STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW V. SCOCOZZA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Scocozza. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have an abbreviated version of my long testimony. With the committee's indulgence, I may be shuffling paper, but it is to quickly summarize my statement.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this joint hearing. I certainly appreciate, as a member of the administration, the cooperation we have had from the committees and the willingness of the committees to work with the Department of Transportation and provide us the opportunity to give good counsel.

SECURITY STATUS OF CAIRO, ROME, ATHENS AIRPORTS

We have been asked to address several specific questions about our security programs, in the aftermath of the tragic explosion on TWA flight 840 on April 2. You asked specifically for an evaluation of the most recent assessments of foreign airport security at the Cairo, Rome, and Athens airports.

Security at the Athens airport was reassessed on March 10, 1986, and at Cairo on March 15. The Rome Airport was scheduled for a formal comprehensive assessment on April 2. Because of the TWA flight 840 bombing that day, the assessment team in Rome was redirected to make an indepth assessment of the airport which concentrated on TWA operations and security provided for them. The last previous assessment at Rome was in December 1985.

The assessments indicate that all three airports have in place effective security programs which meet the standards and recommended practices contained in annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO, standards. These standards constitute the assessment criteria called for by Public Law 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

The subcommittees have been provided copies of these assessment reports, and the FAA would be pleased to discuss them in more detail under appropriate classified conditions.

TWA 840 INVESTIGATION

You will ask, as we did ourselves, how the TWA 840 incident could have occurred if the airport security measures were satisfactory. We and the Greek civil aviation officials have not yet finished our investigation of the case. At this point, the investigators have not reached a firm conclusion on how the terrorist or terrorists managed to get explosives aboard flight 840.

Let me state, however, that we do not now have any indication of departure from ICAO standards or negligence on the part of security forces at any of the airports.

The amount and type of explosives we strongly suspect in this case are quite difficult, but not impossible, to detect. We have been working continuously on ways to improve detection of increasingly sophisticated weapons, and we have been sharing our findings with airport and airline authorities, as appropriate. Our objective is to

make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to repeat the TWA 840 incident.

BILATERAL SUPPORT FOR INCREASED SECURITY

In general, we have found support for our efforts to increase security from the countries we deal with on a bilateral basis. Nowhere has this mutual concern for security been demonstrated more convincingly than with the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, in its actions last fall. The ICAO international security standard was completely revised, and most aspects of it will be implemented worldwide by May 19 of this year.

ICAO also has prepared a model security clause for use by nations in their bilateral agreements. The clause commits the parties to adhere to internationally accepted security standards and to international hijacking conventions, and permits suspension of services for breach of those standards or conventions, after consultations.

The United States has developed a model security article based on the ICAO draft. This is a little misleading because it looks like the United States is following ICAO's lead. It was the United States that convinced them to recommend a model security clause in the first place.

The draft of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Department of State, that they are using, were our initial proposals to ICAO, which are much more stringent than the ICAO standard.

We recently concluded a strong new security article with the Soviet Union, and have reached tentative agreement with several other countries on the text of a new security article. We are including consideration of the security article in all of our bilateral aviation negotiations.

Improving aviation security is a dynamic process. We-and the carriers and our foreign counterparts-are constantly looking at all phases of our programs and making every adjustment that is needed.

FAA AIRPORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

Awareness of improved security measures has clearly been increased by the foreign airport assessments conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration.

The FAA assessments have concentrated on airport security performance. Where it has appeared that better trained personnel might improve performance, the FAA has so recommended. The revised ICAO security standards will require contracting states to provide training programs. In the past, the provision of training programs has been discretionary.

The United States provides several opportunities for foreign government representatives to obtain passenger-screening training, as well as other aviation security-related courses, conducted both within the United States and in the host country.

Personnel from the Rome, Athens, and Cairo Airports have participated extensively in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Program. I believe in 1985, more than 130 employees from the

Cairo airport were trained in the United States, taking part in over 11 courses.

Although the details would be more appropriate for discussion in executive session, as I am sure you recognize, I would like to share with you what actions we have taken in light of recent events. The FAA, after consultation with senior representatives of U.S.-flag carriers operating overseas, took the following steps:

U.S. carriers have been required to strengthen security measures at an expanded number of specific locations.

Teams of FAA security agents are being dispatched to several foreign locations which have been determined to require this additional attention. These agents will provide technical assistance to the U.S.-flag carriers operating at those locations, the host aviation authorities, and U.S. Department of State officials.

We have expanded Federal air marshal presence in potential trouble spots throughout the world.

The Department of State issued a priority notice to its posts abroad to generate even a higher level of diplomatic activity to assist the FAA and the U.S. air carriers in their efforts.

The imposition and enforcement of sanctions against offending parties is this Department's ultimate resource in its attempt to match international security measures to the perceived threat levels.

To date, the Secretary of Transportation has not found it necessary to employ these sanctions. However, the Department stands ready to do so if necessary in the event that there is a reduction of security measures affecting the safety of U.S. citizens or aviation interests.

Measures to prevent criminal acts against U.S. aviation interests and our citizens are costly to implement and require the utmost cooperation of domestic and foreign governments, the U.S.-flag air carriers, and the passengers who fly them. The Department of Transportation is grateful to the many individuals and organizations which have contributed to the effectiveness of its efforts thus far.

We have also learned, however, that these improvements do not come without considerable cost. Measures such as positive passenger-baggage match, x ray or physical search of checked baggage, additional passenger screening efforts, and in some cases redundant passenger screening measures individually and collectively, take their toll.

These are considerations that the Department must continuously assess as it attempts to match effective airport security measures against the threat of international criminal acts against U.S. civil aviation interests. But we will not hesitate to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the security of air travelers.

The Department of Transportation appreciates the interest and support of these subcommittees in attempting to apply reasonable security standards to what the world rightly considers to be criminal acts of violence.

ANTITERRORIST LEGISLATION

In that regard, I would like to call attention to the Senate-passed bill, S. 1429, that would authorize prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals. This would do more than just fill a gap in our legal arsenal by making it a crime, prosecutable in U.S. courts, to assault, injure, murder or attempt such terrorist acts against U.S. citizens anywhere in the world.

Most importantly, this act would give our authorities a legal justification to seek out and bring to justice these criminals anywhere in the world. A major step against terrorism would be the enactment of such a measure by the full Congress.

We believe that our program to protect against terrorism here at home would be substantially aided by prompt action on a legislative proposal by the Department which would authorize the Department of Justice to make arrest records available to airport operators and airlines checking the background of potential employees who would have access to secure areas.

Not only do we need such authority at home, for obvious reasons, but also to strengthen our position in international negotiations on the same issues. We are ready and able to work with the appropriate committees to get prompt action on this proposal.

In closing, let me say that I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you again on this important issue, and I further appreciate the subcommittees' expressed willingness to take actions that would help us to combat terrorism.

I would also like to recognize, on the record, the dedicated men and women of the Federal Aviation Administration who are working in every way to assure that this program works. The Federal air marshals, in particular, are prepared to risk their lives to protect air passengers.

This concludes my prepared statement. Mr. Broderick and I will be happy to answer your questions.

[Mr. Scocozza's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF Hon. Matthew V. Scocozza, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on the problem of international terrorism and its effect on aviation security. With me today from the FAA is Anthony Broderick, Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards, who can address questions concerning FAA's Aviation Security Program. I must point out, however, that many of the details of that program must understandably be considered classified or otherwise sensitive information, in order to protect the integrity of our security programs and the lives and safety of airline passengers. Consequently, we may not be able to answer all of your questions fully in this open hearing.

We have been asked to address several specific questions about our security programs, in the aftermath of the tragic explosion on TWA Flight 840 on April 2. You asked specifically for an evaluation of the most recent assessment of foreign airport security at the Cairo, Rome and Athens airports. When I testified before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science on February 19, just over two months ago, I said that the FAA had been visiting and assessing security at those foreign airports currently served by U.S. air carriers, and at those airports that are the last point of departure for foreign air carriers prior to arrival in the U.S. Our policy is to schedule assessments six times a year depending on the airport's threat to U.S. aviation interests. The Cairo, Rome and Athens airports each receive at least six assessments a year.

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