with 32 abstentions. (Resolution 44/109.) In an explanation of vote, the U.S. Representative offered the following position on nuclear weapon-free zones in general and this resolution in particular: The U.S. Delegation has joined in support again this year of the traditional resolution concerning the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia, L.48. Our delegation is able to support the initiative because the proposal appears to be harmonious with the following criteria to which we subscribe: the initiative for a nuclear-weapon-free zone should arise from states in the region concerned; all states whose participation is deemed important should participate; there should be adequate verification provisions; the zone should not upset existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security; it should effectively prohibit nuclear explosive development or possession for any purpose; it should not restrain the exercise of such rights as freedom of navigation; and it should not affect the rights of states to make arrangements for such matters as port calls and transit privileges.... He ended, however, with the following caveat: It is clear that there are other areas in which the conditions necessary for a nuclear weapon-free zone would not be satisfied, such as areas within the NATO region. Accordingly, our delegation wishes to note the reference in the preambular paragraph three to the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in other regions of the world does not constitute for us an endorsement of such zones on a universal basis. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone On October 30 Australia, New Zealand and three other South Pacific island states submitted a draft resolution entitled "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty." The draft noted the adoption on August 6, 1985, of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Raratonga). Noting that the treaty entered into force on December 11, 1986, with the depositing of the eighth instrument of ratification, the draft noted with satisfaction that 11 members of the South Pacific Forum have now ratified the treaty and that China and the U.S.S.R. have adhered to Protocols 2 and 3 of the treaty. It also noted that the United States and United Kingdom have stated that none of their practices and activities within the treaty are inconsistent with the treaty or its protocols, and commended the treaty and its protocols to the consideration of all member states. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on November 10 by a vote of 132 to 0, with 5 abstentions (U.S.). It was approved by a vote of 151 to 0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.) by the plenary on December 15. (Resolution 44/119 F.) The United States abstained because a favorable vote for the resolution, with its language commending the treaty to the consideration of all member states, would have been in contradiction to our decision not to adhere to the treaty or its protocols. That decision was taken in part because it was felt that the treaty provisions would compromise our deterrence policy. INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE UN General Assembly resolution 2832 (1971), which contained a Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace," (IOZP) called for the great powers to remove their naval forces and facilities from the Indian Ocean. Subsequent annual resolutions endorsed the 1971 declaration and established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean* to consider its implementation. The United States has made clear from the beginning its reservations about the 1971 terms of reference for the deliberations concerning the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In 1980, the United States, together with other Permanent Members of the Security Council and major maritime nations, accepted the invitation of littoral and hinterland states of the region to join the Ad Hoc Committee. Since that time, we have attempted to point out the anomaly of trying to restrict naval forces in the region while ignoring land-based forces, such as those of the Soviet Union that had long occupied Afghanistan, a hinterland state of the Indian Ocean. We also have consistently opposed the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean until there were indications that it could be successful. As long as there is no agreement on the basic principles that should govern an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, the United States believes that such a conference would be premature. In 1989 meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were unable to produce a consensus recommendation for approval by the First Committee. Several members of the Western G-11 group proposed that Committee meetings be superceded by consultations conducted under the Chairman's authority, with the idea that these consultations would be a more productive way of making progress toward a consensus. However, the non-aligned rejected the idea and instead produced a draft resolution that the Western G-11 group found unacceptable because of its stipulation that a conference be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, with its first stage in July 1990 even though there was no agreement as to what the conference was to discuss. The non-aligned also rejected a number of Western compromise proposals. The draft resolution, presented by Yugoslavia on behalf of the non-aligned, was introduced by Sri Lanka on November 7. On November 29 a completely revised resolution was introduced based on the 1988 consensus resolution on the IOZP. (Resolution 43/79.) It called for a conference in 1991 in Colombo and for a 1-week and subsequent 2-week sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1990 to complete "remaining preparatory work." The resolution was adopted on November 30 by the First Committee and approved December 15 by the plenary by a vote of 137 to 4 (U.S., U.K., France, Japan) with 14 abstentions (other NATO countries, Israel). Before the First Committee vote was taken, *Its 49 members in 1989 were Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. the U.S. Representative explained U.S. opposition to the resolution in the following terms: First, it continues to be based on the obsolete notion of great power confrontation in this age of increased great power cooperation in helping diffuse conflicts. Second, it continues the work of the Ad Hoc Committee without any common conception as to what the committee is to accomplish.... It is time for those who have been pressing the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace issue to address the real problems of their region and not to invoke an obsolete concept that conveniently casts the blame for those problems on outsiders. The military presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean is not the cause of those problems. Furthermore, he announced that the United States would not associate itself with the type of conference provided for in the draft resolution or with preparatory work for it (i.e., further meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee). South Atlantic Zone of Peace At the 41st General Assembly in 1986, Brazil and a number of African and Latin American cosponsors introduced for the first time a resolution in the Assembly plenary, without reference to a main Committee, calling for the delaration of a "Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic," to be established "in the region situated between Africa and South America." The text called upon all states, "in particular the militarily significant ones," to respect the zone, "especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the nonintroduction of nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, and the nonextension into the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to it." The resolution also affirmed that the elimination of apartheid and the independence of Namibia were essential for peace and security in the South Atlantic region, and urged the implementation of all UN resolutions dealing with apartheid. The South Atlantic resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 124 to 1 (U.S.), with 8 abstentions. The United States opposed this resolution primarily because of its implication that restrictions should be placed on naval access to and activity in the South Atlantic Ocean. The United States regards such restrictions as inconsistent with the generally recognized principles under international law of the freedom of navigation on the high seas and the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. At the 42nd General Assembly in 1987, a further resolution on the subject was passed which called on states to help implement the declaration and to refrain from any actions inconsistent with it. At the 44th General Assembly, Brazil again took the lead in introducing in the General Assembly plenary a draft resolution on this subject. Largely procedural in nature, the text recalled the resolutions adopted in 1986, 1987 and 1988, noted efforts made by states to fulfill the goals of the declaration, took note of the report submitted by the Secretary General, and called upon states to cooperate in promoting the objectives of the Zone and to refrain from actions inconsistent with them. It also welcomed the beginning of the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia in April 1989, emphasized the need to preserve the environment of the region, and urged all states to refrain from transferring and disposing hazardous, toxic and nuclear wastes into the region. Finally, it requested assistance from UN organs in carrying out seminars devoted to reviewing the developments and legal regime established by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, and asked the Secretary General to submit a report to the 45th General Assembly on the implementation of the declaration. On November 14 the plenary adopted the Brazilian resolution by a vote of 146 to 1 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions. (Resolution 44/20.) U.S. opposition was based on the view that such a resolution would be inconsistent with the generally recognized principles under international law of the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. In addition, the United States believed that any attempt to establish an internationally-recognized zone of peace would be made through multilateral negotiations among relevant parties rather than through a General Assembly resolution. ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT As it had done in previous General Assemblies, Iraq on October 28 introduced a resolution in the First Committee entitled, "Israeli nuclear armament," cosponsored by 19 Arab and Islamic states. Consistent with the text of previous years' resolutions on this subject, the resolution condemned Israel's refusal to renounce its alleged possession of nuclear weapons and requested the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complied with Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and placed all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It expressed concern over Israel's alleged "policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes" (preambular paragraph nine), and called on states and organizations to discontinue cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field (operative paragraph five). It also condemned purported nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa (operative paragraph two), and requested the IAEA "to suspend any scientific cooperation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities" (operative paragraph six). The United States objected to the overall thrust of this resolution, and especially its appeal to the IAEA to suspend nuclear cooperation with Israel. In the November 17 First Committee and December 15 plenary consideration of the resolution, separate votes were taken on five of its paragraphs. On preambular paragraph six, which recalled a resolution of the 1989 IAEA General Conference condemning Israeli refusal to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, the Assembly approved retaining the paragraph by a vote of 86 to 20 (U.S.), with 18 abstentions. Separate votes were also taken on preambular paragraph 10 (declaring that the "declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes is part of its nuclear armament policy"), which was retained by 73 to 22 (U.S.), with 24 abstentions; on operative paragraph 2 (reiterating its condemnation of "the cooperation between Israel and South Africa"), which was retained by 88 to 20 (U.S.), with 17 abstentions; on operative paragraph 6 (calling on states and organization which have not already done so to "discontinue cooperating with and giving any assistance to Israel in the nuclear field"), which was retained by 78 to 22 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions; and on operative paragraph 7 (reiterating its request to the IAEA to "suspend any cooperation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities"), which was retained by a vote of 68 to 22 (U.S.), with 31 abstentions. In the plenary vote on December 15, results were as follows: resolution as a whole, 104 to 2 (U.S.), with 43 abstentions. (Resolution 44/121.) VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE The United States has long maintained that arms-control agreements are meaningless if signatories do not live up to the obligations that they have undertaken. The United States, therefore, has placed special emphasis on effective and appropriate verification and compliance provisions in armscontrol agreements under negotiation and on ensuring that agreements in force are being complied with fully. The United States has sought to gain broad international acceptance of the importance of these concepts of verification and compliance in UN disarmament fora. On the other hand, the United States has generally believed that verification can best be arranged by parties to specific disarmament agreements and has doubted the usefulness or validity of establishing a general UN mechamism to observe compliance with agreements. We have regularly stated that any UN role in verifying compliance with a specific disarmament agreement must be developed and agreed upon by the parties negotiating the agreement. On October 30, the United States, along with 33 other cosponsors, submitted a resolution on "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements," which followed up on a similar resolution it had presented the previous year. The resolution began by noting the importance of respecting the UN Charter, treaties and other sources of international law, taking note in particular "of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them." It stressed that violations of such agreements thus affected the security of states parties and others, and that the weakening of confidence in these agreements diminished their contribution to stability and further disarmament efforts and was therefore a matter of concern to the international community. The operative paragraphs of the U.S. resolution urged states "to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions" of arms limitation and disarmament agreements to which they were parties and called on all member |