(b) PUBLICATION.-The Secretary of State shall post on the Department of State's website the names of individuals whose entry into the United States is banned under subsection (a).

SEC. 7. CONDEMNATION OF THE REGIME AND

INFORMATION.

DISSEMINATION

OF

Congress encourages the Secretary of State to highlight the abysmal record of the SPDC to the international community and use all appropriate for a, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and Asian Nations Regional Forum, to encourage other states to restrict financial resources to the SPDC and Burmese companies while offering political recognition and support to Burma's democratic movement including the National League for Democracy and Burma's ethnic groups.

SEC. 8. SUPPORT DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS IN BURMA.

(a) IN GENERAL.-The President is authorized to use all available resources to assist Burmese democracy activists dedicated to nonviolent opposition to the regime in their efforts to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in Burma, including a listing of constraints on such programming.

(b) REPORTS.

(1) FIRST REPORT.-Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and International Relations of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report on its short-and-long-term programs and activities to support democracy activists in Burma, including a lost of constraints on such programming

(2) REPORT ON RESOURCES.-Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and International Relations of the House of Representatives a report identifying resources that will be necessary for the reconstruction of Burma, after the SPDC is removed from power, including

(A) the formation of democratic institutions;

(B) establishing the rule of law;

(C) establishing freedom of press;

(D) providing for the successful reintegration of military officers and personnel into Burmese society; and

(E) providing health, educational, and economic development.

(3) REPORT ON TRADE SANCTIONS.-Not later than 90 days before the date on which the import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) are to expire, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative and the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations, Finance, and Foreign Relations of the

Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations, International Relations, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, a report on

(A) bilateral and multilateral measures undertaken by the United States Government and other governments to promote human rights and democracy in Burma;

(B) the extent to which actions related to trade with Burma taken pursuant to this Act have been effective in

(i) improving conditions in Burma, including human rights violations, arrest and detention of democracy activists, forced and child labor, and the status of dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD and ethnic minorities;

(ii) furthering the policy objectives of the United States toward Burma; and

(C) the impact of actions relating to trade take pursuant to this Act on other national security, economic, and foreign policy interests of the United States, including relations with countries friendly to the United States.

SEC. 9. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) TERMINATION BY REQUEST FROM DEMOCRATIC BURMA.—The President may terminate any provision in this Act upon the request of a democratically elected government in Burma, provided that all the conditions in section 3(a)(3) have been met.

(b) CONTINUATION OF IMPORT SANCTIONS.—

(1) EXPIRATION.-The import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) shall expire 1 year from the date of enactment of this Act unless renewed under paragraph (2) of this section.

(2) RESOLUTION BY CONGRESS.-The import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) may be renewed annually for a 1-year period, if, prior to the anniversary of the date of enactment of this Act, and each year thereafter, a renewal resolution is enacted into law in accordance with subsection (c).

(3) LIMITATION.-The import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) may be renewed for a maximum of three years from the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) RENEWAL RESOLUTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this section, the term “renewal resolution" means a joint resolution of the 2 Houses of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress approves the renewal of the import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.".

(2) PROCEDURES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.-A renewal resolution—

(i) may be introduced in either House of Congress by any member of such House at any time within the 90-day period before

the expiration of the import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1); and

(ii) the provisions of subparagraph (B) shall apply.

(B) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.-The provisions of section 152(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)) apply to a renewal resolution under this Act as if such resolution were a resolution described in section 152(a) of the Trade Act of 1974.

Renewal of Import Restrictions-Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act

[50 U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 108-272]

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress approves the renewal of the import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

J. SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 2003

[22 U.S.C. 2151 note; Public Law 108-175]

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On June 24, 2002, President Bush stated "Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations".

(2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001) mandates that all states "refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts", take "the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts", and "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts".

(3) The Government of Syria is currently prohibited by United States law from receiving United States assistance because it has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)) and other relevant provisions of law.

(4) Although the Department of State lists Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and reports that Syria provides "safe haven and support to several terrorist groups", fewer United States sanctions apply with respect to Syria

than with respect to any other country that is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.

(5) Terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, maintain offices, training camps, and other facilities on Syrian territory, and operate in areas of Lebanon occupied by the Syrian armed forces and receive supplies from Iran through Syria.

(6) United Nations Security Council Resolution 520 (September 17, 1982) calls for "strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon".

(7) Approximately 20,000 Syrian troops and security personnel occupy much of the sovereign territory of Lebanon exerting undue influence upon its government and undermining its political independence.

(8) Since 1990 the Senate and House of Representatives have passed seven bills and resolutions which call for the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from Lebanon.

(9) On March 3, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that it is the objective of the United States to "let Lebanon be ruled by the Lebanese people without the presence of [the Syrian] occupation army".

(10) Large and increasing numbers of the Lebanese people from across the political spectrum in Lebanon have mounted peaceful and democratic calls for the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanese soil.

(11) Israel has withdrawn all of its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (March 19, 1978), as certified by the United Nations Secretary General.

(12) Even in the face of this United Nations certification that acknowledged Israel's full compliance with Security Council Resolution 425, Syrian- and Iranian-supported Hizballah continues to attack Israeli outposts at Shebaa Farms, under the pretense that Shebaa Farms is territory from which Israel was required to withdraw by Security Counsel Resolution 425, and Syrian- and Iranian-supported Hizballah and other militant organizations continue to attack civilian targets in Israel.

(13) Syria will not allow Lebanon-a sovereign country-to fulfill its obligation in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425 to deploy its troops to southern Lebanon.

(14) As a result, the Israeli-Lebanese border and much of southern Lebanon is under the control of Hizballah, which continues to attack Israeli positions, allows Iranian Revolutionary Guards and other militant groups to operate freely in the area, and maintains thousands of rockets along Israel's northern border, destabilizing the entire region.

(15) On February 12, 2003, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet stated the following with respect to the Syrian-and Iranian-supported Hizballah: "[A]s an organization with capability and worldwide presence [it] is [al Qaeda's] equal if not a far more capable organization * * * [T]hey're a notch above in many respects, in terms of in their relationship with the Iranians and the training they receive, [which] puts them in a statesponsored category with a potential for lethality that's quite great.".

(16) In the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush declared that the United States will "work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction”.

(17) The Government of Syria continues to develop and deploy shortand medium-range ballistic missiles.

(18) According to the December 2001 unclassified Central Intelligence Agency report entitled "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015", "Syria maintains a ballistic missile and rocket force of hundreds of FROG rockets, Scuds, and SS-21 SRBMS [and] Syria has developed [chemical weapons] warheads for its Scuds".

(19) The Government of Syria is pursuing the development and production of biological and chemical weapons and has a nuclear research and development program that is cause for concern.

(20) According to the Central Intelligence Agency's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions", released January 7, 2003: "[Syria] already holds a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin but apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its [chemical weapons] program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive [biological weapons] capability.".

(21) On May 6, 2002, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, stated: "The United States also knows that Syria has long had a chemical warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and is engaged in research and development of the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. Syria, which has signed but not ratified the [Biological Weapons Convention], is pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents.".

(22) According to the Central Intelligence Agency's "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions", released January 7, 2003: "Russia and Syria have approved a draft cooperative program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. In principal, broader access