4. Cases initiated under that act, but not completed, by final proof, until
after the passage of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. 1095,
were left by the latter act, as to the price to be paid for the lands
entered, to be governed by the law in force at the time the entry was
made. lb.
5. A voluntary relinquishment of his entry by a homestead entryman
made in 1864 was a relinquishment of his claim to the United States,
and operated to restore the land to the public domain. Keane v. Bryg-
ger, 276.
6. Prior to 1864 H. made a homestead entry of the land in controversy in
this action. In February, 1864, he relinquished his right, title, and
interest in the same. In March, 1864, the University Commissioners
of Washington Territory, under the act of July 17, 1854, c. 84, selected
this as part of the Territory's lands for university purposes, and on
the 10th day of that month conveyed the tract to R., who, on the 4th
of April, 1876, conveyed it to B. Held, that the title so acquired
should prevail over a title acquired by homestead entry in October,
1888. Ib.
7. The Indian reservation at Sault Ste. Marie, under the treaty of June 26,
1820, with the Chippewas, continued until extinguished by the treaty
of August 2, 1855; and upon the extinguishment of the Indian title
at that time the land included in the reservation was made, by § 10
of the act of September 4, 1841, not subject to preemption. Spalding
v. Chandler, 394.
RAILROAD.
1. A force of five men, in the night service of a railroad company, was
employed in uncoupling from the rear of trains cars which were to be
sent elsewhere, and in attaching other cars in their places. The force
was under the orders of O., who directed G. what cars to uncouple,
and K. what cars to couple. As the train backed down, G. uncoupled
a car as directed. K. in walking to the car which was to be attached
to the train in its place, caught his foot in a switch and fell across the
track. As the train was moving towards him he called out. The
engine was stopped, but the rear car, having been uncoupled by G.,
continued moving on, and passed over him, inflicting severe injuries.
K. sued the railroad company to recover damages for the injuries thus
received. Held, that K. and O. were fellow-servants, and that the rail-
road company was not responsible for any negligence of O. in not plac-
ing himself at the brake of the uncoupled car. Central Railroad Co.
v. Keegan, 259.
2. In an action against a railroad company brought by one of its employés
to recover damages for injuries inflicted while on duty, where the evi-
dence is conflicting it is the province of the jury to pass upon the
questions of negligence; but where the facts are undisputed or clearly
preponderant, they are questions of law, for the court. Southern
Pacific Company v.
Pool, 438.
3. In this case, after a review of the undisputed facts, it is held that there
can be no doubt that the injury which formed the ground for this
action was the result of the inexcusable negligence of the company's
servant. Ib.
PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
REASONABLE DOUBT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 20.
REHEARING.
See PRACTICE, 3.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. An action commenced May 27, 1889, in the District Court of the Terri-
tory of Idaho, before the admission of Idaho as a State, by a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Washington Territory, against a
corporation organized under the laws of Montana Territory, and
against a railroad company organized under the laws of the United
States, upon which latter company service had been made and filed,
was, after the admission of Idaho as a State, removable to the Circuit
Court of the United States for that circuit both upon the ground of
diversity of citizenship of the territorial corporations, and upon the
ground that the railroad company was incorporated under a law of the
United States; and, so far as the latter ground of removal is con-
cerned, it is not affected by the fact that the railroad company after-
wards ceased to take an active part in the case, as the jurisdictional
question must be determined by the record at the time of the transfer.
Washington & Idaho Railroad Co. v. Cœur d'Alene Railway & Naviga-
tion Co., 77.
2. The decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that the Missouri
Pacific company could not maintain its claim for damages because its
possession had not been disturbed or its title questioned, involved no
Federal question; and where a decision of a state court thus rests on
independent ground, not involving a Federal question, and broad
enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dismissed
by this court, without considering any Federal question that may also
have been presented. Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Fitzgerald,
3. In deciding adversely to the claim of the plaintiff in error that by rea-
son of the process of garnishment in attachment against the Missouri
Pacific company, in the action removed to the Circuit Court from the
state court, the Circuit Court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
moneys due the Construction company from the Pacific company,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska did not so pass upon a Federal ques-
tion as to furnish ground for the interposition of this court. Íb.
4. In appointing a receiver of the Construction company to collect the
amount of the decree against the Missouri Pacific company, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska denied no Federal right of the Missouri
Pacific company. Ib.
5. When a party to an action in a state court moves there for its removal
to the Circuit Court of the United States, and the motion is denied,
and the party nevertheless files the record in the Circuit Court, and
the Circuit Court proceeds to final hearing, (the state court meanwhile
suspending all action,) and remands the case to the state court, the
order refusing the removal worked no prejudice, and the error, in that
regard, if any, was immaterial. Ib.
6. An order of the Circuit Court remanding a cause cannot be reviewed
in this court by any direct proceeding for that purpose. Ib.
7. If a state court proceeds to judgment in a cause notwithstanding an
application for removal, its ruling in retaining the case will be review-
able here after final judgment under Rev. Stat. § 709. Ib.
8. If a case be removed to the Circuit Court and a motion to remand be
made and denied, then after final judgment the action of the Circuit
Court in refusing to remand may be reviewed here on error or appeal.
Ib.
9. If the Circuit Court and the state court go to judgment, respectively,
each judgment is open to revision in the appropriate mode. Ib.
10. If the Circuit Court remands a cause and the state court thereupon
proceeds to final judgment, the action of the Circuit Court is not
reviewable on writ of error to such judgment. lb.
11. A state court cannot be held to have decided against a Federal right
when it is the Circuit Court, and not the state court, which has denied
its possession. Ib.
Whether an instrument is under seal or not is a question for the court
upon inspection; but whether a mark or character shall be held to be
a seal, depends upon the intention of the executant, as shown by the
paper. Jacksonville, Mayport &c. Railway v. Hooper, 514.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. When a court of law is construing an instrument, whether a public law
or a private contract, it is legitimate, if two constructions are fairly
possible, to adopt that one which equity would favor. Washington §
Idaho Railroad Co. v. Cœur d'Alene Railway & Navigation Co., 77.
2. When the practice in a department in interpreting a statute is uniform,
and the meaning of the statute, upon examination, is found to be
doubtful or obscure, this court will accept the interpretation by the
department as the true one; but where the departmental practice has
not been uniform, the court must determine for itself what is the true
interpretation. United States v. Healey, 136.
See EMINENT DOMAIN;
JURISDICTION, B, 1.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
CORPORATION, 1;
CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11;
EVIDENCE, 3, 5;
HABEAS CORPUS, 1, 2, 5;
INDICTMENT, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 7, 11, 12, 13;
B, 3; D, 1 to 6.
LIGHT-HOUSE, 1, 2;
NATIONAL BANK;
PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 7;
UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-
PANY, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7.
UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
1. The objects which Congress sought to accomplish by the act of July 1,
1862, c. 120, 12 Stat. 489, granting a subsidy to aid in the construc-
tion of both a railroad and a telegraph line from the Missouri River
to the Pacific Ocean, and by the act of July 2, 1864, c. 216, 13 Stat.
356, amendatory thereof, were the construction, the maintenance and
the operation of both a railroad and a telegraph line between those
two points; the governmental aid was extended for the purpose of
accomplishing all these important results; and there is nothing in
subsequent legislation to indicate a change of this purpose. United
States v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 1.
2. The provisions in those acts permitting the railroad company to ar-
range with certain telegraph companies for placing their lines upon
and along the route of the railroad, and its branches, did not affect
the authority of Congress, under its reserved power, to require the
maintenance and operation by the railroad company itself, through
its own officers and employés, of a telegraph line over and along its
main line and branches. Ib.
3. An arrangement between the railroad company and the telegraph
company, such as was permitted by the 19th section of the act of
July 1, 1862, and by the 4th section of the act of July 2, 1864,
c. 220, known as the Idaho Act, could have no other effect than to
relieve the railroad company from any present duty itself to con-
struct a telegraph line to be used under the franchises granted and
for the purposes indicated by Congress. No arrangement of the char-
acter indicated by Congress could have been made except in view of
the possibility of the exercise by Congress of the power reserved to
add to, or amend the act that permitted such arrangement. Ib.
4. It was not competent for Congress under its reserved power to
add to, alter, or amend these acts, to impose upon the railroad com-
pany duties wholly foreign to the objects for which it was created or
for which governmental aid was given, nor, by any alteration or
amendment of those acts, destroy rights actually vested, nor disturb
transactions fully consummated. With the policy of such legislation
the courts have nothing to do. Ib.
5. The provision in the act of August 7, 1888, c. 772, 25 Stat. 382, re-
quiring all railroad and telegraph companies to which the United
States have granted subsidies, to "forthwith and henceforward, by
and through their own respective corporate officers and employés,
maintain and operate, for railroad, governmental, commercial, and all
other purposes, telegraph lines, and exercise by themselves alone all
the telegraph franchises conferred upon them and obligations assumed
by them under the acts making the grants," is a valid exercise of the
power reserved by Congress. Ib.
6. Since the passage of the act of July 24, 1866, c. 230, the provisions of
which were embodied in the Revised Statutes Title LXV., Tele-
graphs, no railroad company operating a post-road of the United
States, over which interstate commerce is carried on, can bind itself,
by agreement, to exclude from its roadway any telegraph company,
incorporated under the laws of a State, that has accepted the pro-
visions of that act, and desires to use such roadway for its line in
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