Now we have legislation that wants to expand it even further and take the statutory language that is on the books and expand it to encompass the President's determination which he announced publicly as a policy. That is the policy of this country until it is changed either by the President or the Congress. That is a very serious matter, not to be regarded lightly. So, that is the issue that we will be studying in the Congress as we consider the legislation, and I hope we consider the specific act. Mr. LEACH. Will the gentleman yield? Chairman FASCELL. Certainly, Mr. Leach. DETERMINING SUCCESS OF LIBYAN ATTACK Mr. LEACH. First, let me say I am very impressed with the gentleman's description of the problem as it relates to congressionalconsultative relations. I would like to take it a little step further in terms of tactics rather than law. Secretary Whitehead, I think, was right in saying we can't really assess this particular event and its effectiveness except over time. Now that we are a week or two away from the event, as we look at the success and failures of it, it is interesting to note that we successfully showed we were willing to use force, we relieved certain frustrations, and we achieved some military objectives. In a rather unsuccessful way, we killed the daughter of a head of state-not the head of state himself. We caused a grave reaction among our allies. Very interestingly, we have endangered the life of the President of the United States. I stress this point in a very serious way. Back in the mid-1960's, we did a reassessment in the Government on the issue of assassination. As we all know, there may or may not have been several assassinations that we were responsible for in the early 1960's. Those actions, if they occurred, were based upon the morality of assassination which was current in the 1950's-given a Hitler, everyone assumed, yes, it was moral under some circumstances to shoot someone. Very few Americans would have said that would have been immoral, if we had the opportunity. Yet, in the wake of the Kennedy assassination, we came to the conclusion that a policy of assassination produced, among other things, great jeopardy to the President of the United States. No foreign_country could defeat the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force; but they could sure make us vulnerable to terrorism. By this particular policy, which has some of the earmarkings of an assassination bombing, we have made ourselves vulnerable to a counterresponse. Given every account I have read describing Qadhafi as a revengeoriented person, given the death of a member of his family, as well as the wounding of several others, I think one of the great questions at this time is: Are we prepared to defend ourselves against some of the repercussions? And then with regard to the War Powers Act, a very interesting further development unfolds. If a massive terrorist counterreaction of a symbolic nature or real nature occurs, what we have precipitated is suddenly the serious consideration that the United States, rather than making preemptive bombing efforts from 40,000 feet, will have to consider invasions-something that would have been beyond the realm of policymaker's imagination 2 weeks ago. No one in this country was considering the prospect we might invade Libya. But if a given type of counterreaction develops, then it is well within the realm of feasibility that we are suddenly going to be looking at circumstances that do involve the War Powers Act far beyond simply whether it applies to terrorist activities in this kind of setting, but as regards a situation where an act with no consultation in advance precipitated an actual involvement of a much more serious nature between troops. All I would suggest is that I have never known a time period in which governments should hunker down less and open themselves up more. That is one of the implications of the War Powers Actnot to have hunkered-down decisionmaking. I just raise these questions because I personally think it was a courageous decision, although definitely a very risky and perhaps faulty decision, that the President made. But it is a decision that is going to take a great deal of understanding of its final repercussions before any of us can be prepared to suggest that a consensus of American policy can be developed. Chairman FASCELL. Well, the gentleman is correct. It still, of course, raises the question of whether or not we are going to amend the Constitution by indirection. I don't think anybody contemplated that. I certainly would not want to do it. I support the act that was taken, but I still think it is important either under the Constitution or the War Powers Act, or both, to have Congress in the loop. Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent the record be kept open for the amount of time that you might determine, so that I might be able to ask a few more questions of Secretary Scocozza and Secretary Whitehead, and for their response as well.1 BACKGROUND CHECKS OF AIRLINE EMPLOYEES Secretary Scocozza, I want to give you a hint of what the question will be. That is, in your testimony, you talk about the draft legislation that has been submitted or is about to be submitted, and that we take prompt action on it relative to the checking on the background of employees. As I understand it, the airlines have some real questions and concern about that draft legislation, and so I would like to ask you whether or not you are aware of those concerns and whether or not the Department is working with the airlines to come up with a revised draft that might meet their concerns? Mr. Scocozza. We are, Congressman. We have indicated to the carriers and to the Members of Congress and all interested parties that we would be prepared to assure that the regulations that were implemented pursuant to the legislation would certainly specify the parameters of the context of the background checks, how they would be used, the confidentiality of the information, whatever. We feel very, very strongly that if we have to assure the credibility and integrity of the people who have access to the airplanes, we must have access to this information. Chairman FASCELL. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We will be submitting questions to you for the record. We would appreciate your responses as soon as practical.1 Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for these hearings. Chairman FASCELL. The subcommittees stand adjourned, subject to the call of the respective Chairs. [Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. on Thursday, May 15, 1986.] 'Responses to additional questions appear in appendix 3. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1986 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF- Washington, DC. The subcommittees met at 2:20 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel A. Mica (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations) presiding. Mr. MICA. The subcommittees will come to order. I welcome each of my colleagues and our witnesses to a joint subcommittee hearing on behalf of the Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Security and Science, and the Subcommittee on International Operations, in regard to the economic impact of terrorism. I must say at the outset, a number of members are in route to the meeting and should be here shortly, but we have had agreement from the minority to proceed at this time so at least we can begin with the testimony. We will hear from the Honorable Donna Tuttle, the Under Secretary for Travel and Tourism, the Department of Commerce, the Honorable Joan Clark, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, State Department, H. Wayne Berens, Revere Travel, Inc., I understand one of the largest travel agencies in the United States, and Cord D. Hansen-Sturm, the Vice President of Government Affairs of First Family of Travel. The way I would like to proceed is to have at the table at this time Secretary Tuttle and Assistant Secretary Clark, if you will take your place at the table, and have you proceed, with Secretary Tuttle first and then Secretary Clark. Before you do, I won't read my entire opening statement, but without objection, I would like to submit it for the record, and simply say this: this is the first of what we hope will be several hearings on the economic impact of terrorism, on tourism and on other areas in our economy and the global economy. We think, in fact, we know, that the economic impact has been monumental, in the millions, if not the billions of dollars. Some of the figures that we have had are even hard to comprehend. My own State, Florida, is very sensitive to the problems, the rise and fall of tourism and what impacts tourism. We are one of the top 10 States visited by Europeans, and no one looks for silver linings in catastrophies, but if there is any positive side of this entire equation it is that the United States now may be bracing for one of |