An application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act . . ., by an alien after he has been served with an order to show cause or warrant of arrest shall be made and considered only in proceedings under Part 242 of this chapter. In any other case, an alien who believes that he meets the eligibility requirements of section 245 of the Act ... and §245.1, shall apply to the district director having jurisdiction over his place of residence. 8 C.F. R. 245.2(a)(1). No appeal shall lie from the denial of an application by the district director but such denial shall be without prejudice to the alien's right to renew his application in proceedings under Part 242 of this chapter.... 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(4). The above regulations, which carved out jurisdiction for immigration judges in deportation proceedings over applications for section 245 relief, were first adopted by amendments to the regulations published on December 19, 1961, 26 Federal Register 12114. Prior thereto, District Directors had sole authority over these applications. At the time. that the immigration judge's authority was thus enlarged in deportation [Part 242] proceedings, no provision was adopted (and none has since been adopted) for enlarging it in exclusion [Part 236] proceedings as well. Inasmuch as the immigration judges previously had no authority over adjustment of status applications, and given that the authority has been specifically granted in Part 242 proceedings but not in Part 236 proceedings, it cannot be found that the authority extends to immigration judges in the conduct of Part 236 proceedings. We adhere to our previous holdings in cases in which the issue of the immigration judge's authority over adjustment of status applications in exclusion proceedings was raised and rejected, Matter of Zappa, 14 I. & N. Dec. 405 (BIA 1973), Matter of Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 407 (BIA 1967). The regulations specifically limit the immigration judge's authority (and ours on appeal) over applications for section 245 relief to those which are filed by aliens in deportation [Part 242] proceedings. Immigration judges do not have that authority in exclusion proceedings. Matter of Zappa, supra, Matter of Wong, supra. The respondent is a native and citizen of Liberia who presented himself for admission as a nonimmigrant visitor on June 7, 1972. At that time his inspection was deferred. On April 30, 1975, he was found excludable under section 212(a)(20) by the immigration judge. It is alleged that the applicant thereafter married a citizen of the United States who filed a Form 130 petition on his behalf which was approved on March 24, 1976. An application thereafter for adjustment of status was apparently made to and denied by the District Director. The applicant seeks to renew his application in these exclusion proceedings which were reopened by the order of the court. The decision of the immigration judge was correct that he has no jurisdiction to consider the matter. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. MATTER OF CHIRINOS In Bond Proceedings A-20424783 Decided by Board July 14, 1977 (1) The primary consideration in a bail determination is that the parties be able to place the facts before an impartial judge as promptly as possible. There is no requirement for a formal "hearing." Informal procedures, even telephonic "hearings," are encouraged so long as prejudice does not result. (2) There is no right to a transcript of a bond redetermination hearing. (3) 8 C.F.R. 242.2(b) provides that bond redetermination hearings shall be held separate and apart from the deportation hearing itself. This was not done in this case. However, the respondent does not appear to have been prejudiced by this error. Therefore, the appeal from the immigration judge's order denying a bond redetermination will be dismissed. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant-remained longer than permitted APPLICATION: Redetermination of bond ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Frank Murray, Esquire 28 West Flagler, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33130 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Wilson, Maniatis, Appleman, and Maguire, Board Members The respondent appeals from a decision of an immigration judge, dated January 24, 1977, denying his request for a bond redetermination. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a 24-year-old native and citizen of the Honduras, who last entered the United States on June 7, 1974, as a nonimmigrant visitor, authorized to remain until June 30, 1974. He was taken into custody by Service officers pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing and Warrant for Arrest, issued on January 14, 1977. The District Director authorized his release from custody under bond in the amount of $1,000. The bond was posted and he was released on January 17, 1977. At his deportation hearing on January 24, 1977, the respondent's request for cancellation of bond was denied by the immigration judge. The regulations require that the determination of the immigration judge concerning custody status or bond shall be entered on Form I-342 and shall be accompanied by a memorandum by the immigration judge as to the reasons for his determination. 8 C.F.R. 242.2(b). Although these procedures were followed, the regulations also require that this consideration "be separate and apart from any deportation hearing or proceeding, and shall form no part of such hearing or proceeding or of the record thereof." 8 C.F.R. 242.2(b). Therefore, the procedures followed in this case were inappropriate. The bond issue should have been handled separately, with a separate order and a separate appeal to this Board. Nevertheless, there is no right to a transcript of a bond redetermination hearing. Indeed, there is no requirement of a formal "hearing." Our primary consideration in a bail determination is that the parties be able to place the facts as promptly as possible before an impartial arbiter. To achieve this objective we not only countenance, but will encourage, informal procedures so long as they do not result in prejudice. Thus, we even favor telephonic "hearings" before the immigration judge with the consent of the parties, where feasible. The bail record forwarded to us, in addition to the memorandum of the immigration judge, may contain any information which will be helpful to our consideration of the matter. See U.S. ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573 (C.A. 5, 1974). Obviously, this informality cannot carry over to a deportation hearing. The requirement of a separate bond procedure and record is part of the effort to divorce, so far as possible, the bond matter from the deportation hearing. While it is sometimes helpful to have the results of the deportation hearing when considering a bond appeal, it is neither required, nor necessary. Moreover, if transcription of the deportation proceedings would entail delay in passing upon the bond appeal, it would be most undesirable to hold up a bond determination until a transcript could be prepared. While the bond issue was not handled separately, on review of this case, the respondent does not appear to have been prejudiced by the error. The matter is before us now and on consideration of the merits of the bond appeal, we find that a bond in the amount of $1,000 is appropriate in this case. See Matter of San Martin, Interim Decision 2340 (BIA 1974). ORDER: The appeal from the immigration judge's order denying a bond redetermination is dismissed. MATTER OF OBANDO In Visa Petition Proceedings A-21172362 Decided by Board July 20, 1977 (1) United States citizen petitioner filed a visa petition seeking to classify the beneficiary as his unmarried daughter, under section 203(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Beneficiary had been born out of wedlock in 1953 in Belize. On December 15, 1976, the Municipal Court of St. Croix, Virgin Islands, issued a decree of legitimation under Title 16, section 462 of the Virgin Islands Code which provided that the beneficiary would be considered as the legitimate child of the petitioner for all purposes, from the time of her birth. (2) Since the act of legitimation of the beneficiary did not take place until she was 23 years of age, beneficiary cannot qualify as petitioner's "child" under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, and the visa petition was properly denied. (3) Matter of Palacio, 11 I. & N. Dec. 183 (BIA 1965) distinguished. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Russell B. Johnson, Esquire King Christian Hotel Post Office Box 3649 BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Wilson, Maniatis, Appleman, and Maguire, Board Members The United States citizen petitioner filed a visa petition seeking to classify the beneficiary as his unmarried daughter under section 203(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The District Director denied the petition on the ground that the beneficiary had not been legitimated before she reached the age of 18 years, and therefore could not qualify as the child of the petitioner within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The beneficiary was born out-of-wedlock in Belize (British Honduras) on September 14, 1953. Until coming to join her father in St. Croix, Virgin Islands on November 20, 1976, she had always resided with her natural mother in Belize. The petitioner and his wife brought a legitimation proceeding in the Municipal Court of St. Croix, where they reside. The court issued a decree of legitimation dated December 15, 1976. The decree states that |