see if I can sort of scan it and summarize the summary. Let me attempt it.

In its December 1969 report on Consolidated Edison's 10-year expansion plans, the Bureau of Power presented its conclusions and recommendations which I have summarized. Now for the first recommendation, first, the review has not revealed the availability of any substantial alternative plan for meeting expected load requirements through 1975. It will be incumbent on the company to continually review timely performance and manufacturing and construction and remedy insofar as possible any situation that portends delays.

The company responded that their 1969 10-year program did not present alternative plans for generation expansion in the period to 1974 since the plan itself was an alternate to prior plans.

The scheduling of two large nuclear units at Indian Point for 1969 and 1971 was alternative to the Cornwall Pumped Storage plant and the 1969 Ten Year Program is an alternative caused by delays of the nuclear plants. The nuclear plant service dates have each slipped by about two years and we have been forced into the installation of a large number of gas turbines.

We have also joined with neighboring utilities in the development of two fossil-fueled plants on the Hudson River. The schedule for this entire period is tight, but we will continue to keep an extremely close watch on permits, licenses and approvals and on manufacturing and construction schedules to detect any slippage as soon as possible. In these early years of the program there is no option but to order additional gas turbines unless some unforeseen circumstances should create surplus capacity in the systems of some of our neighbors. The delays in completion of the PJM, and Southern Tier transmission ties, however, will limit the capacity we can obtain from Canadian sources and the companies to the west of us.

In their new plan the company says:

Some revisions in the early years of the program were made after our discussions with your Staff. These include an additional 284 MW of gas turbine capacity for 1970 and the purchase of 150 MW from New York State Electric and Gas Corp. to replace 75 MW previously expected from Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. This will add to the expected reserve for this summer, which in the early part will be approximately the same as the summer of 1969, but will improve as the new gas turbines are put in operation. The delay on approximately 130 MW of the gas turbine installations for 1970 due to the General Electric Company strike has not helped this situation. All of our neighboring utilities are aware of the situation and have assured us of all possible emergency support in case of need. We are not satisfied with our reserve capability during June and July of 1970, but we have been unable to contract for any additional firm supply, other than that mentioned above.

The second primary recommendation of the FPC staff

Senator MUSKIE. I wonder if it might be helpful, Mr. Chairman, to proceed with your outlook for 1970-71.

Mr. NASSIKAS. All right.

Senator MUSKIE. The outlook for supply situations. I have scanned over pages 13 to 17 and I might ask questions later.

Mr. NASSIKAS. Yes; I think so.

Senator MUSKIE. But I think we will be interested in the future. Mr. NASSIKAS. This is right.

Turning to page 17, the outlook for 1970 to 1971, winter power load supply situation: Some of the areas that have experienced the greatest difficulties in meeting peak electric system loads in recent weeks are expected to have sufficient installed capacity for the 1970-71 winter season when warm weather temperature sensitive loads will be lower. Problems of a different nature may appear at some locations, however, and the Northeast may be particularly affected. The problems I refer to have to do with fuels for steam-electric generating plants. This is related to generating capacity. We must have fuel to be sure whatever capability we have can be converted to electric energy. There has been a continuing decline in the coal stocks of many electric utilities for about the last year, and relatively critical situations have prevailed at times in some locations. So far, the Southeast and a few other areas generally along the eastern seaboard have experienced the worst shortages, but the areas of short supply are most likely to increase with the advent of winter temperatures and the accompanying increased space heating demands and shorter daylight periods. Present projections indicate there may be severe shortages of natural gas, particularly in parts of New England, during the coming winter. Moreover, there are growing problems in obtaining fuel oils in some instances. It has been reported that the Braintree, Mass., Municipal Electric System, for example, failed to receive any bids in response to a recent advertisement for a fuel oil contract.

Any shortages of gas and oil for direct space heating uses are likely to evidence themselves as added demands for electric energy and thus compound the electric power supply problems in shortage areas by increasing demands for electric power. The Commission is currently participating with representatives of the cooperatively, investor, and municipally owned electric systems in an analysis of fuel problems. Sufficient information has not been received to date, however, to enable a reflection of the dimension of the fuel shortages in our preliminary analysis of 1970-71 winter load-supply situations. I would expect, however, in the course of the next month to 6 weeks that we must definitely receive the information on a crash basis to determine the precise dimensions of the problem and we intend to do so.

The fuel problems confronting the electric utility industry have increased rapidly within the last 12 months and are indicative of the energy crisis which I believe confronts the Nation and can be resolved only by a comprehensive national energy policy and doing something about it. I have outlined that previously in a footnote here.3

The most critical problems of adequate electric power supply in some areas this winter are likely to be those associated with fuel shortages rather than any lack of sufficient bulk power supply facilities.

On July 30, 1970, the President directed that a study be undertaken of the national energy situation. The purpose of the study will be to develop for his consideration possible Federal actions which may be taken to alleviate the acute shortage of clean fuels for this winter and to insure an adequate fuel supply during the next 5 years. The idea of this study is not necessarily to take care of the immediate problem but also to set the basis for a long-range resolution also, which is part of the subject matter of other legislation which is now pending before the Congress of the United States.

The following information pertaining to the northeast region is based on the Bureau of Power's preliminary report for the 1970-71 winter season. This report, by the way, has been submitted in substantially the same terms as I have outlined it to the Office of Emergency Preparedness with which organization the Federal Power Commission, as well as other power agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, have conducted a continuing study starting sometime in March, if my recollection is correct, to see if we can delineate the dimension of the problem and determine what Federal action can be taken to alleviate a developing crisis.

As indicated earlier, the report of the Bureau of Power for the 1970 to 1971 winter season assumes that adequate fuel supplies will be available for generating plant needs, and thus does not reflect either direct or indirect effects of possible fuel shortages in a few localized areas. The information on anticipated winter conditions has also been furnished to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, as I say, for use by the Interagency Committee which has been concerned with problems of tight power supply.

3 Appendix B-An Outline of National Energy Policy: Some Personal Reflections, by John N. Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, at the Federal Power Commission 50th Anniversary Program, June 3, 1970, retained in committee files.

46-966-71-pt. 2- -11