Power, Norms, and Inflation: A Skeptical Treatment

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Transaction Publishers - 307 pagini

Explanations for inflation had for a long time been ceded to the purview of economists. The acceleration in rates of inflation within advanced economies during the 1960s and 1970s, however, prompted sociologists and political scientists to attempt their own accounts for this phenomenon.

There are two major competing explanations of the postwar inflation. One, most commonly held by economists, is that inflation has been produced by governments through a combination of policy errors and cynical manipulation of policy for electoral purposes. The other, often advanced by sociologists and political scientists as an alternative, is that inflation has been an outcome of class conflict. In his study that ranges widely over the literature in the relevant disciplines, Smith examines the strengths and weaknesses of each account, with particular attention to the evidence presented in support of class-conflict explanations. He concludes that, on balance, the policy-error/cynical-manipulation explanation is better supported than its class-conflict rival.

The clarity with which Smith presents these rival accounts and the critical rigor of his scrutiny make this a work of interest to advanced students in macroeconomic theory and to policy makers.

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Pagina 21 - One can rest the monetarist case against activist policy on the proposition that markets always clear and that expectations are rational, but one can also rest it on the much more down-to-earth proposition that we are too ignorant of the structure of the economies we live in and of the manner in which that structure is changing to be able safely to implement activist stabilisation policy in the present environment, or in the foreseeable future.
Pagina 78 - ...The incentives facing an encompassing specialinterest organization are dramatically different from those facing an organization that represents only a narrow segment of society. [...] The members of the highly encompassing organization own so much of the society that they have an important incentive to be actively concerned about how productive it is; they are in the same position as a partner in a firm that has only a few partners'.
Pagina 17 - According to economic theory, the ultimate social cost of anticipated inflation is the wasteful use of resources to economize holdings of currency and other noninterest-bearing means of payment. I suspect that intelligent laymen would be utterly astounded if they realized that this is the great evil economists are talking about. They have imagined a much more devastating cataclysm, with Vesuvius vengefully punishing the sinners below. Extra trips between savings banks and commercial banks? What an...
Pagina 26 - Keynesian orthodoxy is in deep trouble, the deepest kind of trouble in which an applied body of theory can find itself: It appears to be giving seriously wrong answers to the most basic questions of macroeconomic policy'.
Pagina 26 - ... average than a low-inflation decade. We got the high-inflation decade, and with it as clear-cut an experimental discrimination as macroeconomics is ever likely to see, and Friedman and Phelps were right. It really is as simple as that.
Pagina 26 - ... a high inflation decade should not have less unemployment on average than a low-inflation decade. We got the high inflation decade, and with it as clear-cut an experimental discrimination as macroeconomics is ever likely to see, and Friedman and Phelps were right.

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