living and intelligent principle, of the operation of which we are conscious in ourselves, and to which we give the name of the soul. It was impossible that the Divine nature was in him instead of a soul, because it is omniscient, and there were some things of which he declared himself to be ignorant; and because his sufferings, and fears, and sorrows, were incompatible with the perfect felicity of which it is immutably possessed. Can we conceive the Divine nature to have been in an agony, and to have exclaimed, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"*

We conclude, therefore, in opposition to those heresies, that our Redeemer assumed a complete human nature; or, as our Catechism expresses it, with its usual accuracy, that he took to himself "a true body and a reasonable soul." In the ancient creed, which goes under the name of Athanasius, he is said to have not only been perfect God, but perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting."

While we maintain the integrity of his human nature, we admit that he assumed it with all its sinless infirmities. These may be comprehended in the word flesh, which is used by the evangelist John, in speaking of his incarnation; at least the word suggests this idea in other places where it occurs. "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh."t "He remembered that they were but flesh; a wind that passeth away, and cometh not again." In both passages the term seems to represent man as a being frail and mortal. Our Redeemer was not subject to any of the sinful infirmities of our nature, to sensual appetites and transports of passion; nor was there any stimulus or incentive to sin in the constitution or temperament of his body. The Scripture is careful, when it asserts his conformity to us in other things, to make this important exception. "He was in all things tempted like as we are, yet without sin." He was subject to none of those diseases which are the portion of man, who is born to trouble as the sparks fly upwards. Infirmities of this kind would have discommoded him in the discharge of his duty, and he was exempted from them on account of his personal purity. But he was subject to hunger and thirst, to cold and heat, and weariness, to pain of body arising from external injuries, and to distress of mind from the experience or apprehension of evil, and from the effects produced upon his feelings by the scenes with which he was surrounded. Although living in our world, he might have been defended against every annoyance by the order of Omnipotence, as an angel of heaven would be, were he to descend to the earth, and sojourn in it for a season; but such a state would not have accorded with the design of his mission. He submitted to our infirmities, that he might acquire an experimental knowledge of our sufferings, corporeal and mental, and we might be more fully assured of his sympathy; besides that it was only by his tears, and agony, and death, that the great work of our redemption could be accomplished. "We have not a high priest that cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities, but was in all things tempted like as we are."

Before we proceed farther, the question occurs, What was the reason that the Son of God assumed the nature of man? Some of the Schoolmen were so bold as to affirm, that he would have assumed it although man had not sinned. I do not know what arguments they advanced in support of this opinion, nor is it necessary to inquire, because, without hearing them, we may confidently pronounce that they are unsatisfactory and false. Their philosophy, such as it was, could give them no assistance in a matter of pure revelation; and every thing which the Scriptures say upon the subject, directly tends to the opposite conclusion. He became man for the redemption of men, the asPs. lxxviii. 39. Heb. iv. 15. B 2

• Matt. xxvii. 46. † Gen. vi. 3. VOL. II.-3

Idem.

sumption of our nature being necessary to prepare him for those services and sufferings by which alone we could be redeemed. " Verily," says Paul," he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham."* The word which we translate, took on him, or assumed, signifies to take hold of, to assist, or to help, and was so understood by the Greek commentators, the most competent judges. The true sense of the passage, I apprehend, is, that the Son of God interposed for the deliverance, not of angels, but of men; and the nature of his interposition is stated in the preceding verses. "Forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same;" that is, he helped man by becoming a man. It is related by Cæsar, that it was an opinion of the Gauls, "that unless the life of man was given for the life of man, the immortal gods could not be appeased." It would be absurd to quote their sentiments in support of a doctrine of revelation, especially as they founded upon them the cruel and detestable practice of human sacrifices; but it is worthy of attention that they had adopted an idea which in general was true, and was the reason of the great mystery which we are at present considering, the incarnation of our Saviour. If an atonement was necessary, we cannot conceive it to have been made by the sufferings of any other nature than that which had incurred the penalty of sin. No such relation could have been established between two beings of totally different natures, between a man and an angel, that, in consequence of it, what was done by the latter, should have been accepted, as if it had been done by the former. We can understand how the services of an individual may be admitted as an equivalent for the services of the whole class to which he belongs; but there is no principle on which we could account for the same mode of estimating the services of an individual of a different class. If an angel had suffered, there would have been no display of the righteousness of God; as, in that case, the nature which had sinned would have escaped with impunity. It behoved the surety, in this case, to be closely allied to the debtors, bone of their bone, and flesh of their flesh, that he might be identified with them in legal reckoning.

To this argument for the incarnation of our Saviour it may be objected, that God might have saved us without satisfaction to his justice, and consequently, that there was no absolute necessity for the manifestation of his Son in the flesh. He might have freely pardoned our sins, bestowed blessings upon us unbought and unsolicited, and admitted us to communion without a mediator. Some have hazarded this opinion, which is as little distinguished by modesty as by reverence for Scripture. It imports that the mission of Jesus Christ was gratuitous in every sense; that without any sufficient reason he was subjected to sorrow and death; that there has been a theatrical display of the severity of divine justice, to persuade us that it is inflexible and inexora ble, while it would not have been dishonoured, although sin had been permitted to pass with impunity; and that the love of God is not so wonderful as we were wont to believe, because its greatest gift might have been withheld without at all hindering our salvation. Such consequences will justify us in rejecting this opinion, especially when we consider that it does not find the shadow of support in the Scriptures, and rests on no more solid basis than the speculations of presumptuous men.

The necessity of the incarnation farther appears from the nature of the suf ferings which our Redeemer had to endure. They were sufferings which would atone for the guilt of the people of God from the beginning to the end of the world. These were not easy to be borne. Human nature, unsupported by superior power, would have sunk under them. They would have crushed

*Heb. ii. 16.

† Ib. 14.

De Bell. Gall. lib. vi.

the mightiest of our race; they would have overwhelmed the highest angel in irretrievable misery. As it was necessary, therefore, that the penalty of the law should be inflicted on the nature which had sinned, so it was necessary that that nature should be so sustained in the dreadful enterprise, as, although bruised and broken, not to be utterly destroyed. The Son of God united it to himself; he was present with it more intimately than he is with the angels of heaven; he upheld it by the power of his divinity; and hence, although the man Christ Jesus was in such an agony, that his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling to the ground, he bore all his woes with invincible fortitude, and closed the scene with the words of triumph on his expiring lips: "It is finished."

The assumption of our nature by the Son of God is expressed in the Scriptures, by his "partaking of our flesh and blood," by his "being made flesh," and by his "being manifested in the flesh." The Greek writers call it ανθρώπησις, ενανθρώπησις, ενσωμάτωσις, and ενσαρκωσις ; of which last term, the ecclesiastical Latin word incarnatio, which we have adopted into our language, is a literal translation. The act by which the union was formed, we cannot explain; but it constituted such a relation between him and our nature, that it is now as really his nature as is the divine. He is as truly man as he is God. This peculiar relation was indispensably necessary to the unity of the Mediator. Had the two natures, however intimately connected, not been personally united, their actions would not have been referrible to one agent; there would have been two agents, perfectly distinct, whereas now the person of Christ, if I may so express myself, is one principle of operation in the accomplishment of our redemption.

To illustrate this point more fully, I remark that it was not a human person which our Saviour assumed, but a human nature. The distinction between these is important, and should be carefully considered. By a person, we understand an intelligent being subsisting by himself, and not dependent upon any other. This is the meaning of the word when it is used in reference to men; when applied to the Trinity, it expresses a distinction which we cannot explain. To say that the Son of God assumed a human person, would be an express contradiction, because there is an idea imported in the word assumed, with which the personality of his human nature is absolutely inconsistent; for it imports that he made it his own; and besides, on this supposition, as we have already remarked, the acts of the man would not have been the acts of the Son of God, and consequently would not have been available for our salvation. He assumed a human nature, or, in other words, made it his own nature, by giving it a subsistence in his divine person. The term personality merely imports, that the nature of which we are speaking, subsists by itself. To deny, therefore, the personality of the human nature of Christ, takes nothing from it that is essential; it simply represents it as standing in a peculiar relation to another nature. It would have been a person, if it had not been united to the Son of God; but, being united to him, it cannot be called a person, because it does not subsist by itself, as other men do; each of whom has an independent existence. "The Son of God," says our church, “became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man, in one person for ever." And the Athanasian creed affirms, that, although he be God and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ."

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When, in speaking upon this subject, we use the phrase, the constitution of the person of Christ, it is necessary to guard against a misapprehension of the meaning. It is not that his person is made up of two constituent parts, the divine and the human nature; for this would imply that the Son of God was not a person before the union, or that he became a different person after it. The union of the soul and the body is the object in nature which most resem

bles it, particularly in this respect, that as these compose one individual, what is said of either of them may be predicted of that individual; and, in like manner, what is affirmed of either of the natures of Christ, may be affirmed of Christ himself. But the resemblance is not exact; for neither the soul nor the body is a person by itself, but the divine nature of our Saviour had a personal subsistence prior to its union to the human. His person is not a compound person; the personality belongs to his Godhead, and the human nature subsists in it by a peculiar dispensation. The assumption of our nature caused no change in his person; it added nothing to it; and the only difference is, that the same person, who was always possessed of divinity, has now taken humanity.

It was the second person of the Trinity who alone was incarnate, as is evident from the Scriptures. It was the "Word" who was made flesh," the "Son" who was "sent forth in the fulness of time, made of a woman." The incarnation was a personal act, and was therefore limited to the person whose act it was. We say, indeed, that the divine nature was incarnate; but we speak of it not immediately, to adopt the language of scholastic Theology, and as it is considered absolutely and in itself, but mediately in the person of the Son, or as far as it is determined and characterised in the person of the Son. The incarnation was not an act of the divine nature, but of a person in that nature, and therefore terminated upon that person alone. The whole divine nature may be said to have been incarnate; but this is true only because the whole divine nature is in the second person of the Godhead. this way we may explain our meaning; but I am not sure that any distinct idea will be conveyed into the mind of the hearer. If the divine nature is in all the persons of the Trinity, we cannot understand how the incarnation was the act of one, and not of all; and the reason is, that we do not understand in what their personal distinction consists: yet we are certain that there is such a distinction, in consequence of which some acts are ascribed to one person, and others to another; and, in particular, that it was the Son who assumed our nature, and not the Father, or the Holy Ghost, although both concurred in this act; the Father by his appointment and approbation, and the Holy Ghost by his immediate agency in the miraculous conception.

In

This doctrine concerning the person of Christ was opposed by two heresies, which were broached in the fifth century, and after much disputation and confusion, terminated in the separation of their respective adherents from the communion of the catholic church. The first was the heresy of Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, who is said to have taught that there are two persons in Christ, a divine and a human. It originated in the conduct of one of his presbyters named Anastasius, who publicly condemned the title of berxos, or Mother of God, which was frequently given to the Virgin Mary, because, as he said, she was a woman, and of a woman God could not be born. He was supported by Nestorius, who zealously taught the same doctrine, and maintained that she should be called only xxs, or the Mother of Christ, A great clamour was immediately raised; suspicions were entertained, that he denied the divinity of Christ; his enemies eagerly laid hold of the opportunity to humble and overwhelm him; and the affair having been brought before a council assembled at Ephesus, A. D. 431, his heresy was condemned, and it was declared, "that Christ was one divine person, in whom two natures were most closely united, but without being mixed or confounded together." Not a few of the moderns are of opinion, that his sentiments were misunderstood and misrepresented during the violence of the controversy. Men do not always admit all the consequences which others draw from their opinions, nor even all which may be legitimately deduced. It is acknowledged by some ancient writers, and particularly by the historian Socrates, that he was

sound in his views of the Trinity, and consequently of the divinity of Christ.* He himself denied the charges which were fixed upon him by his enemies, and in one of his epistles virtually maintains the doctrine of his opponents, when he says, that Christ is a name significant of an impassible and a passible essence in one person, and that he acknowledged in him mov. Hence it is not improbable that he and his opponents agreed in sentiment, and differed only in words. The controversy, however, gave rise to a sect called by his name, which held this unscriptural doctrine, "that there were two persons in our Saviour, the one divine and the other human; that a union was formed between the Son of God, and the Son of man, in the moment of the virgin's conception, and will never be dissolved; that it was not, however, a union of nature or of person, but only of will and affection; that Christ was therefore to be carefully distinguished from God, who dwelt in him as in his temple; and that Mary was to be called the mother of Christ, and not the mother of God."

It is not necessary to engage in a formal confutation of this heresy, which expressly contradicts the passages formerly quoted, and others which affirm that the "Word was made flesh;" that he who was "in the form of God took upon him the form of a servant, and was found in fashion as a man;" that the Son of God was " made of a woman;" and that her child was "God with us;" all which assert, as clearly as words can do, the unity of his person. Were the doctrine of the Nestorians true, the hope of the church founded on the divinity of the Saviour would be vain; for he who died upon the cross was a man, more highly exalted indeed than other men, but still a creature only, whose blood could not have atoned for the sins of the world.

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The author of the other heresy was Eutyches, the abbot of a monastery in Constantinople, who expressed himself thus; "I acknowledge two natures in Christ before the union, but after the union I acknowledge only one nature." He did not specify the time when the union took place; but some of his followers said, that it took place at the conception, some at the resurrection, and some at the ascension. His opinion seems to have been, that his human nature was absorbed by the Divine, and that the divine nature alone remained. It underwent modifications by those who succeeded him, some of whom chose to say, " that in the Son of God there was one nature, which, notwithstanding its unity, was double and compounded;" while others, who assumed the name of Monophysites, laid down this proposition, "that the divine and human nature of Christ were so united as to form only one nature, yet without any change, confusion, or mixture of the two natures." The heresy of Eutyches was condemned by the council of Chalcedon, a. D. 451, which promulgated the following decree, as expressive of the faith which all Christians should hold, "that in Christ two distinct natures were united in one person, without any change, mixture, or confusion."

The distinction of the two natures in Christ was manifest while he lived upon earth. As God, he knew all things, but as man, there were some things which he did not know; as God, he was blessed for ever; but as man, he was acquainted with grief; as God, he was the living One; but as man, he died upon the cross, That the distinction is continued in the heavenly state is certain from this fact, that " he will so come in like manner as he was seen to go into heaven;"† that is, will return in the human nature, and that he is the ordained man, by whom God will judge the world in righteousness. The absorption of the human nature by the divine, or the mixture of the two natures, is perfectly unintelligible.

The ancient church maintained that the two natures of our Saviour were