Imagini ale paginilor
PDF
ePub

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

The CCD,56/which meets annually in Geneva, Switzerland, is the principal international forum for the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements. Although the CCD is not an organ of the United Nations, it reports each year to the UN General Assembly and conducts much of its work in response to General Assembly resolutions. The U.S. and Soviet Representatives serve as cochairmen of the CCD.

dele

In

In 1976 the CCD met from February 17 to April 22 and from June 22 to September 3. The U.S. gation was led by Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. addition to formal meetings in which members set forth their views on the questions before it, the CCD conducted and concluded negotiations on a draft convention designed to prohibit environmental warfare; held informal meetings with technical experts on chemical weapons, comprehensive test ban issues, and the Soviet proposal to ban new weapons of mass destruction; and served as the focus of informal consultations among members on various disarmament questions. Among the latter were bilateral talks between the U.S. and Soviet delegations on chemical weapons.

Environmental Modification

During the spring session representatives of 21 countries commented on and recommended changes in the joint text of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques which had been submitted by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on August 21, 1975. For its summer session, the CCD created an environmental modification working group, in which all its active members participated, to conduct negotiations in informal meetings; this group met 29 times between July 2 and September 1.

56 The 31 members of the CCD are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. France has not taken its seat at the CCD and does not participate in the work of the Conference.

Negotiations in the working group focused on the major operative undertaking of the draft convention, as set out in article I(1): "Each state party to this convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other state party." Some delegations favored amendment of the article in order to establish a comprehensive prohibition, while others, including the draft's sponsors, maintained that the "threshold" approach taken in the article would effectively meet the dangers of environmental warfare without setting standards so broad and ambiguous as to create risks of uncertainty over compliance and implementation. After lengthy discussions, the text of article I itself was preserved, while a number of associated understandings were developed. These explanatory understandings were forwarded to the UN General Assembly together with the text of the negotiated draft convention at the end of the CCD's session.

One understanding concerned definitions of the terms "widespread, long-lasting, or severe." "Widespread" was defined as "encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers"; "longlasting" was defined as "lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season"; and "severe" was defined as "involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources, or other assets."

The list of illustrative examples of phenomena that could result from the prohibited use of environmental modification techniques was removed from article II of the convention itself, and placed in another understanding reached at the CCD: "It is the understanding of the Committee that the following examples are illustrative . . . earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere." The understanding said that the listed phenomena could reasonably be expected to result in "widespread, long-lasting or severe destruction, damage or injury," but that the list of examples was not exhaustive. The absence of other phenomena from the list "does not in any way imply that the undertaking contained in article I would not be applicable to those phenomena, provided the criteria set out in that article were met."

In the course of the negotiations a number of

amendments were also made to other parts of the draft convention. Provision was made, for example, for a consultative committee of experts, which could be convened at the request of any party to the convention for the purpose of determining the facts of any situation raising questions about the operation of the convention. Another added provision called for the convening of a conference of parties 5 years after the convention's entry into force to review its effectiveness in meeting the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Another amendment provided for international scientific and economic cooperation in the use of techniques for the preservation, utilization, and improvement of the environment for peaceful purposes.

On September 3, Ambassador Martin declared that the completion of the broadly agreed draft convention was "without doubt, the Committee's most substantial achievement in 1976."

"My delegation is, of course, aware that the modified text is not ideal from all points of view, including ours. It is the product of compromise and accommodation of views inherent in the multilateral negotiating process.

We remain convinced that the convention will effectively eliminate whatever serious dangers might be posed by military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

we think that the threshold, as interpreted in the agreed Committee understanding, raises a very strong practical inhibition against the hostile use of environmental modification techniques having, or that would be expected to have, effects anywhere near the threshold criteria. Given the lack of precise control over such techniques, it is highly unlikely that any party would attempt to use them to cause sub-threshold effects because of the risk of producing destruction, damage, or injury above the threshold.

. . There is no element of permissiveness in the treaty with respect to the use of environmental modification techniques to produce any of the phenomena listed in that understanding [relating to article II]. On the contrary, as is noted in its second paragraph, the hostile use of such techniques to produce any of the phenomena listed would be a violation of the undertaking in article I. The understanding assumes that any such hostile use would, per se, be intended to cause destruction, damage, or injury above the threshold."

Chemical Weapons

In a major statement on April 13, Ambassador Martin said that the United States believed that the objective of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons could not be realized in a single, comprehensive agreement, but that a first-stage agreement should cover all lethal CW agents. Such an initial agreement could restrict particular activities in a variety of ways. It could, for example, (1) require a reduction of existing lethal CW stocks to agreed levels and restrict CW production to replacement within the agreed level; (2) ban all lethal CW production, without affecting existing stocks; (3) ban all lethal CW production and require the destruction of lethal CW stocks in phases, over a specified period of time; or (4) ban all lethal CW production. and require the destruction of a certain amount of lethal CW stocks over a specified period. He noted that this last option, which has been suggested by Canada in 1974, "shows promise and merits serious consideration."

He noted that any phased ban calling for an initial reduction of stocks would contain provisions describing the quantity to be destroyed. This quantity could be expressed in various ways: (1) a certain percentage of lethal CW stocks; (2) an absolute quantity, perhaps expressed in tons; or (3) an unspecified amount, with states conducting stock destruction by mutual example or pursuant to separate bilateral or multilateral agreements. Variations of these three approaches could also be considered. Affirming the inherent difficulty of verifying a ban on CW production, Ambassador Martin concluded his statement with a discussion of various verification techniques, including information exchange and on-site observation of stockpile destruction. He further suggested that "As part of the Committee's examination of verification of a CW production ban and verification of CW stockpile destruction, it might be useful to consider the feasibility and utility of technical exchange visits to selected chemical production or disposal facilities of various types in different countries."

From July 5 through July 8, the CCD conducted a series of informal meetings with technical experts. Reviewing the results of these meetings, Ambassador Martin on July 13 remarked on "the similarity of views on the question of defining the agents subject to limitation or prohibition in an initial CW measure." He concluded that:

"1. There appears to be broad support, perhaps even a consensus, for incorporating a general-purpose criterion in any CW agreement.

"12. The use of toxicity as an additional criterion has general applicability and has received broad support.

"3. The applicability of the other approaches that have been suggested is less general. A judgment on the need for such additional criteria can best be made once a consensus is reached on the types of agents to be covered in an agreement.

"To my knowledge no disagreement on
these key points was expressed during the ex-
perts' discussions.

"A closely related issue concerns the agents to be covered in a first-stage agreement. My delegation and a number of others have expressed the view that less toxic lethal agents should not be exempted from prohibition. .

[ocr errors]

He concluded by noting that much of the discussion had concerned verification, where the technical foundation for the CCD's work was not yet firmly established. "Judging from the views expressed," he said, "there is general recognition of the importance. of verification questions, but as yet no consensus on their solution."

On August 12, the United Kingdom introduced a new draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. On September 3, Ambassador Martin called this "a major event," but noted that there had not been sufficient time for considered comments at that session. Nevertheless, he affirmed that "we are confident that the United Kingdom's initiative will make a very large contribution to our future work in the CW field."

Comprehensive Test Ban and Seismic Cooperation

During the week of April 19, the CCD held a series of informal meetings with technical experts on the subject of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). On April 22, Ambassador Martin outlined the U.S. position:

[ocr errors]

In the absence of a reliable, mutual prohibition, we believe that our nuclear testing program serves as an important means of maintaining the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. However, as representatives of the United States have stated on several previous occasions, we would be prepared to give up whatever benefits exist in continued testing

« ÎnapoiContinuă »