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Opinion of the Court.
method of doing said business was as follows: As many places as the Chief Signal Service Officer desired should receive the said Signal Service report were connected upon one continuous line of telegraph called a 'circuit,' and the said reports were then sent over this wire, and at each point where said reports were received an operator took the said reports; each of said points thus receiving the report being called a 'drop,' and all of said points receiving the said reports at the same time; that by reason of this method of sending reports, a specially low rate was made therefor, the said rate being fixed by the Postmaster General in the circulars issued annually, and upon the basis of amount of matter and number of drops, and extent of circuits. That the circuits for the transmission of said Signal Service reports were made up between the points named in the account in this action, and included intermediate points or drops in each case; that the amount sought to be recovered in this action is such proportionate amount of the whole amount paid as the distance along the bonded portion of the telegraph lines upon the said line or lines of railway bears to the whole distance over which such messages or reports were sent."
Such is the case made by the record now before the court.
It is clear, under the acts of 1862, 1864, and 1878, that the Government was entitled to retain, and to apply as directed by Congress, all sums due on account of services rendered in its behalf, by any railroad company named in those acts, that had received the aid of the United States in the construction of its railroad and telegraph lines. All such sums were set apart by Congress for the payment of the principal and interest of any bonds delivered by the United States to such company. The Government could, therefore, have retained and applied, as in the acts of Congress required, all sums due from it on account of messages sent or received by it over the telegraph line constructed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Sinking Fund cases, 99 U. S. 700. No agreement between that company and the Western Union Telegraph Company, transferring to the latter the control of the tele
Opinion of the Court.
graph line constructed by the railroad company, could affect the rights of the United States.
If it distinctly appeared that the amount sued for was only the aggregate of sums originally due from the United States, on account of public messages passing over the telegraph lines constructed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, we should have no difficulty in sustaining the present claim of the Government. But no such state of case is presented by the record. It does not even appear that the Government, prior to the period covering the account in suit, requested the telegraph company to so keep its books as to show what messages sent or received on public business were transmitted over the telegraph line constructed by the railroad company on its route. Nor does it appear that any such account was kept by the Government.
It is agreed to be now impossible to show over what particular wire or wires-whether those belonging to the Western Union Telegraph Company or those belonging to the Union Pacific Railway Company - the messages set out in the Government's bill of particulars were, in fact, transmitted. Nothing more definite appears than that "a part" - how much cannot be now known—were sent over the wires originally established by the railroad company, and "the balance" how much cannot be shown over the wires owned by the telegraph company.
It is because of the impossibility of now distinguishing between these two classes of messages, that this action proceeds, and can only proceed, upon the theory that the length which the telegraph line, constructed by the railroad company, bears to the entire distance, in whatever part of the United States, from the point of origin of a telegraph message to the point of its destination, measures the proportion which might have been rightfully retained by the Government of the entire sum earned by the telegraph company for transmitting and delivering such messages.
According to this theory, the presumption must be indulged that every message delivered to the telegraph company for transmission, and which passed over the whole or some part
Opinion of the Court.
of the general route of the Union Pacific Railway, passed over the telegraph line constructed on the north side of that route by the railroad company, but operated by the telegraph company, rather than over the line, on the south side of that route, owned by the telegraph company. No such presumption can be justified upon any principle of right or justice.
The telegraph company had a line of its own on the right of way of the railway company, with the consent of the United States. It accepted the provisions of the act of Congress giving the Postmaster General authority to fix the rates to be charged for any business transacted for the Government. But it neither expressly nor impliedly agreed that, when no directions in the matter were given by the representative of the Government, it would transmit all messages, on behalf of the Government, from or to points on either side of the route of the Union Pacific Railway, over the telegraph line constructed by the railroad company, rather than over the line owned by itself. In the absence of such directions, the telegraph company was at liberty to send such messages over its own line at the rates established by the Postmaster General. If it did so, the Government was probably benefited rather than injured; for the rates fixed by the Postmaster General were less than the ordinary rates, known as commercial rates, charged against private persons, and which the railway company, by its charter, was entitled to charge for public messages sent over its telegraph line. If, in the absence of any direction not to do so, the telegraph company actually used, for the purpose of transmitting a public message, the line constructed by the railroad company, there can be no doubt that the sum due therefor could be retained by the United States and applied as indicated in the act of 1878; for the telegraph company, notwithstanding the agreement of July 1, 1881, would be bound to take notice of the fact that that telegraph line was constructed with the aid of the Government, and that its earnings on account of public business were dedicated by Congress to specific purposes.
It results that, although the United States was entitled to retain and apply, as directed by Congress, all sums due from
160 70 40 L-ed 343
Statement of the Case.
the Government, on account of the use by the telegraph company, for public business, of the telegraph line constructed by the railroad company, the entire absence of proof as to the extent to which that line was, in fact, so used, renders it impossible to ascertain the amount improperly paid to, and without right retained by, the telegraph company, and subsequently divided between it and the railroad company. Upon this ground, we adjudge that the court below did not err in directing a verdict for the defendants.
The judgment is
40 L-ed 343 GOLDSBY, alias Cherokee Bill, v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
No. 620. Submitted October 21, 1895. - Decided December 2, 1895.
There is nothing in this case to take it out of the ruling in Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487, that an application for a continuance is not ordinarily subject to review by this court.
In the trial of a person accused of crime the exercise by the trial court of its discretion to direct or refuse to direct witnesses for the defendant to be summoned at the expense of the United States is not subject to review by this court.
Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 57, 61, affirmed and applied to a question raised in this case.
While it is competent, if a proper foundation has been laid, to impeach a witness by proving statements made by him, that cannot be done by proving statements made by another person, not a witness in the case.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to allow the introduction of evidence, obviously rebuttal, even if it should have been more properly introduced in the opening, and, in the absence of gross abuse, its exercise of this discretion is not reviewable.
Rev. Stat. § 1033 does not require notice to be given of the names of witnesses, called in rebuttal.
If the defendant in a criminal case wishes specific charges as to the weight to be attached in law to testimony introduced to establish an alibi, he may ask the court to give them; and, if he fails to do so, the failure by the court to give such instruction cannot be assigned as error.
THE plaintiff was indicted on the 8th of February, 1895,
Statement of the Case.
for the murder of Ernest Melton, a white man and not an Indian. The crime was charged to have been committed at the "Cherokee Nation in the Indian country on the 18th day of November, 1894." Prior to empanelling the jury on the 23d of February, 1895, the accused filed two affidavits for continuance until the next term of court. The first, filed on the 12th of February, 1895, based on the ground that for some time prior to the finding of the indictment the defendant had been in jail, was sick, and unable properly to prepare his defence, and that he was informed if further time were given him, there were witnesses, whose names were not disclosed in the application, who could be produced to establish that he was not guilty as charged. This was overruled. The second was filed on the 22d day of February, upon the ground that four witnesses, whom the court had allowed to be summoned at government expense, were not in attendance, and that there were others, whose names were given, who could prove his innocence, and who could be produced if the case were continued until the next term of court; the affidavit made no statement that the four witnesses had been actually found at the places indicated, and gave no reason for their non-attendance, and asked no compulsory process to secure it.
Before the trial the accused filed three requests for leave to summon a number of witnesses at government expense. The first was made on the 12th of February, and asked for twentyfive; the affidavit made by the accused gave the names of the witnesses and the substance of what was expected to be proven by them. The court allowed fifteen. Of the ten witnesses disallowed, two were government witnesses, and were already summoned; seven were the wives of witnesses whom the court ordered summoned, the affidavit stating that the husband and wife were relied on to prove the same fact; the other witness disallowed, the affidavit disclosed, was also relied on simply to corroborate the testimony of some of the witnesses who were allowed. The second request was made on the 16th of February, asking for six witnesses, all of whom were ordered to be summoned. The third request was made on the 19th of February for two additional witnesses, one Harris and wife.