sioner of Pensions,” taken together with a certificate signed by the
Secretary of the Interior and under the seal of that Department, certi-
fying to the official character of the Commissioner of Pensions, is a
substantial compliance with the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 882, and
authorizes the paper so certified to be admitted in evidence. Ballew
v. United States, 187.
6. Sundry exceptions as to the rulings of the court upon the admissibility
of testimony considered, and held to be immaterial, or unfounded.
Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 303.
7. Certain testimony held not to prejudice the defendants, but rather
tending to bear in their favor, if at all material. Pierce v. United
States, 355.
8. Confessions are not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the parties
are in custody, provided they are not extorted by inducements or
threats. Ib.
9. When one party to an action has in his exclusive possession a knowl-
edge of facts which would tend, if disclosed, to throw light upon the
transactions which form the subject of controversy, his failure to
offer them in evidence may afford presumptions against him. Kirby
v. Tallmadge, 379.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 13, 14, 21;
ESTOPPEL, 1;
LOCAL LAW, 3.
EXTRADITION.
See HABEAS CORPUS, 3.
FLEEING FROM JUSTICE.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See EQUITY, 2.
1. Under section 753 of the Revised Statutes, the courts of the United
States have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of
inquiring into the cause of restraint of liberty of any person in jail, in
custody under the authority of a State, in violation of the Constitution
or of a law or treaty of the United States; but, except in cases of
peculiar urgency, will not discharge the prisoner in advance of a final
determination of his case in the courts of the State; and, even after
such final determination in those courts, will generally leave the peti-
tioner to his remedy by writ of error from this court. Whitten v.
Tomlinson, 231.
2. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, verified by oath, as required
by Rev. Stat. § 754, only distinct and unambiguous allegations of fact,
not denied by the return, nor controlled by other evidence, can be
assumed to be admitted. Ib.
3. A warrant of extradition of the Governor of a State, issued upon the
requisition of the Governor of another State, accompanied by a copy
of an indictment, is prima facie evidence, at least, that the accused
had been indicted and was a fugitive from justice; and, when the
court in which the indictment was found had jurisdiction of the
offence, is sufficient to make it the duty of the courts of the United
States to decline interposition by writ of habeas corpus, and to leave
the question of the lawfulness of the detention of the prisoner, in the
State in which he was indicted, to be inquired into and determined,
in the first instance, by the courts of the State. Ib.
4. A prisoner in custody under authority of a State will not be discharged
by a court of the United States by writ of habeas corpus, because an
indictment against him lacked the words "a true bill," or was found
by the grand jury by mistake or misconception; or because a mitti-
mus issued by a justice of the peace, under a statute of the State, upon
application of a surety on a recognizance, and affidavit that the prin-
cipal intended to abscond, does not conform to that statute. Ib.
5. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, verified by the petitioner's oath
as required by Rev. Stat. § 754, facts duly alleged may be taken to be
true, unless denied by the return or controlled by other evidence; but
no allegation of fact in the petition can be assumed to be admitted,
unless distinct and unambiguous. Kohl v. Lehlback, 293.
6. General allegations in such a petition that the petitioner is detained in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the
particular State, and is held without due process of law, are averments
of conclusions of law, and not of matters of fact. Ib.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7;
INDIAN DEPREDATIONS.
See JURISDICTION, D.
INDIAN RESERVATION.
See PUBLIC LAND, 7.
INDICTMENT.
1. An indictment for perjury in a deposition made before a special exam-
iner of the pension bureau which charges the oath to have been wil-
fully and corruptly taken before a named special examiner of the
Pension Bureau of the United States, then and there a competent
officer, and having lawful authority to administer said oath, is suffi-
cient to inform the accused of the official character and authority of
the officer before whom the oath was taken. Markham v. United States,
319.
2. In such an indictment it is not necessary to set forth all the details or
facts involved in the issue as to the materiality of the statement, and
as to the authority of the Commissioner of Pensions to institute the
inquiry in which the deposition of the accused was taken. 1b.
3. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 1025 that "no indictment found and pre-
sented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other court of the
United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judg-
ment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect
or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the
prejudice of the defendant," is not to be interpreted as dispensing
with the requirement in § 5396 that an indictment for perjury must
set forth the substance of the offence charged. Ib.
4. An indictment for perjury that does not set forth the substance of the
offence will not authorize judgment upon verdict of guilty. Dunbar
v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, affirmed. Ib.
5. When two counts in an indictment for murder differ from each other
only in stating the manner in which the murder was committed, the
question whether the prosecution shall be compelled to elect under
which it will proceed is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court.
Pierce v. United States, 355.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 10;
HABEAS CORPUS, 3, 4.
INSOLVENT DEBTOR.
See LOCAL LAW, 1 to 7.
JUDGMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
JURISDICTION.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. In the trial of a person accused of crime the exercise by the trial court
of its discretion to direct or refuse to direct witnesses for the defend-
ant to be summoned at the
ject to review by this court.
2. Where the record shows that the only matter tried and decided in the
Circuit Court was a demurrer to a plea to the jurisdiction, and the
petition upon which the writ of error was allowed asked only for
the review of the judgment that the court had no jurisdiction of the
action, the question of jurisdiction alone is sufficiently certified to this
court, as required by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5. Interior
Construction & Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 217.
expense of the United States is not sub-
Goldsby v. United States, 70.
3. In an action brought in a state court against a railroad company for
ejecting the plaintiff from a car, the defence was that a silver coin,
offered by him in payment of his fare, was so abraded as to be no
longer legal tender. The Supreme Court of the State, after referring
to the Congressional legislation on the subject, held that, "so long as
a genuine silver coin is worn only by natural abrasion, is not appre-
ciably diminished in weight, and retains the appearance of a coin duly
issued from the mint, it is a legal tender for its original value." The
railroad company, although denying the plaintiff's claim, set up no
right under any statute of the United States in reference to the effect
of the reduction in weight of silver coin by natural abrasion. Judg-
ment being given for plaintiff, the railroad company sued out a writ
of error for its review. Held, that this court was without jurisdiction.
Jersey City & Bergen Railroad Co. v. Morgan, 288.
4. On an appeal from a judgment of a territorial court, this court is lim-
ited to determining whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain
the judgment rendered, and to reviewing the rulings of the court on
the admission or rejection of testimony, when exceptions thereto have
been duly taken. Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 303.
5. In an action in the state courts of New York against the collector of
the port of New York, the health officer of that port, and the owners
of warehouses employed for public storage, to recover damages suf-
fered by an importer of rags by reason of their having been ordered
to the warehouses by the collector and disinfected there, and detained
until the charges for disinfection and storage were paid, a ruling by
the highest court of the State that the direction of the collector to
send the rags to the storehouses was pursuant to the requirement that
they should be disinfected, and was in aid of the health officer in the
execution of his official power by the observance of the regulations
made by him—that the collector gave no order for their disinfection
that the health officer gave no such order-that the defendants
assumed to disinfect them without authority, and hence that their
charges were illegal - but that, as the collector had properly sent the
goods to the warehouses for such action as the health authorities
might see fit to take, the plaintiffs became liable for storage and light-
erage, presents no Federal question for review by this court. Bartlett
v. Lockwood, 357.
6. As this appeal was taken long after the act establishing the Circuit
Courts of Appeals went into effect, and as there is an entire absence
of a certificate of a question of jurisdiction, the appeal is dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. In re Lehigh Mining Co., 156 U. S. 322, and
Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 628, distinguished from this case. Van
Wagenen v. Sewall, 369.
7. Even if an examination of the record would have disclosed a question
of jurisdiction, which is very doubtful, this court cannot be required
to search the record for it; as it was the object of the fifth section of
the act of 1891 to have the question of jurisdiction plainly and dis-
tinctly certified, or at least to have it appear so clearly in the decree
of the court below that no other question was involved, that no
further examination of the record would be necessary. Ib.
8. The decree, to review which this writ of error was sued out, was not a
final decree, and this court cannot take jurisdiction. Union Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 374.
9. The rule is well nigh universal that, if a case be remanded by an ap-
pellate court to the court below for further judicial proceedings, in
conformity with the opinion of the appellate court, the decree is not
final.
10. This court has no power to review a decision of a state court that the
averments of an answer in a pending case set forth no defence to the
plaintiff's claim. Iowa Central Railway Co. v. Iowa, 389.
11. If a defendant, among other defences, in various forms, and upon
several grounds, objects to the jurisdiction of the court, and final
judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, and, upon a petition referring
to all the proceedings in detail, and asking for a review of all the
rulings of the court upon the question of jurisdiction raised in the
papers on file, a writ of error is allowed generally, without formally
certifying or otherwise specifying a definite question of jurisdiction,
no question of jurisdiction is sufficiently certified to this court under
the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5. Chappell v. United States, 499.
12. Upon a writ of error under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, in a
case in which the constitutionality of a law of the United States was
drawn in question, this court has power to dispose of the whole case,
including all questions, whether of jurisdiction or of merits. Ib.
13. If the decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals is final under the sixth
section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, a decree upon an inter-
vention in the same suit must be regarded as equally so; and even if
the decree on such proceedings may be in itself independent of the
controversy between the original parties, yet if the proceedings are
entertained in the Circuit Court because of its possession of the sub-
ject of the ancillary or supplemental application, the disposition of
the latter must partake of the finality of the main decree, and cannot
be brought here on the theory that the Circuit Court exercised juris-
diction independently of the ground of jurisdiction which was orig-
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