The United States has long been critical of the lack of objectivity in materials DPI disseminates. In 1986, the General Accounting Office (GAO), responding to a request by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), published a report evaluating DPI printed materials and scripts of its radio programs. It recommended that the Secretary of State develop a review process to better monitor selected UN public information materials. Procedures were initiated in August 1986 to review the materials the UN Information Centers disseminate. The occasions upon which the United States found it necessary to register concern is decreasing, and the extent and depth of anti-U.S. bias has diminished somewhat. The monitoring efforts continue.

The Disarmament Commission is a subsidiary forum for deliberation on disarmament issues as mandated by the General Assembly, when the Assembly is not in session. It considers and makes recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament, and follows up on relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. At the beginning of the 1990 session, the UNDC adopted a reform package (the annex to UN General Assembly resolution 44/119 C) aimed at improving its functioning. Various subsidiary bodies were established for all items except naval disarmament, which, as in the past, was handled through consultations held by the UNDC chairman on his responsibility. The practice of consensus was adhered to throughout the session. The Disarmament Commissionn met in plenary eight times during its May 7-29 session.

In accordance with the reform package, deliberations (except on objective information on military matters (OIMM)) were concluded on all its agenda items. No consensus could be reached on the compilation of recommendations under the general item on nuclear/conventional disarmament, which remained heavily bracketed. The chairman's working paper on results of his consultations on the naval armaments and disarmament was endorsed by all participants in those consultations (the United States did not participate), but reflected differences among them on a number of specific propositions. Consensus was reached on reports dealing with issues covered in working groups on conventional disarmament, the role of the United Nations in disarmament, Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, and the question of South Africa's nuclear capability.

After the conclusion of its 1990 session, members reached agreement on the topics the UNDC will take up for its 1991 session. These topics include: objective information on military matters; process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security with the objective of elimination of nuclear weapons; regional disarmament within the context of

global security; and the role of science and technology in international security, disarmament and other related fields.

Contact group for Agenda Item 4 (Nuclear/Conventional Disarmament). At the outset, it was evident it would be impossible to reach consensus on compilation of recommendations on this item, contained in annex 1 to last year's report of the Commission to the General Assembly. As a result, review of bracketed recommendations was basically pro forma. A proposal by the chairman, however, to delete a bracketed recommendation calling for nonstationing of nuclear weapons in foreign territories was accepted without discussion. The contact group's report states that consideration of item 4 has been concluded.

Consultation Group on Agenda Item 5 (South Africa's Nuclear Capability). After intensive informal consultations a paper was developed which might have been the basis for consensus. The U.S. and other delegations made statements in plenary, however, disclaiming a possible interpretation of the text which implied that South Africa actually possesses nuclear weapons. The United States sought to include a call upon all African states to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but were unsuccessful. In its plenary statement, the U.S. Delegation stressed U.S. policy of encouraging all states to join the NPT.

Working Group on Agenda Item 6 (Role of the UN in Disarmament). This working group reached a consensus text, using the 1989 chairman's working paper as a basis, along with proposals and amendments to it. The chairman's 1989 working paper was unacceptable to the United States for a variety of reasons, including encroachment on the autonomy of the Conference on Disarmament. A good basis to proceed was found, however, and the report was agreed to by consensus.

Agenda Item 7 (Naval Armaments and Disarmament). The U.S. Delegation did not participate in the chairman's consultations. The report on the consultations, contained in a chairman's working paper endorsed by those participating in them, indicated differences on a number of issues, and was less than balanced in its treatment of the item. The paper suggested, in particular, that naval arms control had been accepted in principle by all participants as an issue whose time had come, which was clearly not the case. The United States made clear it did not participate in these consultations, nor was the United States associated in any way with the report.

Working Group on Agenda Item 8 (Conventional Disarmament). Working group discussions focused principally on continuing differences on basic issues such as the priority of conventional disarmament in relation to nuclear disarmament, the extent of the accumulation and sophistication of arms beyond the East-West context, and the importance and practicality of a regional-vs.-global approach to conventional arms control. Attention was also

focused on arms transfers. Despite inherent differences and difficulties, a consensus text was obtained. It clearly pointed out that the so-called arms race was not an exclusively East-West phenomenon; it was still occurring in other regions of the world, and in some regions arms control might contribute to local and international security. The text also noted the need for conventional disarmament to be kept on the international agenda, and in that connection raised the question of placing the subject on the CD agenda as well.

Working Group on Agenda Item 9 (Declaration of 1990s as Third Disarmament Decade). The working group used last year's nonconsensus paper as this year's initial text. Two issues caused difficulties: nonparties to the NPT wanted no reference to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the United States wanted no reference to naval arms control. A compromise formulation was adopted which maintained a reference to the nonproliferation regime but also included language about cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the naval arms control issue, a formulation was ultimately accepted which made clear naval arms control was not endorsed by all states. The final declaration was adopted by

consensus.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a forum which considers and, as appropriate, negotiates on multilateral arms control and disarmament issues. It has a membership of 39, including all 5 nuclear-weapon states and 34 other states. The CD is an autonomous body with its own rules of procedure, and works by consensus. Not a UN body, it is linked to the United Nations in that a personal representative of the Secretary General serves as Secretary General of the Conference, and the CD is funded through the regular UN budget. The Conference reports annually on its activities to the General Assembly, and resolutions adopted by the Assembly frequently request the Conference to consider specific disarmament matters.

The CD was in session from February 6 to April 24, and from June 12 to August 24. During 1990 the CD held 45 formal plenary meetings and 23 informal meetings.

Among the wide range of disarmament issues considered by the CD in 1990, items receiving the most attention were: nuclear test ban; chemical weapons; new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons; outer space arms control; nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; negative security assurances; and a comprehensive program of disarmament. Four ad hoc committees were reestablished from the 1989 session on negative security assurances, radiological weapons, chemical weapons and arms control in outer space. In addition, the CD reached consensus to establish an ad hoc committee on "nuclear test ban," with a non-negotiating mandate.

Ad Hoc Committees

NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES

The Ad Hoc Committee was reestablished during the 1990 CD session "to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." The Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that nonnuclear-weapon states should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Work on the substance of effective arrangements, and discussions on various aspects and elements of a solution, however, revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear states persisted, and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula."

The five nuclear-weapon states have offered unilateral assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states; the U.S. assurance, first offered in 1978, stands as a reliable statement of U.S. policy.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was reestablished in February with a mandate, inter alia, to "continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention ...with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible." The 1990 report of the chemical weapons Ad Hoc Committee was adopted in August, updating the "rolling text" of the convention to reflect work done in 1990.

In CD negotiations in 1990 there was greater recognition of the need for a global approach to the problem of chemical weapons, and more attention was given to concerns of states about security and the role of chemical weapons in that context. There was progress on a variety of issues, but important issues remain unresolved. The CD must still identify and negotiate detailed procedures necessary to assure adequate verification, including arrangements to monitor nonproduction of chemical weapons by civilian chemical industries. Also, the issue of how to ensure the security of states during the stockpile destruction period must be addressed. Finally, important differences remain on such issues as treaty implementing provisions, allocation of costs, and the nature and extent of assistance which might be provided nations attacked or threatened by chemical weapons. CD participants have conducted a series of trial inspections in the chemical industry. The results of these inspections, organized by nations individually in their own industries, have provided valuable insight into defining a regime for monitoring civilian industry under a chemical weapons convention.