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Opinion of the Court.
moted by the Secretary of the Navy from seamen of inferior grades, who have enlisted for not less than two years, and that they are distinguished from other petty officers only in the fact that their pay is fixed by statute instead of by the President. From this it would seem to follow that, although their pay is fixed by law, instead of by the President, they are in other respects entitled to the emoluments of petty officers, among which are rations.
The exception of mates from § 1569 merely indicates that Congress, having already fixed their pay, such pay need not be fixed by the President. But they are still within the exception of "petty officers, seamen, and ordinary seamen attached to receiving ships," who are inferentially allowed a ration by § 1579. The exception of mates from other petty officers in § 1569 indicates that they are petty officers, and the exception of petty officers, from those who are not entitled to rations under § 1579, indicates that as such they are entitled to a ration.
We think there is no authority for saying that they are temporarily appointed to the duties of a warrant officer. While the words "acting master's mates," sometimes employed prior to the Revised Statutes, might indicate, by the use of the word "acting," a person temporarily appointed to the duties of a master's mate, officers who are recognized by law, and whose pay is fixed by a permanent statute, cannot be said to be temporarily appointed. The argument that a "warrant" is defined to be "an instrument conferring authority upon persons, inferior to a commission," and that mates must therefore be warrant officers, because they are appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, proves too much; since all petty officers hold by some sort of designation from a superior authority, and if a warrant be an instrument inferior to a commission, this would make all petty officers warrant officers. On the other hand, as, by § 1405, warrant officers are appointed by the President, it would seem to follow that, if they held their appointments from an inferior authority, they were not to be considered as warrant officers. There is also an implication to the same effect from the act of August
160 598 L-ed 551
1, 1894, c. 176, 28 Stat. 212, raising the pay of mates, and providing that "the law regulating the retirement of warrant officers in the Navy shall be construed to apply to the twentyeight officers now serving as mates." This provision would be quite unnecessary if, under the general provisions of law, they fell within the designation of warrant officers.
After some hesitation and apparent confusion of opinion on the part of the Navy Department, this was the construction of the Revised Statutes finally settled upon by the Navy Regulations of 1893, Art. 28, and we think it is correct. The only difficulty in the case seems to have arisen from certain acts prior to the Revised Statutes, notably the act of 1813, which dealt with warranted "master's mates," under which mates continued to be classified by the Navy Department as warrant officers, until the Revised Statutes were adopted. The judgment of the Court of Claims is, therefore,
L-ed 551 80f 851
UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK.
NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 45, 136. Argued October 17, 18, 1895. Decided January 6, 1896.
Any claim made against an Executive Department, "involving disputed facts or controverted questions of law, where the amount in controversy exceeds three thousand dollars, or where the decision will affect a class of cases, or furnish a precedent for the future action of any Executive Department in the adjustment of a class of cases, without regard to the amount involved in the particular case, or where any authority, right, privilege or exemption is claimed or denied under the Constitution of the United States," may be transmitted to the Court of Claims by the head of such Department under Rev. Stat., § 1063, for final adjudication; provided, such claim be not barred by limitation, and be one of which, by reason of its subject-matter and character, that court could take judicial cognizance at the voluntary suit of the claimant.
Any claim embraced by Rev. Stat., § 1063, without regard to its amount, and
Counsel for the State of New York.
whether the claimant consents or not, may be transmitted under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 116, to the Court of Claims by the head of the Executive Department in which it is pending, for a report to such Department of facts and conclusions of law for 66 its guidance and action." Any claim embraced by that section may, in the discretion of the Executive Department in which it is pending, and with the expressed consent of the plaintiff, be transmitted to the Court of Claims, under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, without regard to the amount involved, for a report, merely advisory in its character, of facts or conclusions of law. In every case, involving a claim of money, transmitted by the head of an Executive Department to the Court of Claims under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 116, a final judgment or decree may be rendered when it appears to the satisfaction of the court, upon the facts established, that the case is one of which the court, at the time such claim was filed in the Department, could have taken jurisdiction, at the voluntary suit of the claimant, for purposes of final adjudication.
Whether the words "or matter" in the second section of that act embrace
any matters, except those involving the payment of money, and of which the Court of Claims under the statutes regulating its jurisdiction could, at the voluntary suit of the claimant, take cognizance for purposes of final judgment or decree, is not considered.
As the claim of the State of New York, the subject of controversy in this case, was presented to the Treasury Department before it was barred by limitation, its transmission by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Court of Claims for adjudication was only a continuation of the original proceeding commenced in that Department in 1862; and the delay by the Department in disposing of the matter before the expiration of six years after the cause of action accrued, could not impair the rights of the State.
The $91,320.84 paid by the State of New York for interest upon its bonds issued in 1861 to defray the expenses to be incurred in raising troops for the national defence was a principal sum which the United States agreed to pay, and not interest within the meaning of the rule prohibiting the allowance of interest accruing upon claims against the United States prior to the rendition of judgment thereon.
The claim of the State of New York for money paid on account of interest to the commissioners of the Canal Fund, is not one against the United States for interest as such, but is a claim for costs, charges and expenses properly incurred and paid by the State in aid of the general government, and is embraced by the act of Congress declaring that the States would be indemnified by the general government for money so expended.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. David B. Hill for the State of New York. Mr. T.
Opinion of the Court.
E. Hancock, Attorney General of the State of New York, Iwas on his brief.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitney for the United States. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Dodge was on the brief.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 3d day of January, 1889, the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted to the Court of Claims all the papers and vouchers relating to a claim of the State of New York against the United States, then pending in the Treasury Department, for interest paid on money borrowed and expended in enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, and equipping troops for the suppression of the rebellion of 1861. That claim, the Secretary certified, involved controverted questions of law, and exceeded three thousand dollars in amount. The communication accompanying the papers stated that the case was transmitted to the Court of Claims under and by authority of section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, to be there proceeded in according to law.
In further prosecution of this claim, the State promptly filed its petition in the court below and asked judgment against the United States for the sum of $131,188.02 with interest from the first day of July, 1862, together with such other relief as would be in conformity with law.
This claim was based on the act of Congress of July 27, 1861, c. 21, providing that "the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay to the Governor of any State, or to his duly authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by such State for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers to be filed and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury." 12 Stat. 276.
By a joint resolution of Congress, approved March 8, 1862,
Opinion of the Court.
it was declared that the above act should be construed "to apply to expenses incurred as well after as before the date. of the approval thereof." 12 Stat. 615.
Before July 4, 1861, the State of New York-pursuant to a statute passed by its legislature April 15, 1861, c. 277-enlisted, enrolled, armed, equipped, and caused to be mustered into the military service of the United States for the period of two years or during the war thirty thousand troops to be employed in suppressing the rebellion. That statute provided that all expenditures for arms, supplies or equipments necessary for such forces should be made under the direction of the Governor and other named officers, and that the moneys therefor should, on the certificate of the Governor, be drawn from the treasury on the warrant of the comptroller in favor of such person or persons as from time to time were designated by the Governor; and the sum of $3,000,000, or so much thereof as was necessary, was appropriated out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated to defray the expenses authorized by that act, or any other expenses of mustering the militia of the State or any part thereof into the service of the United States. That act also imposed, for the fiscal year commencing on the 1st day of October, 1861, a state tax to meet the expenses authorized, not to exceed two mills on each dollar of the valuation of real and personal property in the State. Laws of N. Y. 84th Session, 1861, page 634.
There was no money in the treasury of the State in 1861 that had not been specifically appropriated for the expenses of the state government; none that could have been used to defray the expenses of enlisting, enrolling, arming, equipping, and mustering troops into the service of the United States.
Under the laws of the State the moneys authorized to be raised by the act of April 15, 1861, did not reach the state treasury and were not available for use until the months of April and May, 1862.
The total state tax rate fixed at the session of the legislature beginning on the first Tuesday in January, 1861, was 3 mills, of which 1 mills was the amount authorized by the above