It is necessary, therefore, to begin this part of the subject with the consideration of its immortality.

You all know the doubts entertained by the ancient heathens upon this subject, and especially by the learned and speculative among them. It is from them, indeed, that we know the opinion of the vulgar; but I think it probable that, as the latter felt greater reverence for the established mythology, so they were more steady in the belief of the future existence of the soul. We find that almost in every nation this belief prevails; and it is less likely to be called in question by those who do not indulge in vain reasonings, and who rest satisfied with the authority of tradition. I do not mean, that the more the subject is discussed the weaker the evidence will appear; but that, in conse quence of the disadvantage under which unassisted reason labours in investi. gations of this kind, the result of its exertions has been rather an increase of doubt, than a settled persuasion. It is owing to this cause that the most celebrated philosophers of antiquity express themselves with hesitation, or vary their tone, using at one time the language of confidence, and at another that of uncertainty. The arguments brought forward by modern philosophers, in favour of the immortality of the soul, are better than those of their predecessors; but we shall greatly err, if we suppose that their superiority is the consequence of the gradual improvement of reason. It is true, indeed, that reason is improved; the advances, however, which it has made are not the fruits of its own unaided efforts, but of the assistance which it has derived from revelation. There can be no greater imposition attempted upon mankind, than when Christian divines, or Christian laymen, pretend to give a system of natural religion deduced from the principles of reason. What they call reason, is a compound of the natural suggestions of the mind and the truths of revelation; but they are not at pains to separate them, nor is it properly in their power, as men in general are not able to determine how much they owe to nature, and how much to education. It is sufficient to remind you, that such a system of natural religion as is now commonly exhibited, was never drawn up by a heathen. Christian countries give birth to the authors, and Christian instruction furnished them with the most valuable materials.

The first argument for the immortality of the soul is founded on its immateriality. It is not a material substance; and, as it does not consist of parts, it is not subject to dissolution. We learn by experience what are the qualities of matter, which is extended, divisible, inert; and we are led to believe that thought is not one of its properties, because we observe every where around us, that it exists without intelligence and without feeling. If thought essentially belonged to matter every part of it would think. There are only two ways in which it can be imagined to acquire the property of thinking; by a new modification of its parts, or by having the quality superadded to it. With regard to the latter hypothesis, although it has been adopted by some persons of great name, it is questionable whether they did or could affix any distinct idea to it. To endow matter with the faculty of thought, is to give it a new power, different from and contrary to all its original properties. We do not know the nature of substances, and can observe only their qualities; but, having ascertained these, we naturally conclude, that the substance to which they belong does not admit properties generically different from them. It seems to be as contrary to reason to suppose matter to be made capable of thought, as to suppose spirit to be made capable of figure and division. It avails nothing to appeal to the almighty power of God; because his power cannot work contradictions, or make a substance susceptible of qualities which do not essentially belong to it. He could change the nature of things; but while their nature continues, their properties are fixed and immutable. From all that we know of matter, it appears to be a substance on which the power VOL. II.-38.

of thinking could not be superinduced. The supposition that it is superadded to matter is absurd. If, then, matter could not be the substratum of a property essentially different from all its known qualities, we are necessarily led to the conclusion that where the power of thinking exists, there is a substance, dif ferent from matter, in which it inheres, or, in other words, a soul.

This reasoning is equally conclusive against the hypothesis that thought is the result of some modification of matter. "Matter," says Dr. Johnson, can differ from matter only in form, density, bulk, motion, and direction of motion. To which of these, however varied or combined, can consciousness be annexed? To be round or square, to be solid or fluid, to be great or little, to be moved slowly or swiftly, one way or another, are modes of material existence, all equally alien from the nature of cogitation. If matter be once without thought, it can only be made to think by some new modification; but all the modifications which it can admit are equally unconnected with cogitative powers.'

The argument for the immortality of the soul from its immaterial nature, is thus stated by the same celebrated writer. "Immateriality seems to imply a natural power of perpetual duration as a consequence of exemption from all causes of decay; whatever perishes is destroyed by the solution of its contexture, and separation of its parts; nor can we conceive how that which has no parts, and therefore admits no solution, can be naturally corrupted or impaired. He who made the soul can destroy it, since, however imperishable, it receives from a superior nature its power of duration. That it will not perish by any inherent cause of decay, or principle of corruption, may be shewn by philosophy; but philosophy can tell no more. That it will not be annihilated by Him that made it, we must learn from higher authority."

Such is the amount of the first argument. The soul may live, and will live for ever, if such be the will of the Creator.

The second argument for the immortality of the soul, is founded on its powers, which are not only different from those that we observe in matter, but are superior to the powers of all the other inhabitants of this world. Man not only perceives what is present by means of his senses, as the lower animals do, and recollects the past, but stretches his views into the future, anticipates events to come, with greater or less certainty according to the grounds of expectation, and regulates his conduct with a reference to objects which he has not seen. His mind takes a wider range than this earth, to which his bodily presence is assigned, contemplates the phenomena of nature in the remote regions of the universe, and discovers the laws by which other worlds are governed. By a process of reasoning he rises from the effect to the cause, and ascends in thought to that mysterious Being, who, himself invisible, is seen by the reflection of his glory in his works. He traces the relations in which he stands to that Being and to his fellow creatures, ascertains the duties arising from these relations, and feels that he was made for a nobler purpose than the lower animals, which are ignorant of all those truths, and have no guide but their appetites and instincts. Is it conceivable that these high powers were conferred upon him solely for a temporary use; that these lights were kindled only to enable him to look around him during the short journey of life; that after having blazed for a few years, they are to be extinguished for ever; and that the being on whose path they shed so much brightness, and to whose eye they disclosed such sublime and interesting prospects, is to lie down in everlasting darkness, and mingle with the clods of the valley? In surveying the system of created things, we do not observe in any instance such a disproportion of means to the end. The inferior animals fulfill the purpose of their existence by their senses and instincts. Why was man made * Rasselas, chap. xlviii.

capable of attaining so much knowledge, which, on the supposition that death. terminates his career, is manifestly useless to him? For useless certainly is the knowledge of religious and moral truths, of his Maker, and of his duty, if there is no state beyond the grave, in which the consequences of that knowledge will be experienced, and He who is now dimly perceived in his works, shall be clearly seen and fully enjoyed. We observe too, that the powers of man are progressive, while those of the lower animals are stationary. It is not found that, among them, the species is more improved in one age than in another, or that the individual ever advances beyond a certain point. But the faculties of man are gradually unfolded from infancy to manhood, and in some cases continue vigorous and active to extreme old age. Yet we can never say that they have reached perfection, or that man has made the highest possible intellectual effort, and attained all the knowledge of which he is capable Were the soul to die with the body, the fate of man would be an instance of an abortive work of God, a work made for no intelligible purpose; and it is therefore more consonant to our ideas of Divne wisdom to believe, that, as it is capable from its nature of perpetual duration, and its powers admit of no limit which we know, it will pass into another state of conscious existence, and advance in an interminable career of improvement. Whether the argument be considered as conclusive or not, it undoubtedly affords a strong presumption in favour of the immortality of the soul; and as such we find it brought forward by the heathen philosophers. "I am persuaded," says Cicero, in his treatise de Senectute," since such is the activity of the soul, such is the memory of the past and the foresight of the future, such are its arts and sciences, and inventions, that the nature which comprehends these things cannot be mortal."

The third argument for the immortality of the soul, is founded upon the operations of conscience, the office of which is to judge of right and wrong, as the understanding judges of truth and error; to enjoin the one and forbid the other; to acquit or condemn us according to our conduct; to summon us to the higher tribunal of our Maker; and to anticipate the consequences of his sentence in another state of existence. To evade this argument, conscience has been represented as a factitious faculty, as the effect of education; and hence, it has been said, it is not uniform in its dictates, but commands and prohibits according to the notions of morality which prevail in a particular country. But the only inference which should be deduced from this fact is, that conscience is liable to be perverted as well as the understanding. If it would be absurd to deny that our minds possess the power of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, because we are subject to innumerable errors, and the wildest opinions have been believed, not only by the vulgar, but by philosophers; it would be equally absurd to conclude, that there is no such principle as conscience, because virtue has been sometimes cålled vice, and vice virtue. The operations of conscience, amidst the manifold errors into which it has been betrayed, are a proof that it is natural to the mind. It may be misled, but it still exists. It is found in all ages, in all nations, and under all religions; and we must therefore conclude, that it is an essential principle of our nature. It was planted in our bosom by the hand of the Creator, and its clear unbiassed dictates must be regarded as his commands. If it point to a future state, it is He who is reminding us that this is only the first and probationary stage of our being; that the consequences of our moral actions will not be limited to our present circumstances; and that, when our course is finished, a retribution will take place. In short, the anticipations of conscience, which are common to heathens and to Christians, are an evidence that the soul will pass into another state, where those anticipations will be realized.

In corroboration of this argument, I proceed to mention a fourth, which is

drawn from the unequal distribution of good and evil in the present life. That God is the moral Governor of the world, we may assume as a truth, because it has been already proved, and is denied by none but atheists. We have a witness to it within us, in the operations of conscience, which not only reminds us that he has given us a law for the regulation of our conduct, but acquits and condemns us in his name, and refers us to his future judgment for the ratification and execution of the sentence. But the present state of things, as we all acknowledge, does not accord with our ideas of a perfect moral administration. It is an ancient complaint, that "all things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath."* The promiscuous manner in which men of different characters are treated, seems to confound all moral distinctions. But great as this disorder may be accounted, there still is a greater. "There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous." The lot of the righteous is such as that of the wicked should be, and the lot of the wicked as that of the righteous. Exceptions there are in the course of the Divine government; and righteousness is sometimes rewarded, and unrighteousness punished in the present life. But a few examples of this nature can only be set in opposition to innumerable examples of a different character, in order to show that notwithstanding the latter, there is such a principle in the Divine nature as justice, and consequently, that there is ground to expect its full development under another dispensation. It may be objected, that, although virtue and vice are not visibly recompensed, yet there is a secret retribution in the satisfaction which flows from virtue, and the uneasiness which is the consequence of vice. But, besides that the want of visibility in this retribution does not answer the ends of God's moral government, by vindicating his character and upholding the authority of his law; it may be remarked that, if a future state were left out of the question, both the pleasure and the pain would be greatly diminished, if not annihilated. Many a wicked man would feel no uneasiness, if he were freed from the forebodings of conscience; and in many cases at least, the pleasure arising from virtuous dispositions and actions would not counterbalance the evils with which they are accompanied. The state of the case then, is this, that God has given a law to the human race, and announced his intention to reward obedience, and punish disobedience; yet we find that there is no regular distribution of rewards and punishments; that there is no regular plan according to which affiairs are conducted; that sometimes the righteous and the wicked are placed in the same circumstances, both enduring the evils of life, or both enjoying its good things; and that at other times, their condition exhibits an unexpected contrast, while those who should have been happy are involved in affliction, and those who should have been miserable are surrounded with earthly blessings. If we believe that there is a God, and that he is just and good, we must conclude that this life is not the whole of man; we must believe that it is only a state of discipline and trial, and that his treatment according to his desert, is with manifest propriety deferred till he have finished his course. We must believe that after death is the judgment, when he shall receive according to the deeds done in the body, whether they have been good or evil. Reason assents to the doctrine of revelation, and has led men in every age and nation to expect a future state of happiness or misery. But this belief implies the immortality of the soul. It implies that it will survive the death of the body; and, in the language of an inspired writer, that when ⚫ Eccles. ix. 2. † Ib. viii. 14.

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"the dust returns to the earth as it was, the spirit will return to God who gave it."

The last argument is derived from the universal belief of the immortality of the soul. Another argument has, indeed, been founded upon the desire of immortality which prevails among mankind; but it is questionable whether it possesses much solidity. The desire has been considered as instinctive, and consequently, as an indication by our Creator himself of our continued existence; but it does not appear to be different from the love of life, which is common to us and the inferior animals. It is simply a desire that we may not be deprived of the precious blessing of life; and we may say the same desire is virtually felt by every living creature. But because God has implanted in us a strong love of life, it does not follow, in our case more than in theirs, that our life will not come to an end. The belief of the immortality of the soul can be traced in the history of all civilized nations, and even among savage tribes. It prevailed among the Greeks and Romans, the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, the Persians, the Indians, and the Gauls; and wherever modern travellers have gone, and have had an opportunity to inquire into the opinions of the nations, it has been found that an idea was entertained, more or less distinct, of a state beyond the grave. "The immortality of the soul," as Cicero said long ago, "is established by the consent of all nations." The argument founded upon it is this :-Either this consent results from the uniform suggestions of reason, in every country and in every age, and ought therefore to be considered as the voice of God himself giving notice of our destiny; or, it is the consequence of a tradition descending from the first parents of mankind, who were taught by their Creator that their souls should never die. I acknowledge that the universality of an opinion is not, of itself, a proof of its truth, because there are some notions of religion in which men have agreed, and when without supernatural instruction, still agree, but which we know to be erroneous. But when an opinion is neither contradicted by reason nor revelation, its prevalence among nations separated by time and place, and between whom there was no communication, necessarily leads us to the hypothesis of a common origin, and demonstrates, that as it is congenial to the wishes, so it is consonant to the natural dictates of the mind. And although the maxim, Vor populi est vox Dei, is so far from being uniformly true that it is very frequently false, yet in the present case it may be admitted; and there seems reason to think that it was the Creator himself who taught man to believe that he is made for immortality.

LECTURE LXXXI.

ON THE DEATH OF THE SAINTS, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

The Doctrine of the Immortality of the soul, founded on the testimony of Christ.-Completion of Sanctification at Death.-Doctrine of an Intermediate State of the sleep of the Soul: of Purgatory.—Arguments against Purgatory.—The best argument for it.

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THE arguments for the immortality of the soul which were stated in the preceding lecture, have been considered as conclusive; and, although they do not all possess the same strength, yet their united evidence has been deemed sufficient to be the ground of a rational conviction. But I must remind you again,

Eccles. xii, 7.