Opinion of the Court. to amount was imposed in respect of suits at common law where the United States were plaintiffs. Then came the act of 1875 which prescribed the limit of $500, exclusive of costs, for all civil suits, at common law or in equity, of the several classes therein specified, including suits in which the United States were plaintiffs or petitioners. It is to be observed that the section of that act which defines the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts places the jurisdictional amount in advance of the enumeration, in the same section, of the different cases of which those courts could take cognizance, and there is no repetition, in that section, of such amount. In each of those cases the amount named was jurisdictional under the act of 1875. In the particulars last mentioned, the act of 1887, as corrected in 1888, is unlike any previous statute. The jurisdic tional amount, prescribed by the first section of that act, is fixed at $2000, and that amount is afterwards, in the same section, twice referred to by the words "the sum or value aforesaid." If Congress intended that the Circuit Court should not have original cognizance of any case mentioned in the first section of the act of 1887, unless the value of the matter in dispute exceeded $2000, it would not have taken pains to refer to the value of the matter in dispute in immediate connection with particular cases, and made no such distinct reference in connection with other cases placed within the original cognizance of the Circuit Court. It is clear that a Circuit Court cannot, under that statute, take original cognizance of a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or of a controversy between citizens of different States, or of a controversy between citizens of a State, and foreign States, citizens or subjects, unless the sum in dispute, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $2000, because in immediate connection with the enumeration of each of such cases will be found expressed a limitation of that character in respect of the sum or value necessary to give jurisdiction. But that cannot be said of the reference in the statute to a controversy in which the United States are plaintiffs or VOL. CLX-32 Opinion of the Court. petitioners, or to one between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States. The clause referring to cases or controversies of the two kinds last mentioned was placed between clauses that specifically refer to the value of the matter in dispute; so that it may be reasonably inferred that Congress intended a Circuit Court should take cognizance of a controversy in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or of a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, without regard to the amount involved. This interpretation of the statute is made quite clear if the first section is subdivided as was the section of the Revised Statutes defining the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. With a slight transposition or change of words, having due regard to substance, the first section of the act of 1888, if subdivided, would read as follows: The Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity— First. Where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2000, and the suit is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. Second. Of any controversy in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners. Third. Of any controversy between citizens of different States, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid. Fourth. Of any controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States. Fifth. Of any controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid. The United States being plaintiffs in this action, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction without regard to the value of the matter in dispute. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. L-ed 510 ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 160 499 DISTRICT OF MARYLAND. No. 91. Submitted December 3, 1895. Decided January 6, 1896. 160 679 162 291 164 111 160 499 L-ed 510 165 74 167 745 L-ed 510 761 134 If a defendant, among other defences, in various forms, and upon several 165 361 A petition for the condemnation of land for a light-house, filed by the The only trial by jury required in proceedings in a court of the United THIS was a petition, filed March 21, 1890, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, for the condemnation, under the act of Congress of August 1, 1888, c. 728,1 of a perpetual easement in a strip of fast land 1 An act to authorize condemnation of land for sites of public buildings and for other purposes. SEC. 1. In every case in which the Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer of the government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to pro 160 499 L-ed 510 176 676 160 499 L-ed 510 89f 434 160 499 L-ed 510 97 f 524 179 600 160 499 L-ed 510 f183 143 Statement of the Case. on Hawkins Point in Anne Arundel County in the State of Maryland - described by metes and bounds and courses and distances, and as owned by Thomas C. Chappell — for the purpose of transmitting rays of lights, without obstruction, both by day and by night, between two beacon lights, known as Hawkins Point Light and Leading Point Light, theretofore constructed and put in operation by the United States as range lights of the Brewerton channel of the Patapsco River in the State of Maryland. The petition was in the name of "William Windom, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and ex officio president of the Light-house Board of the United States;" and alleged that under the provisions of section 4658 of the Revised Statutes of the United States the Light-house Board is required to perform all administrative duties relating to the construction, illumination, inspection and superintendence of light-houses, light-vessels, beacons, buoys, and sea-marks and their appendages; that Congress appropriates annually a sum of money for repairs and incidental expenses of light-houses, which is available to pay for the easement aforesaid; and that in the opinion of the petitioner it was necessary and advantageous to the United States to acquire this easement by condemnation under judicial proceedings. The petition was signed by the United States District Attorney, "who cure real estate for the erection of a public building, or for other public uses, he shall be, and hereby is, authorized to acquire the same for the United States by condemnation under judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the government to do so; and the United States Circuit or District Courts of the district wherein such real estate is located shall have jurisdiction of proceedings for such condemnation; and it shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the United States, upon every application of the Secretary of the Treasury under this act, or such other officer, to cause proceedings to be commenced for condemnation, within thirty days from the receipt of the application at the Department of Justice. SEC. 2. The practice, pleadings, forms and modes of proceeding, in causes arising under the provisions of this act, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such Circuit or District Courts are held, any rule of the court to the contrary notwithstanding. 25 Stat. 357. Statement of the Case. appears for the Secretary of the Treasury, the petitioner, by direction of the Attorney General of the United States." Upon the filing of the petition, the court made an order that a copy be served on Chappell on or before March 24, 1890, and that he show cause on or before April 10, 1890, why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. On April 9, 1890, Chappell, "saving and reserving all advantages and exceptions whatsoever, prays leave to except to the order" aforesaid; and demurred to the petition, and for cause of demurrer assigned "that there is no authority of law for this proceeding; and also that it is not shown that the Congress of the United States has appropriated or will appropriate more than five thousand dollars to pay for said easement, and that said easement is of a value greatly exceeding five thousand dollars, and whether Congress annually or has ever appropriated a sum of money for repairs and incidental expenses of the light-house, sufficient to pay for said easement, which is applicable therefor; and also that there is no party plaintiff made in said declaration and petition; and also that the laws of the State of Maryland require said proceeding, if the right to any such has accrued, to be conducted in the circuit court for the county where said land is situated, and by the laws of the United States the said laws of the State form the rule of decision in the courts of the United States in this matter; and also that the United States of America has passed no general law or special law, authorizing the petitioner or the Attorney General of the said United States, nor any other person whatsoever, to institute this proceeding, and said proceeding is instituted ultra vires, and the said United States cannot be made a party to said suit except by the direction and with the consent of the law-making power, and said power has neither directed the same nor consented thereto." On May 12, 1890, after argument on the demurrer, the court, by an order reciting that it appeared that the Secretary of the Treasury, and ex officio president of the Light-house Board of the United States, had been authorized to acquire this easement for the use of the board, and was of opinion that |