102. SUPPLEMENT TO TRIPARTITE PROPOSALS FOR FIXING NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ALL ARMED FORCES, AUGUST 12, 1952 6

I. It is contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limitation of armed forces would necessarily comprehend:

(a) provisions to ensure that production of armaments and quantities of armaments bear a direct relation to the amounts needed for permitted armed forces;

(b) provisions for composition of permitted armed forces and armaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might prejudice a balanced reduction;

(c) procedures in conformity with the directive contained in paragraph 6 (b) of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, for the negotiation within over-all limitations of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments with a view to obtaining early agreement on these matters among states with substantial military resources.

Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments to be comprehended within the treaty or treaties referred to in the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952.

II. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating discussions, might be:

(a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper DC/10 with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, arrangements might be made for a conference between China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to reaching tentative agreement among themselves, by negotiation, on:

1. the distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces;

2. the types and quantities of armaments which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings;

3. the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the types and volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic, even for states with substantially equal aggregate military strength, inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreements would be to reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium

66 United Nations Document DC/20, pp. 162-164.

of power dangerous to international peace and security. Such agreements would necessarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of further tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the following paragraph.

(b) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred to in paragraph II (a), regional conferences might be held, to be attended by all governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions, for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on

(1) the over-all numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of the Tripartite Working Paper on numerical limitations,

(2) the distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated categories,

(3) the type and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate to support the permitted armed forces, and

(4) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

(c) Thereafter a draft treaty might be worked out, as contemplated in operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, comprehending and bringing into a balanced relationship all essential components of the programme.

III. The timing and co-ordination of the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations should ensure the balanced reduction of over-all armed strength and should avoid creating or continuing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security during the period that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are being put into effect. In particular, the initial limitations or reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments and the initial steps toward elimination of prohibited armaments should commence at the same time. Subsequent limitations and reductions should be synchronized with subsequent progress in elimination of prohibited armaments. An international control authority should be established at the commencement of the programme and it should be in a position to assume progressively its functions in order to ensure the carrying out of such limitations, reductions, curtailments and prohibitions. Thus, when the limitations and reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments provided by the treaty or treaties are completed, production of prohibited armaments will have ceased, existing stockpiles of prohibited armaments and facilities for their production will have been disposed of, atomic energy will be utilized for peaceful purposes only, and the international control authority will have assumed its full functions.

103. REGULATION, LIMITATION, AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 28, 1953"

The General Assembly,

67

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for considering the problem of disarmament and affirming the need of providing for; (a) The regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(b) The elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

(c) The effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

the whole programme to be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered,

Believing that the continued development of weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs has given additional urgency to efforts to bring about effectively controlled disarmament throughout the world, as the existence of civilization itself may be at stake,

Mindful, that progress in the settlement of existing international disputes and the resulting re-establishment of confidence are vital to the attainment of peace and disarmament and that efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament programme with adequate safeguards should be made concurrently with progress in the settlement of international disputes,

Believing that progress in either field would contribute to progress in the other,

Realizing that competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of Member States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace,

Conscious of the continuing desire of all nations, by lightening the burden of armaments, to release more of the world's human and economic resources for peace,

Having received the third report of the Disarmament Commission of 20 August 1953, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953,

Endorsing the Commission's hope that recent international events will create a more propitious atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament question, the capital importance of which, in conjunction with other questions affecting the maintenance of peace, is recognized by all,

1. Recognizes the general wish and affirms its earnest desire to reach agreement as early as possible on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and all such other weapons of war and mass destruction, and for the attainment of these ends through effective measures;

ST United Nations Document A/Resolution/160 VIII.

2. Recognizes that, whatever the weapons used, aggression is contrary to the conscience and honour of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations and is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world;

3. Takes note of the third report of the Disarmament Commission; 4. Requests the Commission to continue its efforts to reach an agreement on the problems with which it is concerned, taking into consideration proposals made at the eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report again to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

5. Calls on all Member States, and particularly the major Powers, to intensify their efforts to assist the Disarmament Commission in its tasks and to submit to the Commission any proposals which they have to make in the field of disarmament;

6. Suggests that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible, in order that the Commission may study and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954;

7. Further suggests to the Disarmament Commission, in order to facilitate the progress of its work, to arrange for the sub-committee, when established, to hold its private meetings as appropriate in the different countries most concerned with the problem.

104. ATOMIC POWER FOR PEACE: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 8, 1953*

MADAME PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address this General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and of France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world.

During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly.

Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confidence expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well being for all men.

es Department of State Publication 5314, pp. 1-14.

Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so cleanly etched in your Charter.

Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity merely to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes.

A DANGER SHARED BY ALL

I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many monthsthoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all-and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all.

Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new— one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use.

That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

THE FEARFUL POTENTIALS

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world's first atomic explosion.

Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted 42 test explosions.

Atomic bombs today are more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States' stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equívalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World War II.

A single air group, whether afloat or land-based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II.