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blessedness in the world to come. "Lord, I have hoped for thy salvation, and done thy commandments."*

There are several other particulars connected with the subject of sanctification, which I would have introduced if time had permitted. I might have shown you that the work is progressive, like the shining light which shineth more and more to the perfect day; that it is sometimes suspended, but never totally destroyed; and that it is completed at death, when the souls of believers are made perfect in holiness. I might have also pointed out its advantages, and its tendency to glorify God, and adorn our profession; but I shall leave these topics to your own meditations.

LECTURE LXXVI.

ON GOOD WORKS.

Good Works, the Fruits of Regeneration-Meaning of this Phrase-Nature of Good Works: Necessary that they should be Conformable to the Law of God; be Performed from Respect for his Authority, from Love to Him, and with a View to his Glory-Possible only to Believers-General Remarks respecting them.

HAVING explained the privilege of sanctification, I proceed to speak of good works, which are the fruits of the change effected by divine grace in the soul. We have already seen, that they are not the condition of justification, which is obtained solely by faith, but that they are not therefore unnecessary, because there are many reasons why a believer should perform them, and many important purposes which they serve. I do not intend to resume these topics, but in this lecture shall confine myself to an illustration of their nature, and some remarks of a general kind.

The phrase, Good Works, is often understood in a sense too limited, and which gives an imperfect view of the effect of supernatural grace, and of the duty of a Christian. If you attend to the manner in which the expression is frequently used, you will find, that it comprehends only a part of the works to which "believers are created again in Christ Jesus," and that the most important part is omitted. Many seem to have no idea of any good works, but those which are enjoined by the second table of the law; and their morality is summed up in sobriety, justice, and benevolence, of which the principal or sole object is the temporal welfare of our brethren. The great design of Christianity, as they represent it, is to render us temperate, kind, and charitable. It is thus that the natural aversion of the heart to God discovers itself, even when it is professedly inculcating obedience to his law. The duties of which he is the immediate object are overlooked, or treated as of inferior importance. We are not surprised to find this mutilated morality taught by infidels, who are Atheists or not much different, and consider all religion towards God as superfluous and absurd; it being their opinion that it is not by prayers, and praises, and other exercises of piety, that we are to please him, if there is such a Being and he takes any notice of our conduct, but by acting properly in the various relations subsisting between us and our brethren. But it is lamentable, that the

Ps. cxix. 166.

anguage of Christian teachers should so often show, that they have studied in the same school. When some of them talk of good works, we hear much of meekness, and candour, and beneficence, and the forgiveness of injuries, but little or nothing of faith, and love to God, and the dedication of the heart to him, and zeal for his glory. It is not a false charge which has been brought against such men, that they preach heathen morality; for it is separated in a great measure from piety, and chiefly consists in the social virtues. When we speak of good works, we understand the words in the most extensive sense, as comprehending the whole duty of man, prescribed in both tables of the law; and we remember the declaration of Him, whom alone we call our Master, that "to love the Lord our God with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, is the first and great commandment."

I would observe farther, that there is often a very incautious way of speaking concerning the relative value of good works. They are not only contrasted with faith to the depreciation of the latter, from ignorance, it may be presumed, of what faith is, of which I know not a more notable specimen than may be found in a well-known paper of the Spectator concerning faith and morality;* but they are represented as the ultimate end of religion, as the terminating point of its wonderful apparatus of contrivances and means. Thus, other important matters are thrown into the shade. Faith is undervalued; the atonement is overlooked, or regarded only as an expedient for advancing the interests of virtue; nothing is heard of but eternal and immutable morality; and so large a space does it fill in the understandings or imaginations of some men, that all other points of religion dwindle into insignificance, and they adopt the celebrated but senseless maxim, that it matters not what is our creed, if our life is orthodox. The ultimate end of religion is the glory of God in the salvation of sinners; and his glory is manifested not only by their obedience to his law, but by every part of the scheme of redemption; by the process, so far above the ideas and calculations of reason, which has reconciled his justice and mercy, and restored his lost image in the soul of man. But, although it were granted that the object to which the several steps in the plan of redemption are subservient, is the sanctification of our nature, which puts it again into a capacity to serve and enjoy its Creator, we should still object to the extravagant importance which is assigned to good works; for this reason, that by good works, those who speak of them in this manner, principally or exclusively mean the common duties of life; and were they honestly to state their sentiments, it would appear that the design of religion is accomplished, in making us good members of families, good neighbours, and good subjects of the state; not too strict and scrupulous, however, but attentive to decorum, and free from any gross and habitual vice. But all this might have been effected, without the circuitous method which has been adopted; without the death of a divine Redeemer, and the descent of the heavenly Spirit; by a plain rule of duty, and the operation of natural sentiments and affections. The design of Christianity is nobler and more extensive, namely, to make man holy in heart, as well as in life; to inspire him with the love of God; to give God the supreme place in his affections, that he may love his fellow creatures only in subordination to him, and for his sake; to establish the empire of the Divine will in his conscience, and to secure the prompt and cheerful performance of all the duties, of those which respect God, in the first place, and of those which respect man, in the second. Good works, as commonly understood, are only a branch, and, to speak still more correctly, are only fruits, of the holiness which religion infuses into those who are subject to its influence. The design is to make all things new; to fill the mind with light, and the heart with love; to form beings

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on whom their Maker can look with unmixed complacency; and, when this great moral change is completed, religion may be said to have attained its end.

I now proceed to inquire into the nature of good works. Here it is proper to observe, that something is necessary to make a work good in itself; and that other things are necessary to make it good as performed by us.

That a work may be good in itself, it must be enjoined by the law of God, the sole rule of obedience. The command of man cannot make a work good. unless it be, at the same time, virtually or explicitly commanded by God: the suggestions of reason do not possess sufficient authority, because it is not our supreme guide, and is liable to error. He who created us, has alone a right to prescribe the mode in which we should exert our faculties, and fulfil the purposes of our being. We find the sinful practices of the Jews sometimes condemned, simply on the ground that they were not commanded, and without a reference to their obvious pravity. "The children of Judah have done evil in my sight, saith the Lord; they have set their abominations in the house which is called by my name, to pollute it. And they have built the high places of Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my heart." And God says, "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."* On this ground, all those works are rejected, which are enjoined by superstition, and are supposed to possess so much merit, as to recommend the performer in a particular manner to the favour of God. The Papist undertakes pilgrimages to places fancied to be holy, submits to penances and frequent fasts, repeats appointed prayers in a given number and at stated times, and presents offerings to the church, in the full persuasion that his acts of piety are pleasing to God, and will procure a reward; but, as he proceeds solely upon the ground of human authority, he loses his labour, and his services are set aside by the simple question, "Who hath required this at your hands?" It is plain that duty is a relative term, and implies obligation; but the source of all moral obligation is the will of God. This is the reason why some things should be done, and other things should not be done. Our own opinion will not give goodness to our works; for, on this supposition, we should be a law to ourselves, and independent of the Sovereign of the universe: their goodness can arise solely from their conformity to the standard which the Divine authority has established.

Some moralists have maintained that the character of an action depends upon the intention of the agent, insomuch that, if a man have a good design, it will justify the means which he employs to accomplish it. This is the meaning of the celebrated maxim of certain casuists in the church of Rome, that the end sanctifies the means; and practically it is adopted by others who excuse themselves, and even claim praise, when they have erred, on account of the alleged purity of their motives. It is acknowledged that an action good in itself may become bad through intention; or in other words, it may be divested of all moral worth by being performed with an unlawful design, and the agent may be guilty of sin in the divine estimation. The giving of alms is not a virtue when it flows from ostentation; nor zeal for truth when it originates in pride and passion; nor prayer when the object is to be seen of men. although intention may convert good into evil, it does not possess the opposite power of turning evil into good. To ascribe to it such power is to deny that there is any essential difference of actions, to render morality entirely an arbitrary thing, to represent it as continually changing its character, so that what is vicious to-day may be virtuous to-morrow, and what is vice in one man may be virtue in another, according to the views by which they are respectively

* Jer. vii. 30, 31. Matt. xv. 9.

But

influenced. It sets aside the law of God, and substitutes, in the room of a permanent standard, the ever-varying decisions of the human mind, blinded by prejudice, warped by passion, and forming its judgments upon deceitful appearances and short-sighted calculations. The only province which ought to be assigned to intention in morality, is to give value to such actions as are conformable to the law of God, to the goodness of which it is indispensably necessary that the state of the mind be right. Men may think that they are doing God good service, but this idea will not exculpate them, if they are like the Jews, who sought to promote his glory by opposing the truth and persecuting its friends. It is sufficient to explode the doctrine of intention to consider the extent to which it would carry us; for upon this principle many of the greatest crimes might be justified, because those who committed them imagined that they were doing their duty.

No work, therefore, is good in itself unless it be commanded. The Church of Rome teaches, that there are works of supererogation, meaning by these, works which men are not bound to perform by any positive command, and which therefore exceed the measure of their duty, and create a superfluous degree of merit that may be transferred to others for their benefit. They are not required from any man; but they are recommended by what they call counsels of perfection, counsels to aim at higher attainments in holiness than are necessary to our salvation. They found this doctrine upon the advice or counsel of Paul to the Corinthians, not to marry;* and particularly upon the words of our Lord to the young man, "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor." With respect to the first, it is plain that abstinence from marriage was not recommended as a higher degree of holiness, but as good "for the present distress;" that is, as a matter of prudence, because it was a time of persecution, when those who were encumbered with families would be exposed to particular inconvenience and danger; and hence it appears that it is not a counsel addressed to Christians in general. With respect to the second, it was not a counsel, but a command to an individual, of whose sincerity our Lord was pleased to make trial, by demanding the sacrifice of all his earthly possessions. The perfection of which he speaks is not a higher degree of holiness than others had attained, but the perfection of sincerity; if thou wilt prove thyself sincere in seeking eternal life, go and sell all that thou hast.' It is a proof of deplorable blindness, of unaccountable stupidity, for any man to imagine that it is possible to exceed the measure of our duty; for what more can be conceived than is implied in these two commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself?" This is a summary of the whole duty of man. The highest possible love to God, and the highest possible love to our neighbour, are already required; and our love to both is to be manifested in every way which Scripture and Providence may point out. Works of supererogation have no existence but in the vain imaginations of ignorant and self-righteous men. The Church of England says well in her fourteenth article, “Voluntary works, besides, over, and above God's commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and pride. For by them men do declare, that they not only render unto God as much as they are bound to do, but that they do more for his sake than of bounden duty is required. Whereas, Christ saith plainly, 'When ye have done all that ye are commanded to do, say, We are unprofitable servants.'"

Having seen what is necessary to render an action materially, let us next inquire how it becomes formally, good. An action may be good in its own

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nature, and yet may be so vitiated by the state of mind in which it is performed, as to be of no value in the Divine estimation.

I observe, then, that it is requisite to the moral goodness of an action, that it be performed from respect for the authority of God. Its abstract nature is the same, when we are influenced by any other principle; but, then, it is not an act of obedience, and cannot therefore be acceptable to God, as our Lawgiver and Judge. Philosophers have inquired into the foundation of morality, and, as we might have expected, have come to different conclusions. They have told us, that it is agreeable to the fitness of things; that it is conformable to nature; that it is conformable to reason; that it is conformable to truth; that it is productive of good. But whatever theory we adopt, none of them proves any thing more than that there is a propriety, a decency, an order, an utility, in doing some things and not doing others. No proper obligation_results from any of these systems; they do not take hold of conscience, and create the idea of duty. The Scriptures, disregarding all metaphysical speculations, go directly to the point, and lay down the only intelligible and practical foundation of morality, namely, the will of God. In reading them, you do not find that particular actions are enjoined upon the principles of philosophy, but on the stronger grounds of religion. It is the will of God, that we should do this or that; it is his law, by which we should regulate our conduct. To do our duty, is not to satisfy the dictates of our own minds, but to express our reverence for him. Virtue is obedience, that is, conformity to the will of a superior; and the great example proposed to us, is that of our Saviour, who came "not to do his own will, but the will of him who sent him."

From these observations it follows, that to constitute a work formally good, it must be done, not because it will please ourselves or others, but because it is commanded by God. Hence you perceive the reason that some works, which have a specious appearance, and excite the admiration of men, are rejected by the Searcher of hearts. The true principle of obedience is wanting. While the persons are acting in literal conformity to the law, the Lawgiver is not in all their thoughts. Hence also you may see whence that persuasion is necessary, of which the apostle speaks when he says, "Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin, This is not justifying faith, or faith in Christ, as has sometimes been imagined; and hence the words have been improperly quoted, to prove that none but believers can perform works acceptable to God; but it is an assurance in our minds, that what we are doing is right, founded upon the careful study of the law. If we should do what is lawful in itself, thinking it to be unlawful, to us it would be a sin; if we should do it without knowing any thing respecting its nature, the best that could be said of it is, that it is neither good nor evil. Then only are our works right, when we know them to be commanded, and do them because they are commanded.

I observe once more, That to the goodness of our works, it is necessary that they flow from love to God. Love to him is stated to be the sum of the first table of the law; and, although love to our neighbour is represented to be the sum of the second, yet, unless it be founded on love to God, it will not be a religious affection. It is conceivable that a man may perform a variety of duties because God has commanded them, and at the same time perform them unwillingly. Conscience may force him to act contrary to his inclinations. The principle which predominates may be fear; under the influence of which a person will earnestly and diligently do what is necessary to ward off the danger which he dreads; but he is only submitting to a less, in order to escape a greater evil. The works which he performs, are not his choice; he is impelled to them by a very different principle from that of obedience, Now, although

* Rom. xiv. 23.

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