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of the parties of the letter written by the Memphis firm and the set-
tlement made by the latter after it. Ib.
1. When a case has once been decided by this court on appeal, and re-
manded to the Circuit Court, that court must execute the decree of
this court according to the mandate. If it does not, its action may be
controlled, either by a new appeal, or by writ of mandamus; but it
may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate, and
its decision of such matters can be reviewed by a new appeal only.
The opinion delivered by this court, at the time of rendering its decree,
may be consulted to ascertain what was intended by the mandate; and,
either upon an application for a writ of mandamus, or upon a new
appeal, it is for this court to construe its own mandate. In re San-
ford Fork & Tool Co., 247.
2. When the Circuit Court, at a hearing upon exceptions to an answer in
equity, sustains the exceptions, and (the defendant electing to stand
by his answer) enters a final decree for the plaintiff; and this court,
upon appeal, orders that decree to be reversed, and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion,
the plaintiff is entitled to file a replication, and may be allowed by the
Circuit Court to amend his bill. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See RAILROAD, 1.
See OFFICERS IN THE NAVY.
1. The decree and complaint, taken together, fully describe and furnish
ample means for identification of the property to which the defend-
ant in error was adjudged to be entitled. Haws v. Victoria Copper
Mining Co., 303.
2. The contention that the complaint did not aver a discovery of a
vein or lode prior to the location under which the plaintiffs in error
claim is wholly without merit. Ib.
3. Likewise is the contention without merit that the discovery under
which the defendant in error claims was of only one vein. Ib.
4. Possession alone is adequate against a mere intruder or trespasser,
without even color of title, and especially so against one who has
taken possession by force and violence. Ib.
See BOUNDary Line.
In 1868, Y., a citizen of Louisiana, being then married, mortgaged his
interest in certain real estate in that State to E. H., his wife joining
in the mortgage. In 1870 the father of Mrs. Y. died, leaving a policy
of insurance in her favor. Y. collected this sum and converted it to
his own use and the use of the community. In 1876, by a transac-
tion between Y. and the residuary legatee of E. H., who was also in-
debted to Y., her said indebtedness was discharged, and Y.'s interest
in that mortgage was assigned to Mrs. Y. in replacement of her para-
phernal moneys and property, so secured and converted by her hus-
band. In 1881 Mrs. Y. became entitled to a further sum, on the final
settlement of her father's estate, which was in like manner received
by Y., and converted to his own use and that of the community. In
1881, on the petition of Mrs. Y., filed in 1881 in a suit against her
husband for a dissolution of the community and a separation of
property, a decree to that effect was made by the state court; and
it was further adjudged and decreed that Y. was indebted to Mrs. Y.
in the sums so received by him from her father's estate, with recogni-
tion of mortgage on the property described, and the property be
sold to satisfy said judgment and costs. In 1882, in order to en-
able Y. to borrow from N. & Co., Mrs. Y. executed a mandate and
power of attorney, authorizing the cancelling and erasure of the
mortgage to E. H. What was done under that power was afterwards
claimed by Y. and by Mrs. Y. not to amount to such cancellation, and
by N. & Co. to be effective. A mortgage to N. & Co. was then exe-
cuted by Y., and the inscription of Mrs. Y.'s mortgage was then re-
newed. In 1883 N. & Co. commenced proceedings to foreclose their
mortgage, (Mrs. Y. not being made a party to the suit,) and obtained
a decree of foreclosure in 1886. The property was duly appraised
according to the law of Louisiana, and at the sale no sufficient bid
was made. It was then advertised for sale on a credit of twelve
months. In 1887, Y. notified the marshal that Mrs. Y. had an incum-
brance on the property prior to the mortgage to N. & Co., (stating
the amount of it,) and that a sale for less than that amount would
be invalid. Notwithstanding this notice, a sale was made for a less
sum. This sale was attacked by Y. and Mrs. Y. by various proceed-
ings set forth in the opinion of the court, which resulted in a decree
setting aside the sale, and adjudging that the attempted renunciation
by Mrs. Y. of her special mortgage was invalid, and that that mort-
gage should be recognized as the first mortgage on the property, supe-
rior in rank to the mortgage of N. & Co. Held, (1) That Mrs. Y.
must stand upon her legal mortgage, resulting from the receipt of
her paraphernal property, and recognized by the judgment of 1881,
decreeing a separation of property; or upon a judicial mortgage aris-
ing from that judgment; or on the contract between herself and the
residuary legatee of E. H.; (2) That if her mortgage be held to be
legal or judicial, its existence was not a bar to the confirmation of
a sale for an amount insufficient to satisfy it, and that it could not
rank the special conventional mortgage of N. & Co.; (3) That by
the transaction between the residuary legatee of E. H. and Mrs. Y.,
the respective debts were discharged by agreement and compensated
each other, and when the principal obligation was thus discharged,
the mortgage fell with it, and would not be revived, although the
indebtedness were reacknowledged; (4) That the decree below should
be reversed. Nalle v. Young, 624.
See EQUITY, 4.
The single fact that the statutes of Kansas regulating the assessment and
taxation of shares in national banks permit some debts to be deducted
from some moneyed capital, but not from that which is invested in the
shares of national banks, is not sufficient to show that the amount of
moneyed capital in the State of Kansas from which debts may be de-
ducted, as compared with the moneyed capital invested in shares of
national banks, is so large and substantial as to amount to an illegal
discrimination against national bank shareholders, in violation of the
provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5219. First National Bank of Garnett v.
See OFFICERS IN THE NAVY.
See RAILROAD, 2, 3.
This case comes within the general rule that the allowance or refusal of a
new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the appli-
cation is addressed. Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 303.
1. Where land is used for the purpose of a home, and is jointly occupied
by husband and wife, neither of whom has title by record, a person
proposing to purchase is bound to make some inquiry as to their title.
Kirby v. Tallmadge, 379.
2. The possession of real estate in the District of Columbia, under appar-
ent claim of ownership, is notice to purchasers of the interest the per-
son in possession has in the fee, whether legal or equitable in its nature,
and of all facts which the proposed purchaser might have learned by
due inquiry. Ib.
3. The principle applies with peculiar cogency to a case like the present,
where the slightest inquiry would have revealed the facts, and where
the purchaser deliberately turned his back upon every source of infor-
mation; and a purchase made under such circumstances does not
clothe the vendee with the rights of a bona fide purchaser without
OFFICERS IN THE NAVY.
Mates are petty officers, and as such are entitled to rations or commutation
therefor. United States v. Fuller, 593.
PATENT FOR INVENTION.
The inventions claimed in the third and fourth claims of letters patent
No. 339,913 dated April 13, 1886, issued to Harry C. McCarty for an
improvement in car trucks, if not void for want of novelty, as the ap-
plication of an old process or machine to a similar or analogous subject,
with no change in the manner of application, and no result substan-
tially distinct in its nature, were inventions of such a limited character
as to require a narrow construction; and, being so construed, the letters
patent are not infringed by the bolsters used by the appellee. McCarty
v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 110.
See ESTOPPEL, 2, 3, 4.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
1. There is nothing in this case to take it out of the ruling in Isaacs v.
United States, 159 U. S. 487, that an application for a continuance is
not ordinarily subject to review by thi court. Goldsby v. United
2. The court below can, before a new trial, authorize the allegation as to
the decision by the Secretary of War upon the necessity of taking the
land to be amended, if necessary. United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Company, 668.
3. The court adheres to its opinion and decision in this case, 159 U. S. 349,
and corrects an error of statement in that opinion, which in no way
affects the conclusions there reached. Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad
Co. v. United States, 686.
See ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR;
CRIMINAL LAW, 11;
JURISDICTION, B, 3;
MANDATE, 1, 2;
See EVIDENCE, 9.
1. The provision in the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, grant-
ing the right of way through the public lands of the United States to
any railroad duly organized under the laws of any State or Territory,
which shall have filed with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its
articles of incorporation and due proofs of its organization under the
same, plainly means that no corporation can acquire a right of way
upon a line not described in its charter or articles of incorporation.
Washington & Idaho Railroad Co. v. Cœur d'Alene Railway & Navi-
gation Co., 77.
2. A railroad company whose road is laid out so as, under the provisions
of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, entitled "An act granting
to railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United
States," to cross a part of such public unsurveyed domain, cannot take
part thereof in the actual possession and occupation of a settler, who
is entitled to claim a preëmption right thereto when the proper time
shall come, and who has made improvements on the land so occupied
by him, without making proper compensation therefor. Washington
& Idaho Railroad Co. v. Osborn, 103.
3. The act of March 3, 1877, c. 107, 19 Stat. 377, providing for the sale of
desert lands in certain States and Territories, does not embrace alter-
nate sections, reserved to the United States, along the lines of rail-
roads for the construction of which Congress has made grants of lands.
United States v. Healey, 136.