the action of their governments. Whilst Plato and Socrates, Epicurus and Zeno, were philosophizing on rules for the conduct of life, and exhibiting with much force and dignity the attractiveness of virtue, slavery was a recognized status among the people, foreigners were treated as enemies, and the customs of war were of the most barbarous character. Among Greek cities and states, a certain recognition of international justice was shown by the action of the Amphyctionic Council-an institution more religious than political, for the pacific adjustment of disputes. That Council had doubtless some influence in restraining the savagery of intestine wars, by binding its members not to destroy any of the Amphyctionic Towns, not to turn away their running waters, and not to commit theft in the Temple of Delhi, the common centre of the confederacy. But the authority of the Council was confined to the twelve nations of the Hellenic name, associated with the worship of Apollos at Delphi, and Demeter at Thermopylæ.

As in Greece, so in Rome, the ethics of Cicero and other writers were far in advance of the ethics of the nation. Cicero apologized for the use of force as a means of repelling aggression, just as we justify the punishment of crime for the purpose of repressing its excesses. In theory the Romans had, for a time at least, their fecial laws, and their Collegium fecialium, for the purpose of controlling the conduct of their armies towards other nations in time of war, and no

war was declared unless permitted by the feciales. The Romans knew better than any other nation the action of the Law of Nature, that unwritten body of obligations which lies at the foundation of moral duties. The jus gentium was, to the Romans, the Law of Nature found in and applicable to all men and to all countries. But such theories did not permeate the sentiments of the nation, or control the action of the State. them, every consideration was subordinate to the love of and thirst for conquest. Blinded by the desire for universal dominion, the Romans did not see that any International Law did or could exist, and if they apprehended its existence, they certainly did not acknowledge its authority, nor observe its doctrines.

With

With the introduction of Christianity in Rome, a high motive for more friendly and peaceful intercourse between nations was created, which ought to have acted as a powerful force among its followers. Recognizing no difference between men of different races, laying down principles of conduct altogether at variance with those held by the general community, it might have been expected that Christianity should have inaugurated a new code of international obligations, more obligatory than any suggested by ethics or philosophy. But though Christianity eventually became the religion of the State, its teaching had but little influence on the policy of the Empire. A few of the early Christians conspicuous for high morals, having at first made determined resistance to the

custom of war, ended with acquiescing with it as a punishment of God; whilst rulers and people, as a whole, remained impervious to the teaching of a religion adopted more as a political force than as a rule of life.

*

In the dark era which followed the disruption of the Roman Empire, great part of the salutary effects produced by Roman Law and order disappeared; nevertheless, other and more benign influences modified the asperities of the times. The Pope of Rome assumed, not without some success, the dignified position of International Arbitrator or Judge. The Councils of the Church, held from time to time, attended by the Sovereigns in person, or their Ambassadors, by the dignified clergy and other influential classes from many countries in Europe, exercised a beneficial influence on international relations. The Crusades organized, at the bidding of Urban II., in order to deliver the Holy Land from the dominion of the Turks, had the effect of making many people, heretofore quite segregated, come into contact with one another. Whilst Chivalry and Knighthood did much to discourage brutal ferocity in manners, and an increasing commerce taught nations to regard each other, not as natural enemies, but as alike dependent

*The Roman law did not absolutely lose its authority, even during the darkest time of the Middle Ages. The Basilica, prepared by order of the Emperor Basil; the Aniani Breviarium, promulgated by Alaric II. in Gaul; the Fuero de Juzgos, published by the Visigoths in Spain, and the Theodosian Code, were all founded upon the Roman Law. The usages of the Goths, Ostrogoths, and Visigoths were everywhere abandoned in favour of Roman jurisprudence.

on the right use of the resources wisely distributed by Providence over the surface of the earth.

In the Middle Ages the Mediterranean was the centre of European Commerce, and the Italian Republics had the trade of the East in their hands. Not yet in possession of direct communication by sea with India, Europe received at the hands of the Italians many of those articles which Egypt and Syria sent to minister to European taste and luxury. These articles were first carried by land, by the most indirect and circuitous routes, from the interior of India to Goa, from Goa to Aden; thence they were brought by the Italians by sea to the Mediterranean coasts and from Venice or Genoa, Marseilles or Barcelona, distributed through the chief marts of merchandise in Europe. But Commerce was exceedingly adventurous in those days, and as Hallam said, "When neither robbery nor private warfare was any longer tolerated, there remained that great common of mankind, the Sea, unclaimed by any king, so that the liberty of the sea was but another name for the security of the plunderers." We need not be surprised, therefore, in finding that the relative rights and duties of enemies and friends, or of Belligerents and Neutrals, were fully recognized and regulated by written customs.

The "Consulato del mare,” a work which embodied the customs of the sea, variously given as issued between the twelfth and fourteenth century, gave

unequivocally its decision on one of the most interesting questions of International Maritime Law,* viz. Whether the property of a Belligerent found in a neutral ship, and the property of a neutral found in a Belligerent ship, were liable to confiscation. The rule as laid down by the " Consulato" was as follows:“When an armed vessel meet a merchant Ship, and both Ship and Cargo belong to the enemy, there is no difficulty in deciding as to the course to be pursued. The Admiral, or the chief of the force, is bound to capture them both. But when the ship belongs to a friendly state, and the goods to the enemy, then the Admiral may compel the Master of the Ship to give up the goods, on his paying the freight due to him upon them. If, on the contrary, the Ship belongs to the enemy, and the goods to friends, then the owner of the Ship must agree with the Admiral for the redemption of the Ship, at a reasonable price; and if they cannot come to an agreement, then the Admiral has the right to take the Ship to his own port, and the owner of the goods is bound to pay freight upon the same, as if the Admiral had taken the goods to the place of their destination." And these are the principles which Holland adopted in her war with the Hanseatic League, and which were subsequently defended by Grotius and other writers.

As trade passed from the Mediterranean to the

* "Consulato," ch. ccxxxi., "De nau de mercederia presa per nau armada."